Wilkinson v. Skinner

• Decision Date: 02 May 1974
• Citation: 34 N.Y.2d 53,356 N.Y.S.2d 15,312 N.E.2d 158
• Parties: , 312 N.E.2d 158 Gregory WILKINSON, Appellant, v. Albert SKINNER et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 15

356 N.Y.S.2d 15

34 N.Y.2d 53, 312 N.E.2d 158

Gregory WILKINSON, Appellant, v. Albert SKINNER et al., Respondents.

Court of Appeals of New York.

May 2, 1974.

Herman Schwartz, Amherst, David C. Leven, Rochester, and Edward I. Koren, Amherst, for appellant.

Joseph C. Pilato, William J. Stevens and Michael K. Consedine, Rochester, for respondents.

WACHTLER, Judge.

While confined in a county jail, ¹ appellant was placed in punitive segregation for a period of approximately five days. He brought this action, seeking monetary damages and injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging, Inter alia, that this segregated confinement, without a hearing, was violative of his constitutional rights.

A close reading of appellant's papers discloses that the gravamen of his complaint is that he had the right to a full hearing, with all of the traditional trial safeguards, that he was denied such a hearing, and that his confinement amounted to cruel and unusual punishment.

The legal weakness and sparsity of facts presented to the court in the pleadings and affidavits of both parties were so infirm as to virtually invite summary judgment. However, before granting this relief, a court must search the record to determine if any facts are alleged which do state a cause of action. In so doing 'any other form of evidence, documentary and otherwise, may also be used' (Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Consol.Laws of N.Y., Book 7B, CPLR 3212.15, p. 436).

In his complaint, appellant asserts that 'The placing of plaintiff in a solitary confinement cell was done intentionally, and maliciously * * * thus entitling Plaintiff to compensatory and punitive damages'. This allegation does not state a cause of action for intentionally and maliciously punishing appellant without legitimate reason. However, in a supporting affidavit executed in connection with a motion for a preliminary injunction appellant stated: 'I believe that I did not violate any rule or regulation of the Monroe County Jail or commit any violation of the law prior to being placed in the solitary confinement cell'.

In his affidavit, the respondent Sheriff implicitly asserts that appellant somehow violated the discipline of the jail, but he fails to state in what manner this was done. ² The Sheriff contends that: 'Your deponent has a constitutional right to place prisoners in solitary confinement if a prisoner violates the good discipline and order of the jail.' To the extent that the foregoing statement can be interpreted as asserting a right of detention officials to mete out discipline or withhold privileges without having to give a reason therefore, it is as overblown and untenable as the assertion by appellant of his rights.

In the Second Circuit case dealing with the right of prisoners to bring civil suits (Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, cert. den. 404 U.S. 1049, 92 S.Ct. 719, 30 L.Ed.2d 740), the defendants (i.e., prison officials) were careful to spell out the offenses allegedly committed by the inmate which underlay the discipline, including specific breaches of the rules spelled out in the Prisoner's Handbook (pp. 183--184). The inmate appellant prevailed on that issue because the fact finder concluded that the discipline was meted out for illegitimate reasons rather than for the reasons alleged by the prison officials (p. 184).

If detention officials did not have to give reasons for their actions in punishing or withholding privileges from an inmate, they could in effect, act in an unconstitutional manner safely screened from court or administrative review. (See, e.g., Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 84 S.Ct. 1733, 12 L.Ed.2d 1030; Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 88 S.Ct. 994, 19 L.Ed.2d 1212.)

Since we can construe the Sheriff's affidavit to aver that he acted in a legitimate manner, 'to maintain the discipline and order of the jail', that question of fact will have to be resolved at trial by the fact finder.

Appellant's main complaint appears to be that he was denied a hearing before being sent to the isolation cell. He asserts he had a constitutional right: to notice; to present witnesses; to testify on his own behalf; to cross-examine witnesses; to be represented by counsel, or counsel substitute; to an impartial hearing examiner; and to a decision based on the evidence. Both parties concede that appellant had been afforded none of these alleged rights.

Appellant's asserted constitutional right to the panoply of protections cannot be sustained by current case law on the facts of this case. However, respondents' apparent assertion that appellant is not entitled to any due process safeguards is equally without merit.

The trial court recognized the minimal due process requirements spelled out in the Sostre case (supra) but felt the case at bar was distinguishable in that here there was no 'substantial' (Sostre, p. 202 of 442 F.2d) discipline involved. The punitive segregation imposed in this case lasted for only five days as opposed to the punishment in Sostre which lasted for over one year. However, the punishment here is nevertheless substantial in juxtaposition to the broad range of minor punishments that could be and are meted out short of punitive segregation.

We do not wish nor intend to make due process safeguards turn on whether a court chooses to define a particular punishment as 'substantial' or not. Suffice it to say, that the punishment meted out in this case must carry with it at least the minimal safeguards afforded by the due process of law. Confining someone in a segregation cell is not a minor punishment. Equally important, an inmate's prison record may have a great effect on the future punishment he will receive and may even affect his chances for parole. (See Hudson v. Hardy, 137 U.S.App.D.C. 366, 424 F.2d 854, 856.)

The requirements of due process are not static; they vary with the elements of the ambience in which they arise. (See, e.g. Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287.) In Sostre the court held that there the plaintiff had the right to know the charges and evidence against him and to explain his action (442 F.2d, at p. 198). Whatever the intended scope of Sostre, the Minimum (id.) due process requirements spelled out are sound. They help guard against the possibility of an inmate being sent to punitive segregation for illegitimate reasons. They also provide a record of at least the substance of the charges and denials for reviewing bodies to study should the detention official's actions be questioned or the inmate's past record become pertinent. To require detention officials to write out the charges against a prisoner does not seem to impose too heavy a burden; nor is it an undue burden to allow the prisoner to defend himself against those charges. The fact finder need not be from outside the detention facility however he should be someone who is not likely to prefer charges against prisoners as part of the normal course of his duties. ³ (Accord In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 99 L.Ed. 942). The hearing should be simple, quick, and should take place as soon as practicable.

In any event, on the fact pattern alleged in this case, appellant was entitled to a rudimentary administrative hearing at least. Although the rights he claimed may have been greatly overexaggerated, a cause of action does lie for the denial of the rudimentary rights spelled out in this decision.

Appellant asserts correctly in his complaint, that he has the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. That such cruel and unusual punishment can occur within the four walls of a prison cannot be gainsaid. (See, e.g., Church v. Hegstrom, 2 Cir., 416 F.2d 449, 451.) It is also now evident that the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution is binding on the States. (See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758.) Nevertheless, even taking appellant's assertions as true, we hold that he did not state a cause of action for the abridgement of his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.

Punitive segregation is utilized in every State in the Nation. (See President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice: Task Force Report: Corrections (1967), pp. 50, 51.) Merely confining an inmate in a segregated cell does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. There are, of course, some cells that are so subhuman as to constitute such punishment even for a very brief confinement. (See, e.g., Wright v. McMann, 2 Cir., 387 F.2d 519; Hancock v. Avery, D.C., 301 F.Supp. 786; Holt v. Sarver, D.C. 300 F.Supp. 825; Jordan v. Fitzharris, D.C., 257 F.Supp. 674.) One day in some cells might be constitutionally intolerable (see Sostre, 442 F.2d, at p. 193, n. 2). Short of a situation such as existed in Wright (supra) the determination of when a punishment becomes cruel and unusual involves a balancing process.

In Sostre, the inmate was kept in punitive segregation for over one year but the confinement conditions, although 'severe' (Sostre, 442 F.2d, at p. 192) were not so intolerable as to shock the conscience (see Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172, 72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183). In the case at bar, the time spent in confinement was considerably shorter than in Sostre, but the conditions of confinement were worse. In Sostre, the inmate was not kept from contacting fellow inmates; he had a normal sized cell, all legal materials were available; and he could exercise (Sostre, p. 186). Appellant in this case allegedly was not allowed to converse with other inmates and the cell appeared to be more uncomfortable than in Sostre: 'The ventilation is very poor and the only good source of air is through a feeding slot located in the door. The trap door remained closed during the time that the Plaintiff was in solitary confinement. Lighting in the...