People v. Arnold
| Decision Date | 28 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 160046,Calendar No. 1 |
| Citation | 508 Mich. 1,973 N.W.2d 36 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lonnie James ARNOLD, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Dana Nessel, Attorney General, Fadwa A. Hammoud, Solicitor General, Michael G. Roehrig, Prosecuting Attorney, and Alexis Gipson-Goodnough, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
State Appellate Defender (by Marilena David-Martin) for Lonnie J. Arnold.
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
A person charged with a crime should not have to guess at the penalty he or she faces upon conviction.1 Yet that is the predicament a defendant faces after being convicted of indecent exposure as a sexually delinquent person under MCL 750.335a. At an earlier stage of this case, we held that a person found guilty under § 335a(2) of the Penal Code could be sentenced either to a nonmodifiable term of "1 day to life" or to the other applicable statutory penalties established by that statute.2 However, according to the Court of Appeals’ interpretation on remand, such a person would also have to examine MCL 777.16q and MCL 777.62 of the sentencing guidelines in the Code of Criminal Procedure, because the guidelines purport to apply to individuals in defendant's circumstances and suggest that he could face a radically different penalty—imprisonment for life or any term of years.
When this case was last before us, we declined to resolve whether § 335a or the guidelines applied in these circumstances. Today, we must confront the clear conflict between the "1 day to life" sentence in § 335a(2)(c) of the Penal Code and the sentence in §§ 16q and 62 of the guidelines. Contrary to the Court of Appeals, we hold that the guidelines do not create an alternative sentence that can be imposed instead of the "1 day to life" sentence in § 335a(2)(c). This means that individuals convicted of an indecent-exposure offense under § 335a as sexually delinquent persons must be sentenced pursuant to the penalties prescribed in that statute as described in our earlier opinion. Because defendant did not receive such a sentence, he is entitled to resentencing.
Our prior opinion in this case laid out the relevant facts:
Defendant Lonnie Arnold masturbated in front of an employee at the Monroe Public Library in January 2013. He was charged with aggravated indecent exposure, MCL 750.335a(2)(b), indecent exposure by a sexually delinquent person, MCL 750.335a(2)(c), and also with being a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12. He was convicted after a jury trial on both substantive indecent-exposure counts.[3 ]
As discussed more below, § 335a(2) provides a penalty of up to one year of imprisonment and a fine for indecent exposure, two years of imprisonment and a fine for aggravated indecent exposure, and an alternative of "1 day to life" imprisonment if the defendant commits either indecent exposure or aggravated indecent exposure and is deemed to have been a sexually delinquent person at the time of the offense.4 At sentencing, defense counsel argued that § 335a(2)(c) required a sentence of "1 day to life." The trial court disagreed, observing that it was prohibited from imposing a so-called "life tail," under which the maximum penalty is life in prison and the minimum penalty is a term of years.5 The trial court sentenced defendant to 25 to 70 years’ imprisonment on the controlling count of indecent exposure as a sexually delinquent person.6 The minimum sentence of 25 years was calculated to fit within the sentencing guidelines range.7
Defendant appealed his sentence, and the case eventually reached our Court. In a unanimous opinion, we held that the "1 day to life" sentence for indecent exposure as a sexually delinquent person was an alternative to the other sentences provided in § 335a for indecent exposure and aggravated indecent exposure.8 In other words, a defendant convicted of indecent exposure or aggravated indecent exposure while being a sexually delinquent person could be sentenced either to "1 day to life" or to "the other statutory penalties available under the statute ...."9 This scheme remained intact even after § 335a was amended in 2005.10 In addition, we held that that the "1 day to life" sentence was not modifiable.11 That is, a sentence of "1 day to life" was just that: the minimum was one day and the maximum was life, neither of which could be changed.
Because our interpretation of the statute did not account for the sentencing guidelines, we remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to "resolve what effect the adoption of the legislative sentencing guidelines had on the operation of the sexual-delinquency scheme as we have construed it...."12 On remand, the Court of Appeals phrased the issue as "reconcil[ing] the optional, alternative sentence of ‘1 day to life’ provided in MCL 750.335a(2) ... with the classification of indecent exposure (and other designated offenses) by a sexually delinquent person as a Class A felony subject to the sentencing guidelines as provided in MCL 777.16q of the Code of Criminal Procedure."13 The need to reconcile these statutes resulted from the fact that the guidelines provide ranges of sentences that depart from the "1 day to life" sentence included in § 335a(2)(c).
In attempting to resolve this tension between the sentencing frameworks, the Court of Appeals observed the interpretive principle that statutes involving the same subject matter should be read in pari materia , i.e., construed together to avoid conflict.14 After determining that the guidelines and § 335a both concerned the same subject matter, the Court of Appeals concluded that "the sentencing guidelines provide yet another sentencing alternative for individuals convicted of indecent exposure as a sexual delinquent."15 Accordingly, a trial court could sentence a defendant in these circumstances to "(a) one day to life for indecent exposure by a sexually delinquent person, MCL 750.335a(2)(c), or (b) a sentence premised on a scoring of the guidelines, MCL 777.16q, which in this case could be enhanced under the habitual-offender statute, MCL 777.21."16 Because the trial court "was not aware of its range of sentencing options" when it sentenced defendant, the Court of Appeals vacated defendant's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing.17
Defendant then sought leave to appeal in this Court. We granted the application and ordered argument on, among other things, whether the offense of "indecent exposure by a sexually delinquent person ... is subject to the sentencing guidelines ... because it is set forth in MCL 777.16q as a listed felony."18
We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo.19
The issue presented is whether the guidelines expand on the sentences available for an individual convicted under § 335a of indecent exposure or aggravated indecent exposure as a sexually delinquent person. More specifically, we must decide whether, as an alternative to the penalty in § 335a(2)(c), such a defendant can be sentenced under the guidelines, i.e., whether the guidelines constitute a substantive penalty provision that allows for a sentence other than an unmodifiable sentence of one day to life. We find that § 335a(2)(c) and the guidelines offer conflicting sentences but that the latter do not create an alternative penalty provision. Thus, the only penalties that can be imposed are those under § 335a(2), as interpreted by our decision in Arnold I .
Section 335a defines the offenses of indecent exposure and aggravated indecent exposure, lays down the penalties for these offenses, and establishes an alternative sentence that is available when a defendant commits one of these offenses while being a sexually delinquent person. The statute states, in relevant part:
As noted above, in Arnold I , we interpreted this language to allow an individual convicted of an indecent-exposure offense as a sexually delinquent person to be sentenced to either "1 day to life" under § 335a(2)(c) or to the appropriate penalty in § 335a(2)(a) or (b).21 And, as also mentioned, the sentence under § 335a(2)(c) must be precisely "1 day to life."
The guidelines, however, contemplate a different range of sentences for an individual found guilty under § 335a(2)(c). In § 16q, the guidelines specifically refer to § 335a(2)(c): "This chapter [that is, Chapter 777 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which sets out the sentencing guidelines] applies to the following felonies enumerated in chapter 750 of the Michigan Compiled Laws: ... [MCL] 750.335a(2)(c) ...."22 The table set forth in § 16q, shown below in relevant part, indicates that § 335a(2)(c) is a Class A felony with a statutory maximum of life imprisonment:
| M.C.L. | Category | Class | Description | Stat. Max |
| 750.332 | Property | H | Entering horse in race under false name | 4 |
| 750.335a(2)(b) | Person | G | Aggravated indecent exposure | 2 |
| 750.335a(2)(c) | Person | A | Indecent exposure by sexually delinquent person | Life |
The guidelines "grid" for Class A felonies, set out in § 62 of the...
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