People v. Austin
| Decision Date | 31 March 1981 |
| Citation | 108 Misc.2d 829,438 N.Y.S.2d 908 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Langston AUSTIN a/k/a Sweetpea, and John Lawson, Defendant. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court |
Robert M. Morgenthau, Dist. Atty., New York County, by James Fogel, New York City, for the People.
Chester L. Mirsky, Washington Square Legal Services, Inc., New York City, for defendant John Lawson.
Benjamin Levitt, New York City, for defendant Langston Austin.
The principal issues presented on this application to suppress statements made by the defendant, John Lawson, at a time when he claims to have been in custody are: (1) what circumstances, in this case, must be considered in determining whether Lawson was in custody, and (2) in particular, what is the effect on that determination of the circumstance that Lawson was required by his employer, a governmental agency, to submit to interrogation.
The conclusion is compelled, as a matter of fact, based on all the applicable circumstances, that Lawson was in custody when he was interrogated. Also, I hold as a matter of fact and law that he invoked his right to counsel.
An indictment has been filed against the defendant accusing him of the Class B felony of robbery in the first degree. The charge is that on January 3, 1980, John Lawson forcibly stole money and subway tokens from the New York City Transit Authority.
John Lawson was a New York City subway token clerk. Lawson, while on duty with another token clerk, William McCarten, was robbed by a black male with a gun.
Transit Authority detectives, as a result of an investigation they conducted, concluded that Langston Austin was the robber. They also concluded that Lawson had conspired with Austin to effect the robbery, so that the robbery was sham so far as Lawson was concerned.
The detectives conferred with an assistant district attorney. A determination was made to arrest Lawson. However, arrangements were made to conduct a lineup in which Lawson, and other token clerks, would be asked to view Austin and stand-ins. Also, arrangements were made to have Lawson interrogated after the lineup and before his arrest.
Detective Clair contacted Lawson's supervisor to arrange his availability (during Lawson's working hours) for the lineup. On July 15, 1980, at about 10 P.M., Detectives Clair and Gonzales went to the token booth where Lawson was then working. Lawson's supervisor was at the booth. Clair introduced himself and told Lawson that they would like him to view a lineup concerning the robbery. Lawson agreed.
Clair testified that Transit Authority rules required Lawson's cooperation during his working hours. He also testified that he would have arrested Lawson on the spot, if he had refused to accompany them.
Clair and Gonzales took turns in remaining near the token booth for about thirty minutes while Lawson's supervisor arranged for another clerk to take over Lawson's duties. They then took Lawson in their department auto to Transit Authority headquarters at 370 Jay Street, Brooklyn, where they had him wait, with a group of other token clerks, for the lineup. Clair did not recall any police guard supervising the group. Accordingly, if Lawson had decided to leave, he would have been able to do so.
The lineup consisted of five stand-ins, and Austin. The stand-ins had been solicited from the streets of Brooklyn. When Lawson viewed the lineup, he said that he recognized Austin, whom he called by his nickname, "Sweetpea," from the streets. However, he said that Austin was not involved in the robbery. He said he recognized the stand-ins from the streets, but did not know their names.
Lawson rejoined the other token clerks after the viewing. About twenty minutes later, he was brought into an interrogation room, where he sat at a table with an assistant district attorney, Detective Clair and another detective. A third detective videotaped the interrogation. However, because of some unknown technical audio problem, the first ten minutes of the conversation were not recorded. Nonetheless, it is clear that Miranda warnings were administered by the assistant district attorney. Lawson then advised the assistant district attorney that he was willing to talk with him without counsel. Lawson was not advised that he was the target of the investigation or that he was about to be arrested.
When the audio problem was corrected, and the conversation recorded, the assistant district attorney indicated that Lawson's current statement contradicted an earlier statement he had given. Lawson responded to the effect that "If you're going to do these changes, I'll call my lawyer." He continued talking for a moment. The assistant district attorney then continued the interrogation, continuing to focus on contradictions. About fifteen minutes later, Lawson said, "I have to get my lawyer on this." The interrogation continued for an additional eight minutes, when Lawson said that he wanted counsel. Interrogation then stopped and Lawson was formally arrested.
I make the following conclusions of law:
Lawson contends that his statements made at the lineup must be suppressed because they were the product of custodial interrogation before receiving Miranda warnings. He also urges that his statements made during his interrogation must be suppressed because, although questioned after Miranda warnings, his request for counsel was not respected. The People argue that Lawson was not in custody at the lineup or during the interrogation. They also contend that even if he were in custody during the interrogation, his right to counsel was respected.
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602 at 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the Supreme Court said that: "By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." The Supreme Court later declared, clarifying the scope of its decision in Miranda, that the "Miranda warnings" are not required in all police interrogations which occur in a coercive environment but only those in which a person is actually in custody, or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any meaningful way. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 at 495, 97 S.Ct. 711 at 713, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977). Accordingly, our first inquiry is whether Lawson was in custody at the lineup or at the interrogation.
As just noted, Miranda warnings must be given, not only to one who is physically restrained or formally arrested, but to one who has been deprived of his freedom in a significant way.
In Miranda, the Court explained the nature and setting of custodial interrogation, as reflected in police training manuals, of isolating an individual in an unfamiliar police dominated atmosphere in which a statement may be induced by fear or other psychological motivation not necessarily consistent with a truthful fact finding process. In People v. Rodney P., 21 N.Y.2d 1, at 9, 286 N.Y.S.2d 225, 233 N.E.2d 255 (1967), our Court of Appeals approvingly quoted the following language of a California decision.
To effectuate the purposes of the Miranda rule, the Court of Appeals adopted, as the test of whether custody has occurred, whether "the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way or is led to believe, as a reasonable person, that he is so deprived." People v. Rodney P., supra, at 9, 286 N.Y.S.2d 225, 233 N.E.2d 255. In People v. Yukl, 25 N.Y.2d 585, at 589, 307 N.Y.S.2d 857, 256 N.E.2d 172 (1969) the Court declared,
The application of this test requires the making of a finding of fact. People v. Yukl, supra, at 588, 307 N.Y.S.2d 857, 256 N.E.2d 172. A conclusion as to whether the accused was in custody or not, may not, at least in the unexceptional case, be reached as a matter of law. People v. Palumbo, 49 N.Y.2d 928, 428 N.Y.S.2d 620, 406 N.E.2d 437 (1980). The issue, presented
recurrently, is often troublesome because no one factor is determinative. Rather, all of the circumstances of the case should be brought to bear on the issue. An entire spectrum of facts have been considered as relevant in this fact-finding task: some, in context, tending towards a finding of custody; others, in context, tending towards a finding that the suspect was not in custody.
For example, the place where the questioning occurs is a factor to be considered. The Miranda court stated that: "General on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process is not affected by our holding." 384 U.S. 436, 477, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1613-14, 16 L.Ed.2d 694.
In one case, an individual was interrogated by the police, who did not have guns drawn, on the street in the familiar surroundings in front of his home....
To continue reading
Request your trial