People v. Buehler

Decision Date25 July 2006
Docket NumberDocket No. 254298.
Citation271 Mich. App. 653,723 N.W.2d 578
PartiesPEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Nicholas James BUEHLER, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Ronald J. Frantz, Prosecuting Attorney, and Gregory J. Babbitt, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.

Law Office of John R. Moritz, P.C. (by John R. Moritz), Holland, for the defendant.

Before: HOEKSTRA, P.J., and ZAHRA and MURRAY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This case is before us on remand from our Supreme Court. In our prior opinion, we determined that the plain and unambiguous language of MCL 750.335a afforded a trial court discretion to impose alternative sentences of probation or imprisonment when sentencing a person convicted of indecent exposure as a sexually delinquent person.1 See People v. Buehler, 268 Mich.App. 475, 478-480, 710 N.W.2d 55 (2005), vacated 474 Mich. 1081, 711 N.W.2d 335 (2006). Thus, we affirmed defendant's sentence of three years' probation for his April 28, 2003, conviction of indecent exposure as a sexually delinquent person, MCL 750.335a and MCL 750.10a. However, because the trial court exercised the sentencing discretion afforded it by MCL 750.335a in favor of a sentence of probation, we declined to consider whether a court is bound, when sentencing such a defendant to a term of imprisonment, by the indeterminate term of imprisonment for one day to life expressly set forth in MCL 750.335a, or by the more recently enacted legislative sentencing guidelines. Id. at 478, 710 N.W.2d 55.

On remand, we have been directed to consider whether the trial court provided substantial and compelling reasons for imposing a sentence that it acknowledged was a departure from the sentencing guidelines. See People v. Buehler, 474 Mich. 1081, 711 N.W.2d 335 (2006). The Court has also directed that we consider "whether any term of imprisonment that may be imposed by the [trial] court is controlled by the legislative sentencing guidelines or by the indeterminate sentence prescribed by MCL 750.335a." Id. Having considered these questions, we conclude that the trial court's stated basis for imposing a probationary sentence does not equate to the substantial and compelling reason required for departing from a sentence imposed under the guidelines, and that any term of imprisonment imposed by the trial court would in fact be controlled by the more recently enacted legislative sentencing guidelines. Nonetheless, we again hold that because the version of MCL 750.335a in effect at the time defendant committed his offense afforded the trial court discretion to impose a sentence of probation, defendant's probationary sentence must be affirmed.

For offenses to which the legislative sentencing guidelines apply, a trial court must impose a sentence within the guidelines range unless the trial court states on the record a "substantial and compelling" reason for a departure from the guidelines. MCL 769.34(2), (3). To constitute a "substantial and compelling" reason for departing from the guidelines, a reason must be objective and verifiable, must irresistibly attract the attention of the court, and must be of considerable worth in deciding the length of the sentence. People v. Babcock, 469 Mich. 247, 257-258, 666 N.W.2d 231 (2003). An objective and verifiable reason is one that is "external to the minds of the judge, defendant, and others involved in making the decision, and [is] capable of being confirmed." People v. Abramski, 257 Mich. App. 71, 74, 665 N.W.2d 501 (2003).

Whether a particular factor is objective and verifiable is reviewed by this Court de novo, as a matter of law. Babcock, supra at 264-265, 666 N.W.2d 231. Upon such review, we find that the trial court's stated reasons for sentencing defendant to probation—that defendant was maintaining his sobriety and, in the court's opinion, possessed the ability to control his conduct when he was not drinking—are not objective and verifiable. Whether defendant possesses the ability to control his conduct when not drinking is a subjective determination not external to the minds of the judge, defendant, or others involved in the sentencing decision. Abramski, supra. The trial court's reasons for "departing" from the guidelines were, therefore, not substantial and compelling. Babcock, supra at 257, 666 N.W.2d 231.

Resolution of the question whether any term of imprisonment that may be imposed by the trial court is controlled by the legislative sentencing guidelines or by the indeterminate sentence prescribed by MCL 750.335a is a matter of statutory interpretation, which we also review de novo. People v. Davis, 468 Mich. 77, 79, 658 N.W.2d 800 (2003). "Our primary task in construing a statute is to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature," as indicated by language used in the statute. People v. Williams, 268 Mich.App. 416, 425, 707 N.W.2d 624 (2005). If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, no construction is necessary or permitted. Davis, supra. However, apparently plain statutory language can be rendered ambiguous by its interaction with other statutes. People v. Valentin, 457 Mich. 1, 6, 577 N.W.2d 73 (1998).

Regarding the statutes at issue here, at the time defendant committed his crime, MCL 750.335a provided that the offense of indecent exposure as a sexually delinquent person "may be punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term, the minimum of which shall be 1 day and the maximum of which shall be life . . . ."2 Although this language plainly requires that any term of imprisonment imposed for a conviction of indecent exposure as a sexually delinquent person be for a period of one day to life, § 34(2) of the sentencing guidelines act, MCL 769.31 et seq., requires that a defendant convicted of certain enumerated felonies on or after January 1, 1999, be sentenced in accord with the minimum sentence prescribed by the "version of those sentencing guidelines in effect on the date the crime was committed." MCL 769.34(2); see also People v. Hendrick, 472 Mich. 555, 557, 697 N.W.2d 511 (2005). It is not disputed that a version of the statutory sentencing guidelines rendering the offense of indecent exposure as a sexually delinquent person subject to its provisions was in effect at the time defendant committed the instant offense on November 28, 2002. See MCL 777.16q; see also 1998 PA 317. Thus, with respect to the sentence for indecent exposure as a sexually delinquent person, both MCL 750.335a and MCL 769.34(2) are applicable to this case. However, while MCL 750.335a requires a particular term of imprisonment, the guidelines provide only for a minimum term of imprisonment based on the scoring of defined variables.3

As a rule of statutory construction, statutes that relate to the same subject or that share a common purpose are in pari materia and must be read together as one. People v. Webb, 458 Mich. 265, 274, 580 N.W.2d 884 (1998). Indeed, the Legislature is charged with knowledge of existing laws on the same subject and is presumed to have considered the effect of new laws on all existing laws. People v. Ventura, 262 Mich.App. 370, 376, 686 N.W.2d 748 (2004). The object of the in pari materia rule is to...

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8 cases
  • People v. Arnold
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • July 28, 2021
    ...more specific provision, which usually controls, the sentencing guidelines were enacted after that version. People v. Buehler , 271 Mich. App. 653, 658-659, 723 N.W.2d 578 (2006). That is no longer the case, as the versions of § 335a and the guidelines at issue were enacted together. See 20......
  • People v. Arnold
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • July 19, 2018
    ...sentences for defendants convicted of indecent exposure by a sexually delinquent person, relying on People v. Buehler (On Remand) , 271 Mich. App. 653, 723 N.W.2d 578 (2006) ( Buehler II ).4 That said, during the pendency of defendant's appellate proceedings this Court had decided People v.......
  • People v. Arnold
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • June 11, 2019
    ...convicted under MCL 750.335a(2)(c) must still "abide by the sentencing guidelines" as directed by People v. Buehler (On Remand) , 271 Mich. App. 653, 658-659; 723 N.W.2d 578 (2006), rev'd in part on other grounds 477 Mich. 18, 727 N.W.2d 127 (2007). Arnold I , unpub. op. at 5. However, we r......
  • People v. Arnold
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • July 28, 2021
    ... ... establish the criminal conduct but simply serve as directions ... to guide judges during sentencing) ... [ 45 ] Baldwin , 150 Wash.2d at ... 461 ... [ 46 ] Our decision in People v ... Buehler , 477 Mich. 18, 20, 24; 727 N.W.2d 127 (2007), ... held that probation was not an alternative penalty available ... for sexually delinquent persons convicted under § 335a ... In our discussion, we stated in dicta that the guidelines ... controlled over a prior version of ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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