People v. Buckley

Decision Date05 June 1942
Docket NumberNo. 78.,78.
Citation4 N.W.2d 448,302 Mich. 12
PartiesPEOPLE v. BUCKLEY.
CourtMichigan Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Charles Buckley was convicted of failure to assist an injured person and failure to identify himself after an automobile accident, and he appeals.

Affirmed.Appeal from Recorder's Court for City of Detroit, Mark D. Taylor, judge.

Before the Entire Bench.

George F. Curran, of Detroit, for appellant.

Herbert J. Rushton, Atty. Gen., Edmund E. Shepherd, Sol. Gen., and William E. Dowling, Pros. Atty., Wayne County, Richard E. Lamb, Asst. Pros. Atty., and Henrietta E. Rosenthal, Asst. Pros. Atty., all of Detroit, for the People.

STARR, Justice.

Defendant appeals from conviction and sentence for the crime of failure to assist an injured person and failure to identify himself after an automobile accident as required by Act No. 161, Pub.Acts 1937, as amended by Act No. 318, Pub.Acts 1939 (Comp.Laws Supp.1940, § 4722, Stat.Ann.1941 Cum.Supp. § 9.1590), which provides, in part: (c) The driver of any vehicle involved in any accident resulting in injury or death to any person shall also [after stopping] give his name, address, and the registration number of his vehicle, also the name and address of the owner, and exhibit his operator's or chauffeur's license to the person struck or the driver or occupants of any vehicle collided with and shall render to any person injured in such accident reasonable assistance including the carrying of such person to a physician or surgeon for medical or surgical treatment if it is apparent that such treatment is necessary or is requested by the injured person, and any person violating this provision shall upon conviction be punished as provided in section 56 of this act.’

Defendant attacks the sufficiency of the information filed against him in the ‘recorder's court, traffic and ordinance division,’ of the city of Detroit. We quote the material part of such information, the words italicized having been omitted through error:

‘That Charles Buckley late of the city of Detroit, in said county, heretofore, towit, on January 12, 1941, at the said city of Detroit, in the county aforesaid being then and there the driver of a motor vehicle which motor vehicle was then and there involved in an accident at W. Vernor highway and Ferdinand street in the said city of Detroit and which accident did then and there result in injury to one Albert Beauchene, did then and there knowingly and wilfully fail and neglect to render to the said Alfred Beauchene, injured in said accident, reasonable assistance including the carrying of such person to a physician or surgeon for medical and surgical treatment, it being apparent that such treatment was necessary; and did then and there fail and neglect to give his name, address and the registration number of his vehicle or the name and address of the owner thereof: contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the People of the State of Michigan. * * *

‘Note-See Sec. C, Act 161 P.A.1937.’

This case is submitted on an agreed statement of facts which states, in part:

‘The defendant was tried (in recorder's court, traffic and ordinance division) before a jury commencing on April 23, and the trial concluded on April 24, 1941. He was sentenced to the State prison for a term of not less than one year nor more than five years, without recommendation. The testimony briefly showed, on the part of the People, Charles Buckley was driving in a westerly direction on Vernor highway in the city of Detroit; and that as he passed the intersection of Ferdinand and Vernor the body of a man, later identified as Albert Beaucham, was seen falling close to where Mr. Buckley's car was driven. No one saw the actual impact. Mr. Buckley and three witnesses produced by the State, who were in the car of Mr. Buckley's, testified that his car did not hit anyone at that place and time. However one of the People's witnesses who was driving in an easterly direction on Vernor highway testified that he stopped his car and Mr. Buckley stopped his, and as Mr. Buckley got out of the car he made the statement to the People's witness, ‘Did I hurt you, Buddy?’ and the People's witness replied, ‘No, the man you hurt is laying back there in the road.’ Defendant then left the scene of the accident and was seen approximately two hours later at his home where he was taken into custody by the officers. A man lay unconscious in the road and was carried to the curb and sent to the hospital unconscious. He was identified as Albert Beauchene. Albert Becauchene was not produced as a witness; medical testimony was produced to show that he could not be in court for approximately a month. The defendant, Charles Buckley, gave as his reason for stopping at this time and place curiosity to see what the accident consisted of. * * *

‘No questions were raised at the trial concerning the jurisdiction of he trial judge to hear this case, and concerning the sufficiency of the information. These questions were first raised in the motion for new trial.’

Defendant's motion for new trial was denied, and having obtained leave, he appeals.

The recorder's court of the city of Detroit is a municipal court. The record contains an order showing that Judge Taylor (circuit judge of the first judicial circuit of Michigan) presided at defendant's trial in the recorder's court, traffic and ordinance division, and such order also shows defendant's conviction and sentence of one to five years. Although the record does not expressly so indicate, we understand that Judge Taylor had been assigned by the presiding circuit judge of the State to the recorder's court, traffic and ordinance division, in pursuance of 3 Comp.Laws 1929, § 13763 (Stat.Ann. § 27.292), which provides: ‘The presiding circuit judge shall have full directory power over the matter of apportioning the work of the several circuits among the circuit judges of the state. Upon the request of the governor he shall designate one (1) or more judges to hold court in the various circuit courts and recorder's courts of this state whenever necessary to relieve congested conditions in said courts.’

Defendant contends that the trial judge (Taylor) did nto have authority to conduct the trial of the present case in the recorder's court, traffic and ordinance division, of the city of Detroit.

In November, 1939, in pursuance of the provisions of 3 Comp.Laws 1929, § 16524, as amended by Act No. 227, Pub.Acts 1931, and Act No. 24, Pub.Acts 1933, Comp.Laws Supp.1940, § 16524, Stat.Ann. § 27.3947, the voters of the city of Detroit by referendum adopted 3 Comp.Laws 1929, § 16535, as amended by Act No. 227, Pub.Acts 1931, Comp.Laws Supp.1940, § 16535, Stat.Ann. § 27.3958, which provides: Sec. 18. The judges of the municipal court-traffic and ordinance division hereinbefore constituted shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all prosecutions and proceedings in behalf of the people of this state for all crimes, felonies, misdemeanors and offenses committed within the corporate limits of any municipality adopting this act and arising under the Michigan motor vehicle law and all other state laws relating to traffic on the public highways of this state, including the crime of negligent homicide and the crimes of manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter committed in the operation of any motor vehicle. * * * Each judge of said court shall have equal and coordinate powers and duties with respect to the business of said court. One judge shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of said business. Said judges shall have the power and duty to apportion the business of said court between themselves. In the event of their failure so to do, the deputy clerk of said municipal court-traffic and ordinance division, hereinafter provided for, shall have the duty and power to distribute the work of said court between the judges thereof, assigning thereto the cases ready for trial. Except as herein specified, all constitutional, statutory and charter provisions relating to the duties and powers of the municipal court and the judges thereof shall apply to the municipal court-traffic and ordinance division and the judges thereof, with respect to the business of said court. Said judges shall not participate in the organization or operation of the other division of the municipal court or branches thereof; and shall have no other jurisdiction than that provided herein. Upon the filing by the deputy clerk of the municipal court, traffic and ordinance division, with the chief clerk of the municipal court of his certificate of the absence or disability of all of the judges of the said municipal court, traffic and ordinance division, the presiding judge of the municipal court may assign one or more judges of the municipal court to duty in the said municipal court, traffic and ordinance division, during the period of the absence or disability of said judges of the municipal court, traffic and ordinance division; said judge or judges of the municipal court so assigned shall have and exercise all the jurisdiction and powers of a judge of the municipal court, traffic and ordinance division, during the period of their service in said municipal court, traffic and ordinance division.’

Defendant claims that the statutory provision above quoted provides the exclusive and only method of assigning judges to the recorder's (municipal) court, traffic and ordinance division, and that such statute in effect provides that only judges of the recorder's (municipal) court may be assigned to duty in the recorder's court, traffic and ordinance division. In other words, defendant contends that Judge Taylor, a circuit judge, could not be assigned by the presiding circuit judge to the recorder's court, traffic and ordinance division. Defendant's contention is based upon the premise that the above-quoted statute, adopted by the voters of Detroit in 1939, in effect repealed ...

To continue reading

Request your trial
36 cases
  • Citizens for Pre-Trial Justice v. Goldfarb
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • February 20, 1979
    ...a significant change in a long-standing statute (one of which it must be presumed the Legislature was well aware, People v. Buckley, 302 Mich. 12, 21, 4 N.W.2d 448 (1942), Lenawee County Gas & Electric Co. v. City of Adrian, 209 Mich. 52, 64, 176 N.W. 590 (1920)), must be regarded as "evide......
  • Smith v. Smith
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • November 8, 1989
    ...250 Mich 227 [229 N.W. 911 (1930) ]. See, also, Rathbun v State of Michigan, 284 Mich 521 [280 N.W. 35 (1938) ].' People v Buckley, 302 Mich 12, 22 [4 N.W.2d 448 (1942) ]. " 'This court has held that only, when 2 acts are so incompatible that both cannot stand, does a later act repeal a for......
  • Scholle v. Hare
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • July 18, 1962
    ...continuing to function thereunder will, until he is legally succeeded, be upheld as the acts of a de facto officer. See People v. Buckley, 302 Mich. 12, 4 N.W.2d 448; People v. Russell, 347 Mich. 193, 79 N.W.2d 603; Greyhound Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 360 Mich. 578, 104 N.W.2d 395......
  • Rockwell v. Board of Ed. of School Dist. of Crestwood
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • April 4, 1975
    ...v. Auditor General, 250 Mich. 227, 229 N.W. 911. See, also, Rathbun v. State of Michigan, 284 Mich. 521, 280 N.W. 35.' People v. Buckley, 302 Mich. 12(22), 4 N.W.2d 448. "This court has held that only, when 2 acts are so incompatible that both cannot stand, does a later act repeal a former.......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT