People v. Brown

Decision Date29 November 2016
Docket NumberNo. 327734,No. 327736,No. 327814,327734,327736,327814
PartiesPEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LORENZO LAMONT BROWN, Defendant-Appellant. PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TERI BERNARD JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant. PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WADDELL POOLE BURNEY, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

UNPUBLISHED

Wayne Circuit Court

LC No. 14-011033-01-FC

Wayne Circuit Court

LC No. 15-00469-01-FC

Wayne Circuit Court

LC No. 14-011033-02-FC

Before: WILDER, P.J., and CAVANAGH and SERVITTO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendants Lorenzo Brown, Teri Johnson, and Waddell Burney were tried jointly, before a single jury. The jury convicted defendant Brown of assault with intent to commit murder, MCL 750.83; carrying a weapon with unlawful intent, MCL 750.226; felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f; and possession of a firearm during commission of a felony, second offense ("felony-firearm"), MCL 750.227b. The jury convicted defendant Johnson of one count each of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, MCL 750.84; carrying a weapon with unlawful intent; felon in possession of a firearm; and felony-firearm, second offense. It convicted Burney of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder; carrying a weapon with unlawful intent; and felony-firearm, first offense. The trial court sentenced Brown as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to concurrent prison terms of 500 to 749 months for the assault with intent to commit murder conviction, and 5 to 10 years each for the carrying a weapon with unlawful intent and felon-in-possession convictions, to be served consecutive to a five-year term of imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction. The court sentenced Johnson as a fourth-offense habitual offender to concurrent prison terms of 150 to 300 months for the assault with intent to do great bodily harm conviction, 5 to 10 years each for the carrying a weapon with unlawful intent conviction, and the felon in possession conviction, to be served consecutive to a five-year term of imprisonment for the felony-firearm, second offense, conviction.1 Finally, the court sentenced Burney to concurrent prison terms of 6 to 10 years for the assault conviction and 10 to 60 months for the carrying a weapon with unlawful intent conviction, to be served consecutive to a two-year term of imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction. All three defendants appeal as of right. In each case, while retaining jurisdiction, we remand for further findings of fact and supplementation of the record regarding the trial court's mid-trial closure of the courtroom. We shall hold Brown's sentencing issues in abeyance pending the proceedings on remand. We reject defendants' remaining claims of error and affirm on those issues as stated below.

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Defendants' convictions arise from the nonfatal shooting of Jamil Dismuke outside the Sam D Liquor Store in Detroit. On the night of November 22, 2014, Dismuke was walking toward the door of the store. His brother, Demond Davis, was outside the store, and their uncle, Richard Davis, was inside the store. A witness, Ashlee Kennedy, was also outside the store. Witnesses heard a barrage of gunshots, one of which struck Dismuke in the leg, causing him to fall in the store parking lot. After Richard pulled Demond inside the store, one of the defendants, allegedly Lorenzo Brown, came across the street, stood over Dismuke, and shot him in the head at close range. Richard and Demond observed this shooting on a security camera monitor inside the store. Dismuke recovered from the shooting, but sustained some degree of mental impairment.

The prosecution's theory at trial was that all three defendants were involved in firing gunshots at Dismuke, and that it was defendant Brown who shot Dismuke in the head. Kennedyinitially told the police that she did not know the identities of the shooters, but she later testified pursuant to an investigative subpoena that she knew the shooters by their nicknames. She identified Brown as the person who shot Dismuke in the head. At trial, Richard testified that he saw the three defendants at the corner outside the store before the shooting started. He did not know who shot Dismuke in the head. Demond identified the defendants as the persons being at the scene. He identified Brown as the person who shot Dismuke in the head based on his observations of the shooter's clothing on the store security video. Dismuke identified Brown as the person who shot him in the head, and identified Johnson and Burney as the other individuals who shot at him.

Defendants were tried jointly before a single jury. Before trial, the trial court denied Burney's motion for a separate trial. The primary factual issue at trial was the credibility of Kennedy, Richard Davis, and Demond Davis. The prosecutor introduced the video footage from the store surveillance cameras, but the officer who obtained a copy of the video footage from the store inadvertently failed to capture approximately one minute of feed from one of the cameras. This was the camera that would have recorded the point-blank shooting of Dismuke. The jury convicted all three defendants of the weapons charges. In addition, it convicted Brown of assault with intent to commit murder, but convicted Burney and Johnson of the lesser offense of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder.

II. PUBLIC TRIAL (DOCKET NOS. 327734, 327736, 327814)

During trial, Demond Davis became emotional during cross-examination by Burney's counsel and left the witness stand without permission. Demond informed the trial court that he felt intimidated by defendants' supporters among the courtroom spectators. He also mentioned that he was fearful because persons he believed were associated with defendants were parking outside his house, calling him, and following him. After Demond resumed testifying, Burney's counsel stated for the record that courtroom deputies had removed spectators, including Burney's mother, from the courtroom. All three defendants later moved for a mistrial, arguing that their right to a public trial had been violated. The trial court denied the motion, stating that it had exercised its discretion to remove spectators "because two very threatened witnesses testified, and one was indeed the victim of the crime."

All three defendants argue that the trial court violated their right to a public trial by removing spectators from the courtroom.2 "Whether the circuit court violated [a] defendant's right to a public trial presents a question of constitutional law," which we review de novo. People v Vaughn, 491 Mich 642, 649-650; 821 NW2d 288 (2012).

The right to a public trial is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, § 20 of the Michigan Constitution. Vaughn, 491 Mich at 650. Denial of a public trial is a structural error, that is, a defect "that affect[s] the framework of the trial, infect[s] the truth-gathering process and deprive[s] the trial of constitutional protections withoutwhich a trial cannot reliably serve as a vehicle for determining guilt or innocence." People v Watkins, 247 Mich App 14, 26-27; 634 NW2d 370 (2001). In People v Kline, 197 Mich App 165, 169; 494 NW2d 756 (1992), this Court quoted four requirements for total closure of a trial, as set forth in Waller v Georgia, 467 US 39, 48; 104 S Ct 2210; 81 L Ed 2d 31 (1984):

(1) The party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, (2) the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, (3) the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and (4) it must make findings adequate to support the closure.

The Court in Kline noted that Waller "addressed total closure of a suppression hearing, and does not necessarily govern partial closures." Kline, 197 Mich App at 169-170. The Kline Court stated, "Because the effect of a partial closure does not reach the level of total closure, only a substantial, rather than a compelling, reason for the closure is necessary." Id. at 170. However, the Court applied these four requirements to its review of the trial court's decision to close the courtroom to all persons not related to the complainant, but within the context of a substantial reason for partial closure rather than a compelling reason for total closure. Id. at 171. This Court remarked that "[t]he age of an alleged victim, the nature of an alleged offense, and the potential for harm to the victim are appropriate factors to consider in weighing an accused's right to a public trial against the government's interest in protecting a victim from undue harm." Id. This Court then stated:

In this case, the court undoubtedly considered these factors, as well as complainant's mental capacity and subsequent treatment at the trauma center, in deciding to partially close the courtroom. However, the court failed to make findings on the record in support of its order as required by the United States Supreme Court. Although we recognize that a defendant is not required to show prejudice to obtain relief for a violation of the right to a public trial, United States v Galloway, 937 F2d 542, 546 (C.A. 10, 1991), we do not think that the failure to make findings at the time of the partial closure requires reversal. In these circumstances, where the closure order appears to be narrowly drawn, we do not think that failure to state the findings on the record in and of itself, requires a new trial. The lack of findings prevents us from determining whether the defendant's right to a public trial was outweighed by the interest asserted by the government in protecting the complaining witness. To grant defendant a new trial under these circumstances without making that determination would not be in the public interest. Cf. Waller, supra (failure to
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