People v. Arnold
| Decision Date | 19 July 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 154764,154764 |
| Citation | 918 N.W.2d 164,502 Mich. 438 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Lonnie James ARNOLD, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Bill Schuette, Attorney General, Aaron D. Lindstrom, Solicitor General, William Paul Nichols, Prosecuting Attorney, and Michael C. Brown, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
State Appellate Defender (by Marilena David–Martin ) for defendant.
Christian P. Margosian, amici curiae, in support of defendant.
Bill Schuette, Attorney General, Aaron D. Lindstrom, Solicitor General, and Laura Moody, Chief Legal Counsel, in support of amici curiae the Monroe County Prosecutor.
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
In this case we determine whether individuals convicted of being "sexually delinquent persons" must be given a "1 day to life" prison sentence in accordance with MCL 750.335a(2)(c). We conclude that a "1 day to life" sentence has never been required by the statutory scheme, overruling the Court of Appeals' contrary conclusion in People v. Campbell , 316 Mich. App. 279, 894 N.W.2d 72 (2016), and remand this case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of our conclusion.
Defendant Lonnie Arnold masturbated in front of an employee at the Monroe Public Library in January 2014. He was charged with aggravated indecent exposure, MCL 750.335a(2)(b), indecent exposure by a sexually delinquent person, MCL 750.335a(2)(c), and also with being a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12. He was convicted after a jury trial on both substantive indecent-exposure counts.
At sentencing, the Department of Corrections (DOC) recommended1 that defendant serve 225 months to 40 years in prison on the count of indecent exposure by a sexually delinquent person, to be served concurrently with 2 to 15 years on the aggravated indecent-exposure count.2 At sentencing, defense counsel, Steven Hyder, asked that defendant be given "1 day to life":
The law still says that a minimum term of sentence one day to life is what the sentence should be. ... [T]his Court can sentence him to one day on any conviction, one day to life imprisonment. I don't believe that you have to follow the guidelines for the habitual offender and follow them in sentencing him to 225 months, is what the recommendation is, Judge.
The trial judge, however, rejected this request, concluding that it was not legal:
The trial court sentenced defendant to 25 to 70 years' imprisonment on the controlling count, to be served concurrently with a 2-to-15-year sentence for aggravated indecent exposure.3
In the Court of Appeals, defendant argued that he had to be sentenced to "1 day to life" rather than under the sentencing guidelines. In an unpublished opinion, the panel concluded that the sentencing guidelines still controlled sentences for defendants convicted of indecent exposure by a sexually delinquent person, relying on People v. Buehler (On Remand) , 271 Mich. App. 653, 723 N.W.2d 578 (2006) ( Buehler II ).4 That said, during the pendency of defendant's appellate proceedings this Court had decided People v. Lockridge , 498 Mich. 358, 870 N.W.2d 502 (2015), making the sentencing guidelines advisory. The panel therefore remanded to the trial court to determine whether it would have adhered to the guidelines had it known they were only advisory.
Defendant moved for reconsideration, arguing that the Court of Appeals erred by relying on Buehler II . In the meantime, the Court issued its opinion in People v. Campbell , 316 Mich. App. 279, 894 N.W.2d 72 (2016), in which it held that defendants convicted of indecent exposure by a sexually delinquent person must be sentenced to "1 day to life" under MCL 750.335a(2)(c). Id . at 300, 894 N.W.2d 72. Consequently, the panel in the instant case granted reconsideration and, in an unpublished opinion, held that defendant, like the defendant in Campbell , must be sentenced to "1 day to life."
People v. Arnold (On Reconsideration) , unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued September 22, 2016 (Docket No. 325407), p. 2, 2016 WL 5328628. We then granted leave to appeal. People v. Arnold , 500 Mich. 964, 892 N.W.2d 369 (2017).
Questions of statutory interpretation are subject to de novo review. People v. Babcock , 469 Mich. 247, 253, 666 N.W.2d 231 (2003).
Criminal defendants charged with committing certain sex crimes also can be charged with having been a "sexually delinquent person" at the time of the offense. In People v. Winford , 404 Mich. 400, 405-406, 273 N.W.2d 54 (1978), we discussed the basic contours of the sexually-delinquent-person scheme:
Winford thus laid out three main components of the sexually-delinquent-person scheme: (1) predicate offenses that are eligible for "a more flexible form of incarceration" when committed by a sexually delinquent person, (2) a definition of "sexually delinquent persons,"5 and (3) a "procedural provision" containing charging instructions.
The predicate offense for sexual delinquency status with which defendant in the instant case was charged is indecent exposure. The governing statute provides:
Thus, indecent exposure is a one-year misdemeanor, with aggravated circumstances making it a two-year "misdemeanor,"6 but when committed by a "sexually delinquent person," the offense "is punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term, the minimum of which is 1 day and the maximum of which is life." The "procedural provision," MCL 767.61a, sets out how an individual accused of one of the predicate offenses can also be accused of being a sexually delinquent person:
In any prosecution for an offense committed by a sexually delinquent person for which may be imposed an alternate sentence to imprisonment for an indeterminate term, the minimum of which is 1 day and the maximum of which is life, the indictment shall charge the offense and may also charge that the defendant was, at the time said offense was committed, a sexually delinquent person. ... Upon a verdict of guilty to the first charge or to both charges or upon a plea of guilty to the first charge or to both charges the court may impose any punishment provided by law for such offense.
Defendant's sentencing illustrates the interpretive challenges posed by these statutes. Defendant did not challenge the presentence investigation report prepared by the DOC. The sentencing guidelines list indecent exposure by a sexually delinquent person as a Class A felony, MCL 777.16q, and the proposed scoring of defendant's guidelines variables placed him in cell F-III of the Class A grid, which provides for a minimum sentence of 135 to 225 months, MCL 777.62, the high end of which was then doubled to 450 months because defendant was a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 777.21(3)(c). Given the prospect of being forced to spend at least 11.25 years in prison before being eligible for parole, MCL 791.234(1), defendant understandably preferred the prospect of a sentence with a one-day minimum. The trial court, however, concluded that it could not give him a "life tail," arguing that the DOC would not accept such a sentence. In so stating, the court was apparently referring to MCL 769.9(2), which provides:
In all cases where the maximum sentence in the discretion of the court may be imprisonment for life or any number or term of years, the court may impose a sentence for life or may impose a sentence for any term of years. If the sentence imposed by the court is for any term of years, the court shall fix both the minimum and the maximum of that sentence in terms of years or fraction thereof, and sentences so imposed shall be considered indeterminate sentences. The court shall not...
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People v. Arnold
...an alternative penalty provision. Thus, the only penalties that can be imposed are those under § 335a(2), as interpreted by our decision in Arnold I .A. STATUTORY BACKGROUNDSection 335a defines the offenses of indecent exposure and aggravated indecent exposure, lays down the penalties for t......
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