People v. Broadie

• Decision Date: 18 June 1975
• Citation: 371 N.Y.S.2d 471,37 N.Y.2d 100,332 N.E.2d 338
• Parties: , 332 N.E.2d 338 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Imogene BROADIE, Appellant. The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Mildred JAMES, Appellant. The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Larry C. MOSELY, Appellant. The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Doris McNAIR, Appellant. The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Roberta FOWLER, Appellant. The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Theodore PAUL, Appellant. The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Arthur Lee VENABLE, Appellant. The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Rolando MONTANE, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 471

371 N.Y.S.2d 471

37 N.Y.2d 100, 332 N.E.2d 338

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Imogene BROADIE, Appellant.

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Mildred JAMES, Appellant.

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Larry C. MOSELY, Appellant.

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Doris McNAIR, Appellant.

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Roberta FOWLER, Appellant.

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Theodore PAUL, Appellant.

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Arthur Lee VENABLE, Appellant.

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Rolando MONTANE, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

June 18, 1975.

Joseph Heller, New York City, for appellant in the first above-entitled action.

Nicholas Ferraro, Dist. Atty. (Jenny M. Maiolo, Kew Gardens, of counsel), for respondent in the first above-entitled action.

Abraham Hecht, Bayside, for appellant in the second above-entitled action.

Nicholas Ferraro, Dist. Atty. (Jenny M. Maiolo, Kew Gardens, of counsel), for respondent in the second above-entitled action.

Peter L. Yellin, Public Defender (Charles Steinman, Robert S. Beer and Leslie A. Bradshaw, Rochester, of counsel), for appellants in the third and fourth above-entitled actions.

Jack B. Lazarus, Dist. Atty. (Melvin Bressler, Rochester, of counsel), for respondent in the third and fourth above-entitled actions.

Daniel R. Santola, Delmar, and Martin Brickman, Albany, for appellant in the fifth above-entitled action.

Sol Greenberg, Dist. Atty. (Peter L. Rupert, Albany, of counsel), for respondent in the fifth above-entitled action.

Michael G. Breslin, Albany, for appellant in the sixth above-entitled action. Mark C. Morril, New York City, Daniel G. Moriarty, Albany, Elizabeth B. DuBois, Margaret K. Brooks, New York City, and Risa G. Dickstein, for appellant in the seventh above-entitled action.

Sol Greenberg, Dist. Atty. (Peter L. Rupert, Albany, of counsel), for respondent in the sixth above-entitled action.

Sol Greenberg, Dist. Atty. (Peter L. Rupert, Albany, of counsel), for respondent in the seventh above-entitled action.

Edward Gasthalter, New York City, for appellant in the eighth above-entitled action.

Robert M. Morgenthau, Dist. Atty. (T. James Bryan and Peter Zimroth, New York City, of counsel), for respondent in the eighth above-entitled action.

Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen. (Peter J. Dooley, Ruth Kessler Toch, Albany, Samuel Hirshowitz and David R. Spiegel, New York City, of counsel), in his statutory capacity under section 71 of the Executive Law.

BREITEL, Chief Judge.

Eight defendants, convicted of drug offenses, in separate appeals challenge the constitutionality of statutes classifying the crimes for which they were convicted as class A felonies, the highest rank of crime in this State (Penal Law, Consol.Laws, c. 40, §§ 220.40, 220.39, 220.18). They also challenge the applicable sentencing provisions imposing a mandatory maximum sentence of life imprisonment and minimums from one or six years to eight and one-third years (Penal Law, § 70.00, subd. 2, par. (a); subd. 3, par. (a), cls. (ii), (iii); for a compilation and analysis of the drug statutes see, generally, Rosenblatt, New York's New Drug Laws and Sentencing Statutes). In each case, the Appellate Division sustained the statutes as constitutional.

Six defendants were convicted of one or two felonious 'street' sales of heroin or cocaine. Two, however, were convicted of more serious offenses, sale of one-eighth ounce or more of cocaine, and possession of one ounce or more of heroin.

The principal issue is whether the so-called 'drug' laws, in mandating life imprisonment and, therefore, lifetime parole on parole release, prescribe sentences so disproportionate as would constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of constitutional limitations (N.Y.Const., art. I, § 5; U.S.Const., 8th Amdt.). Of course, defendants in these cases are not being punished for their status as addicts but for the offenses they have committed, however impelled by their 'drug dependency', if that were the cause of their criminal acts (cf. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758; People v. Davis, 33 N.Y.2d 221, 226, 351 N.Y.S.2d 663, 666, 306 N.E.2d There should be an affirmance. The sentences are not grossly disproportionate in constitutional analysis. The Legislature may distinguish among the ills of society which require a criminal sanction, and prescribe, as it reasonably views them, punishments appropriate to each. Thus, while the courts possess the power to strike down punishments as violative of constitutional limitations, the power must be exercised with especial restraint. However disproportionality is measured, the instant sentences do not rise to the gross disproportionality violative of constitutional limitations. The constitutional equal protection (N.Y.Const., art. I, § 11; U.S.Const., 14th Amdt.) arguments of appellants are not separately discussed because the same reasoning which supports the concededly and intendedly severe sentences, especially with regard to deterrence, would sustain, if valid, a reasonable classification between defendants in drug cases and in other cases.

787, 789, cert. den. 416 U.S. 973, 94 S.Ct. 1999, 40 L.Ed.2d 562). In a deterministic sense, all criminals commit the crimes they do because they 'must'.

The cruel and unusual punishments clause is a flexible one with a long historical development (see Appendix attached to this opinion). Although the intent of the framers was to proscribe barbaric, torturous punishments, the clause has come to mean much more. Prohibited also are punishments grossly disproportionate to the crime. In considering punishments the maximums must be examined, whether they be for long or lifetime imprisonment or for long or lifetime parole (see Matter of Lynch, 8 Cal.3d 410, 419, 105 Cal.Rptr. 217, 503 P.2d 921).

No punishment in this State has ever been struck down as unconstitutionally disproportionate to its crime. Courts of this State have nevertheless recognized the principle of gross disproportionality (see People v. Davis, 33 N.Y.2d 221, 226, 351 N.Y.S.2d 663, 666, 306 N.E.2d 787, 789, Supra; Matter of Bayard, 25 Hun. 546, 549). Elsewhere, even in the United States Supreme Court, this principle has been considered applicable, and, in some instances, has been used to overturn statutory punishments (see Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 30 S.Ct. 544, 54 L.Ed. 793; Hart v. Coiner, 4 Cir., 483 F.2d 136, cert. den. 415 U.S. 983, 94 S.Ct. 1577, 39 L.Ed.2d 881; Ralph v. Warden, 4 Cir., 438 F.2d 786, cert. den. 408 U.S. 942, 92 S.Ct. 2846, 33 L.Ed.2d 766; Matter of Foss, 10 Cal.3d 910, 112 Cal.Rptr. 649, 519 P.2d 1073; Matter of Lynch, 8 Cal.3d 410, 423, n. 13, 105 Cal.Rptr. 217, 503 P.2d 921, Supra, and cases cited; People v. Lorentzen, 387 Mich. 167, 194 N.W.2d 827). Given the flexibility of the cruel and unusual punishment clause, and the persuasive, if not circular, logic of the assertion that grossly disproportionate punishments are 'cruel and unusual', the applicability of the principle is here accepted.

Apart from a subjective evaluation which looks to the extent to which the conscience of the court is shocked by punishments imposed, there have developed standards to determine whether punishments are constitutionally disproportionate. Because such a subjective test has obvious weaknesses in trying to apply a rational analysis, although often used by such of the courts which have applied or discussed the cruel and unusual punishments clause, there will be no discussion of it (see, e.g., Wilkinson v. Skinner, 34 N.Y.2d 53, 59--60, 356 N.Y.S.2d 15, 312 N.E.2d 158; Matter of Lynch, 8 Cal.3d 410, 424, 105 Cal.Rptr. 217, 503 P.2d 921, Supra; but cf., e.g., Matter of Pell v. Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, 34 N.Y.2d 222, 233--235, 356 N.Y.S.2d 833, 841, 313 N.E.2d 321, 326; Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 175--176, 72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183 (Black, J., concurring)).

The gravity of the offense is obviously key, as is the gravity of the danger which the offender poses to society. Given grave offenses committed or committable by dangerous offenders, the penological purposes of the sentencing statutes, whether they be the rehabilitation or isolation of offenders or the deterrence of potential offenders, will be decisive (see Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 365, 30 S.Ct. 544, 54 L.Ed. 793, Supra; O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 337--341, 12 S.Ct. 693, 36 L.Ed. 450 (dissenting opn); Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136, 141, cert. den. 415 U.S. 983, 94 S.Ct. 1577, 39 L.Ed.2d 881, Supra; Matter of Foss, 10 Cal.3d 910, 919--920, 112 Cal.Rptr. 649, 519 P.2d 1073; Supra; Matter of Lynch, 8 Cal.3d 410, 425, 105 Cal.Rptr. 217, 503 P.2d 921, Supra; Faulkner v. State, 445 P.2d 815, 818--819 (Alaska)).

In considering these factors, it will be useful, and will follow precedential doctrine, to compare the challenged punishments with those prescribed in the same jurisdiction for other offenses and also with punishments for the same or similar offenses prescribed in other jurisdictions (see, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 377, 380--381, 30 S.Ct. 544, 54 L.Ed. 793, Supra; Hart v. Coiner, 4 Cir., 483 F.2d 136, 141--142, cert. den. 415 U.S. 983, 94 S.Ct. 1577, 39 L.Ed.2d 881, Supra; Ralph v. Warden, 4 Cir., 438 F.2d 786, 791--792, cert. den. 408 U.S. 942, 92 S.Ct. 2846, 33 L.Ed.2d 766, Supra; Matter of Lynch, 8 Cal.3d 410, 426--428, 105 Cal.Rptr. 217, 503 P.2d 921, Supra; People v. Lorentzen, 387 Mich. 167, 177--179, 194 N.W.2d 827, Supra).

In assessing the gravity of a criminal offense, the primary consideration is the harm it causes to society. The Legislature, in making this assessment, could properly view criminal narcotics sales not as a series of isolated...