People v. Bryant

• Decision Date: 10 July 1979
• Citation: 418 N.Y.S.2d 621,71 A.D.2d 564
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. David BRYANT, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 621

418 N.Y.S.2d 621

71 A.D.2d 564

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. David BRYANT, Defendant-Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

July 10, 1979.

D. H. Fromm, New York City, for respondent.

L. R. Friedman, New York City, for defendant-appellant.

Before MURPHY, P. J., and SULLIVAN, MARKEWICH, LUPIANO and SILVERMAN, JJ.

MEMORANDUM DECISION.

Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County, rendered October 25, 1976, affirmed. To the extent that the facts are set forth in the dissent, they are fairly stated and need not be repeated here. This is not to say that we accept the conclusions drawn by our dissenting brother, particularly to the effect that defendant's attendance at the police station was not willing on his part and that his eventual confession was coerced by means of involuntary police detention.

At the very beginning, a "straw man" ("The police conceded that had Bryant sought to leave during the questioning, he would not have been permitted to do so.") should be identified and eliminated. There is not the slightest indication in the evidence that this attitude on the part of the police was ever conveyed to defendant. We do not have any indication at all that defendant had any idea that he was not free to leave at any time. His presence at the station house was completely voluntary; he said so himself: "I put on the clothes and went to the police station willingly." Again: "When I went to the police station, I went willingly, not knowing of such a crime, not knowing that any crime had happened but I went willingly . . ." He spoke to the police voluntarily: "I told him (a policeman) I didn't commit such a crime so I'm willing to speak." The fact that his first statements concerning involvement in the crime were a mixture of admission and disclaimer bears not at all on the voluntary nature of his participation in the investigation. His mother, testifying in a manner that may be fairly characterized as non-committal, capable of different interpretations, said nothing capable of being construed as an indication of involuntariness on defendant's part.

There is an implication that there was something sinister and coercive in what the police did in checking out each of the statements made by defendant concerning his activities on the critical evening. Taxed by the police with having told untruths, defendant blithely uttered another falsehood which did not stand up under investigation. In this connection, consideration of a footnote in the dissent takes us along an interesting path:

"Bryant did not testify at the suppression hearing. He did testify at trial, however, and stated that he went to the precinct voluntarily. This was not evidence before the suppression court, but more importantly would have been the only plausible trial posture. Had he testified that he went to the police station against his will, a natural conclusion for the jury to draw would be that his refusal to accompany the police meant that he had something to hide."

It is to be observed that defendant did not participate personally in the suppression hearing. Nor, although he had every opportunity to litigate, both at the hearing and at trial, the question of his mental capacity and whether his participation and statements were voluntary, this was not done. All of this is explained by the quoted footnote it may be said, as sheer speculation as a matter of trial tactics, repudiated entirely on this appeal. It is not any more speculative to consider that the jury might have concluded that defendant faced the police interrogation as a challenge of his ability to talk his way out of the difficulty, and that this was obvious to the jury. And his fate, i. e., that he ended by entangling himself by demonstrable and demonstrated lies is quite often the fate of most "smart alecs." The complete and utter failure of his lying statements, and the necessity for their investigation were brought about by defendant's own choice and not the result of a plot initiated by the police. Indeed, this appears to have been the prime cause of the length of time that defendant spent at the police station.

Defendant is not to be heard to argue for the first time on this appeal that his appearance at the station house was other than voluntary. This is more than a matter of a finding from conflicting evidence; this was a flat and unequivocal admission in his own words by a party to this action, and not subject to speculation at this juncture.

There was not probable cause for arrest at the beginning of interrogation, but defendant, his ploy having failed, and faced with the knowledge that the police had located a witness who had seen him following the victim, whom he had denied knowing, made a full inculpatory statement. At that point, it became proper for the first time to place him under formal arrest. Dunaway v. New York, --- U.S. ----, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979), is cited, in our view, inappropriately for the proposition that this defendant's interrogation was improper. Obviously, such a conclusion must rest on a finding that it was custodial. We hold it was not.

All concur except MURPHY, P. J., and SULLIVAN, J., who dissent in a memorandum by SULLIVAN, J., as follows:

About 1:50 a. m. on March 29, 1975, the body of 8 year-old Karen Smith was found on the rooftop landing of 1285 Washington Avenue, a building in a New York City Housing Authority complex in the Bronx. The victim had been stabbed several times and appeared to have been sexually assaulted.

At about 3:30 a. m., Detective Chapman of the Housing Authority Police Department arrived at the scene. He spoke with Officer Clark, a Housing Police Officer, who told him that he had "caught" Daniel Bryant, an 18 year old neighborhood youth, on the same roof landing on other occasions. Clark also told Chapman that Bryant had been previously seen with young girls.

Later that morning, at about 8:30 a. m., Chapman, accompanied by Sergeant D'Amico and Detective Nucci of the Housing Authority, went to Bryant's apartment. Bryant appeared at the door in his underwear. Chapman, displaying his shield and identifying himself, stated that he was investigating the death of a child at 1285 Washington Avenue. The officers were admitted into the apartment, and Chapman told Bryant the dead girl's name. He responded that he did not know the girl but had heard of the homicide. The officers then asked Bryant if he would accompany them to the South Bronx Housing Precinct. He said that he would, but that he first had to get dressed.

Before the officers left the apartment, the Miranda warnings were read to Bryant. He was not asked, however, whether he understood them. Nor in reading Bryant his rights did the officers wait for his responses.

Arriving at the precinct at about 9:05 a. m., Bryant was taken before the desk officer, who was told that Bryant was a "suspect" in a homicide case. Chapman asked the desk officer for an arrest form so that he could read Bryant the Miranda warnings. On this reading of his rights Bryant was asked whether he understood the warnings and responded affirmatively.

The foregoing facts were established from the testimony of Detective Chapman at the suppression hearing. When Chapman testified for the second time, at trial, he stated that Officer Clark had told him that he had caught Bryant on the roof with young girls. But at the suppression hearing Chapman testified only that Clark caught Bryant on the roof, and that he had previously been seen with young girls. Under either version, however, the scant details furnished by Clark hardly suffice to establish probable cause for Bryant's arrest. This was conceded by the People at the Huntley hearing. The suppression court, however, found that Bryant accompanied the officers to the precinct voluntarily and, in reliance upon People v. Morales, 52 A.D.2d 818, 383 N.Y.S.2d 608, aff'd 42 N.Y.2d 129, 397 N.Y.S.2d 587, 366 N.E.2d 248), held also that Bryant's detention was justified on the basis of reasonable suspicion.

It is now firmly established that the station house detention and questioning, such as took place here, if not voluntary, cannot be based on less than probable cause, and that custodial interrogation cannot be equated with perfunctory on-the-scene questioning:

(D)etention for custodial interrogation regardless of its label intrudes so severely on interests protected by the Fourth Amendment as necessarily to trigger the traditional safeguards against illegal arrest. We accordingly hold that the Rochester police violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments when, without probable cause, they seized petitioner and transported him to the police station for interrogation. (Dunaway v. New York, --- U.S. ----, ----, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 2258, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979).)

The questioning...