People v. Brooks

• Decision Date: 15 February 1980
• Docket Number: Cr. 21000
• Citation: 605 P.2d 1306,162 Cal.Rptr. 177,26 Cal.3d 471
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 605 P.2d 1306 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Darrell Edward BROOKS, Defendant and Respondent.

Page 177

162 Cal.Rptr. 177

26 Cal.3d 471, 605 P.2d 1306

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Darrell Edward BROOKS, Defendant and Respondent.

Cr. 21000.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

Feb. 15, 1980.

John K. Van de Kamp, Dist. Atty., Harry B. Sondheim and Eugene D. Tavris, Deputy Dist. Attys., for plaintiff and appellant.

Michael Korn, Sherman Oaks, and Allan Baum, Beverly Hills, for defendant and respondent.

Wilbur F. Littlefield, Public Defender, Los Angeles, Dennis A. Fischer and Stephen F. Moeller, Deputy Public Defenders, as amici curiae on behalf of defendant and respondent.

MOSK, Justice.

The People appeal from an order dismissing the case against defendant Darrell Edward Brooks. The dismissal was based on an order granting defendant's pretrial motion to suppress evidence (Pen.Code, § 1538.5), ¹ which motion the People now contend the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain. We are called upon to decide whether, after reversal on appeal of a pretrial order of suppression, the court has jurisdiction to entertain a new or renewed motion to suppress based on grounds raised in the initial motion but which the court declined to reach.

I

The procedural history of the case is germane to this appeal. Defendant was charged in a three-count information with murder ( § 187), assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury upon a peace officer ( § 245, subd. (b)), and the possession for sale of a controlled substance, phencyclidine (Health & Saf.Code, § 11378, subd. (a)).

Following his arraignment, defendant pleaded not guilty and made a pretrial suppression motion on the ground of illegal search and seizure. ( § 1538.5.) The minute order setting the motion for hearing referred to motions "to traverse the search warrant" and "to declare entry invalid." At oral argument on the motion, however, the evidence presented and issues considered by the court pertained only to defendant's claims that the reliability of the informant was not adequately established and that the affidavit in support of the search warrant contained misstatements. Sustaining both defense claims, the court granted the motion on the ground of invalidity of the search warrant and suppressed the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant. When the People announced their inability to proceed, the court dismissed on its own motion. ( § 1385.) The People appealed from the dismissal ( § 1238, subd. (a)(7)), and the Court of Appeal reversed in an unpublished opinion.

Defendant then filed a motion to suppress on the ground that the officers who executed the search warrant failed to comply with knock-notice requirements of section 1531. The People did not object to this motion and, following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found there had been neither literal nor substantial compliance with section 1531 and again suppressed the evidence. As at the first hearing, the People announced their inability to proceed. Defendant asked for dismissal pursuant to section 1385, and the court granted the motion. It is from this dismissal that the People now appeal. ²

The People contend the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain defendant's second motion. They assert that during the first hearing defendant had full opportunity to litigate the lawfulness of the search and seizure and was thereafter precluded from seeking a second hearing to present an additional ground for suppression. As will appear, however, we conclude to the contrary. During the first hearing defendant lacked opportunity for a full determination of the merits of his motion as originally made and noticed. Accordingly, the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain defendant's renewed motion for the purpose of affording him the full hearing to which he was initially entitled. And since the People do not complain of error in the court's ruling on the merits of the motion, we shall therefore affirm the judgment.

II

Section 1538.5 provides a comprehensive and exclusive procedure for the final determination of search and seizure issues prior to trial. Its enactment was chiefly aimed at redressing defects identified in the previously existing procedures: (i) the unnecessary expenditure of time and effort in allowing repeated challenges to the legality of a search or seizure during the course of a criminal proceeding; (ii) the waste of jury time in permitting search and seizure questions to be raised during trial, since the determination of these issues takes place outside the presence of the jury; and (iii) the lack of adequate opportunity for the prosecution to obtain appellate review of an adverse decision on a search and seizure question before trial commences and jeopardy attaches. (22 Assem.Interim Com.Rep. (1965-1967) No. 12, Search and Seizure, pp. 13-16, 2 Appen. to Assem.J. (1967 Reg.Sess.) (hereafter cited as Assembly Report); see People v. Belleci (1979) 24 Cal.3d 879, 884, 157 Cal.Rptr. 503, 598 P.2d 473, and cases cited.)

In accordance with these objectives, section 1538.5 requires that a defendant's motion for the return of property or suppression of evidence obtained as a result of a search or seizure be made at an early stage. In the case of a felony offense initiated by complaint, the motion may be made at the preliminary hearing before the magistrate. (Subd. (f).) Additionally, if the defendant is held to answer at the preliminary hearing or the felony is charged by indictment, the defendant is entitled to renew or make the motion in superior court at a special de novo hearing. (Subd. (i).) ³ Thus the defendant is entitled to two suppression hearings, both of which must take place prior to trial. The defendant is not entitled to renew his pretrial motion to suppress at trial and, subject to a narrowly circumscribed exception (subd. (h)), he is not permitted to raise search and seizure issues for the first time at trial.

The People rely on Madril v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 73, 123 Cal.Rptr. 465, 539 P.2d 33, for the proposition that a defendant is limited to a single section 1538.5 pretrial hearing in the superior court. We held in Madril that "determination of a 1538.5 motion at a special hearing in the superior court whether in the defendant's or in the People's favor deprives that court of jurisdiction to reconsider the matter unless the People, pursuant to subdivision (j), seek to reopen the matter At trial upon a showing of good cause." (Id. at pp. 77-78, 123 Cal.Rptr. at p. 467, 539 P.2d at p. 35.) The Madril holding would appear at first blush to support the People's contention that the trial court was without jurisdiction to entertain defendant's second motion. Equally enticing is the following statement, quoted with approval in Madril : " 'Under (section 1538.5) a defendant is entitled to make only one pretrial motion to suppress evidence in the superior court . . . . He is not entitled to a second hearing on the motion prior to trial.' " (Id. at p. 77, 123 Cal.Rptr. at p. 467, 539 P.2d at p. 35, quoting People v. Superior Court (Green) (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 477, 481, 89 Cal.Rptr. 223.)

The People's reliance on Madril and Green, however, is wholly misplaced. The codefendants in Green moved to suppress evidence under section 1538.5. At the hearing on the motion both defendants were represented by the same attorney; although the judge presiding over the hearing rendered a detailed explanation of the problem of a potential conflict of interests, both defendants consented to the single representation. Following denial of the motion, the defendants retained new and separate counsel and moved to renew their motion to suppress. The motion was granted over the People's objection and a second hearing was held before a different judge. The renewed motion was "submitted on the transcript of the testimony taken at the first hearing supplemented by additional testimony of Agent Feldman which was substantially the same as that given by him at the first hearing." (10 Cal.App.3d at p. 479, 89 Cal.Rptr. at p. 224.) The motion was granted and the People sought mandamus, contending the trial court lacked jurisdiction to conduct a second hearing on the motion before trial. In holding the defendants were not entitled to a renewal of their section 1538.5 motion, the court determined that "defendants had a Full hearing at which extensive testimony was taken . . . and that the second hearing was directed to the Same motion on the Same grounds, raising the Same issues and submitted on the Same evidence." (Ibid.; italics added.) Observing that a defendant's exclusive means of obtaining review before trial of an adverse ruling on a pretrial motion to suppress is to file for writ of mandate or prohibition ( § 1538.5, subd. (i)), the court found nothing in the statute to indicate review by way of a rehearing was permissible. ⁴ It was particularly concerned that to permit such a rehearing would result in the same search and seizure issue being raised in "repeated and endless hearings." (Id. at p. 480, 89 Cal.Rptr. 223.)

The applicability of the Green reasoning to Madril is plain on the facts of the latter case. There the respondent court initially granted the defendant's section 1538.5 motion to suppress. One week after the court granted the motion, the People moved for a reopening and reconsideration of the motion on the ground that additional evidence had been omitted from the first hearing "through haste and inadvertence" and needed to be brought to the court's attention. (15 Cal.3d at pp. 74-75, 123 Cal.Rptr. 465, 539 P.2d 33.) The court granted the People's motion and held a second hearing, at which time it vacated its first order and denied the motion to suppress. The defendant's petition for writ of mandate presented the question whether the trial court had jurisdiction to reconsider the section 1538.5 motion prior to trial. In concluding it did not, we repeated an earlier observation that to permit relitigation of search and...