People v. Brown
| Decision Date | 06 August 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. S218993.,S218993. |
| Citation | 190 Cal.Rptr.3d 583,61 Cal.4th 968,353 P.3d 305 |
| Court | California Supreme Court |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Shauntrel Ray BROWN, Defendant and Appellant. |
Henry C. Coker, Public Defender, Randy Mize, Chief Deputy Public Defender, Emily Rose–Weber and Robert L. Ford, Deputy Public Defenders, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Steven T. Oetting, Deputy State Solicitor General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Doris A. Calandra, Melissa Mandel and Donald W. Ostertag, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A deputy sheriff investigating an emergency call of a fight in progress pulled his patrol car behind defendant Brown's parked vehicle and activated the emergency lights. Approaching the car, he saw Brown sitting behind the wheel, apparently intoxicated. We conclude Brown was detained when the emergency lights were activated. A reasonable person under the circumstances would not have felt free to leave and Brown submitted to the show of authority by remaining in his parked car. We further conclude that Brown's brief detention was supported by reasonable suspicion. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeal's judgment.
About 10:37 p.m. on a Sunday night, the San Diego County Sheriff's Department received an emergency call on its 911 line. The caller confirmed his address with the dispatcher and reported some people were fighting in an alley behind his home on Georgia Street in Imperial Beach. He could hear screaming and one person said, “the gun was loaded.” The following colloquy ensued:
“911: And it sounds physical?
“[Caller]: Yes.”
The caller estimated that more than four people were involved, and said the participants lived two houses down from him on the same block. The dispatcher sent an officer to the scene and stayed on the line with the caller. The dispatcher asked the caller to report any other mention of a weapon and asked if anyone had gotten into a car. The caller said there was a car in the alley, facing south toward Fern Avenue. He then relayed that he knew a squad car had arrived because he heard the siren and saw the lights. When the caller confirmed the officer was on the scene, the call ended. It had lasted approximately four minutes.
A dispatcher told Deputy Sheriff Geasland that four suspects were fighting in the alley behind the caller's residence on Georgia Street between Coronado and Fern Avenues, and that “somebody may have said ‘something about a loaded gun.’ ” Geasland was on the scene within three minutes. As he drove north in the alley from Fern towards Coronado, he saw a car coming towards him and away from the fight location. Geasland yelled to the driver, Brown, Brown did not respond and kept driving. Geasland continued down the alley but saw no one.
Geasland suspected Brown might have been involved in the fight because he had come from that location and had failed to acknowledge the deputy's question. He was also concerned about the report of a weapon and the possibility that Brown may have been injured. He turned around and drove in the direction Brown had taken.
Geasland found Brown's car parked on Georgia Street, a few houses down from the house behind which the fight had occurred. He pulled behind Brown's car and activated the overhead emergency lights on his patrol car. (See discussion, post, 190 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 591–592, 353 P.3d at pp. 312–313.) He approached and spoke with Brown, who was in the driver's seat. Brown identified himself and produced his driver's license. He appeared upset and flustered. He was mumbling and had watery, bloodshot eyes. Geasland could smell alcohol coming from the car. He asked if Brown had been drinking and whether he had been involved in the fight. Brown admitted both. A traffic deputy arrived and conducted further investigation for driving under the influence (DUI).
Charged with felony DUI, Brown moved to suppress evidence of his physical condition, statements, and breath test results as the fruits of an unlawful detention. (Pen.Code, § 1538.5.) The trial court denied the motion, concluding Brown had not been detained until the deputy saw signs of intoxication. At that point, the deputy had a reasonable suspicion that Brown had been driving under the influence.
Brown pleaded guilty to driving with a blood-alcohol concentration (BAC) over .08 percent (Veh.Code, § 23152, subd. (b) ) and admitted a BAC exceeding .15 percent (id. § 23578). He also admitted suffering three prior DUI convictions (id. §§ 23550, subd. (a), 23626), and was sentenced to two years in county jail (Pen.Code, § 1170, subd. (h) ).
The Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction, holding that “when a vehicle is already stopped, without police action, merely activating emergency lights on a police vehicle, without more, does not constitute a seizure within the Fourth Amendment.” Alternatively, the court held that, if a detention did occur, it was supported by reasonable suspicion.
An officer may approach a person in a public place and ask if the person is willing to answer questions. If the person voluntarily answers, those responses, and the officer's observations, are admissible in a criminal prosecution. (Florida v. Bostick (1991) 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (Bostick ); Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 U.S. 491, 497, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (Royer ) (plur. opn. of White, J.).) Such consensual encounters present no constitutional concerns and do not require justification. (Bostick, at p. 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382.) However, “when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen,” the officer effects a seizure of that person, which must be justified under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 19, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, fn. 16 (Terry ); accord, Bostick, at p. 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382.) In situations involving a show of authority, a person is seized “if ‘in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave,’ ” or “ ‘otherwise terminate the encounter,’ ” (Brendlin v. California (2007) 551 U.S. 249, 254–255, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (Brendlin )), and if the person actually submits to the show of authority (id. at p. 254, 127 S.Ct. 2400 ).
The critical question here is when Brown's detention occurred. If the encounter with Geasland was consensual, it required no justification. When Geasland then saw obvious signs of intoxication, a detention to investigate drunk driving was warranted. But if Geasland effected a detention when he turned on the emergency lights, he was required to “point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that [Brown] may be involved in criminal activity.” (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 231, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 885 P.2d 982 (Souza ); accord, United States v. Cortez (1981) 449 U.S. 411, 417–418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (Cortez ); Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at pp. 17, 20–21, 88 S.Ct. 1868.)
In reviewing the trial court's suppression ruling, we defer to its factual findings if supported by substantial evidence. We independently assess the legal question of whether the challenged search or seizure satisfies the Fourth Amendment. (People v. Leyba (1981) 29 Cal.3d 591, 596–597, 174 Cal.Rptr. 867, 629 P.2d 961.)
Here we consider two questions. One, when an officer approaches a motorist in a parked car, what differentiates between a consensual encounter and a detention? Two, what is required to demonstrate submission to a show of authority?
In People v. Bailey (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 402, 222 Cal.Rptr. 235 (Bailey ) an officer stopped behind the defendant's parked car and activated his emergency lights. (Id. at p. 404, 222 Cal.Rptr. 235.) Applying the test from United States v. Mendenhall (1980) 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (Mendenhall ), the court concluded a detention had occurred because (Bailey, at pp. 405–406, 222 Cal.Rptr. 235.)1
The Court of Appeal here faulted Bailey for overlooking a critical point. Relying on California v. Hodari D. (1991) 499 U.S. 621, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (Hodari D. ), it held that ” The court reasoned: “[P]olice will give chase, but mere demands, or even pursuit, are not seizures until the citizen accepts the command, either direct or implied, or when the police succeed in restraining that person.” Applying Hodari D., the appellate court upheld the trial court's finding “that Brown was not stopped by police nor was he detained by the deputy until after the deputy approached the car and immediately observed clear indications of intoxication.”
Bailey provides the more persuasive authority. Hodari D. is distinguishable and inaptly applied here. In Hodari D., a group of...
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