People v. Butler
| Decision Date | 27 May 1982 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 62895,No. 10,10 |
| Citation | 319 N.W.2d 540,413 Mich. 377 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Belton BUTLER, Defendant-Appellant. Calendar |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., County of Wayne, Edward Reilly Wilson, Chief Appellate Asst. Pros. Atty., Principal Atty., Appeals, Timothy C. Scallen, Asst. Pros. Atty., Detroit, for plaintiff-appellee.
State Appellate Defender Office by Kim Robert Fawcett, Asst. State Appellate Defender, David Handzo, Research Assistant, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.
Belton Butler was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon. 1 The people's evidence tended to show that he was riding in an automobile in which a revolver was found. The judge, in instructing the jury, stated the pertinent language of the statute making it an offense to "carry a pistol whether concealed or otherwise, in a vehicle operated or occupied by" the defendant. He said that the elements of the offense were that there was a pistol in the automobile, that We hold that the failure to so instruct requires a new trial and reverse and remand therefor.
Butler owned or operated the automobile, and, that he knew that the weapon was in the automobile. He did not, however, instruct that "carrying" the weapon was an element of the offense.
Belton Butler and a companion, Victoria McLoud, were arrested after two police officers stopped Butler's automobile as he was driving in Highland Park, Michigan. The police had earlier received a report linking Butler's automobile to an armed robbery and rape committed the previous day and had placed the automobile under surveillance. An officer testified that after the police stopped the automobile and Butler and his companion complied with an order to leave the automobile, he noticed a revolver resting on the automobile's floorboard a short distance from the driver's seat. Butler and his companion were arrested and charged with carrying a concealed weapon.
The officer acknowledged on cross-examination that he had not seen Butler in actual possession of the revolver. This factual gap was bridged by the person who made the report which led to surveillance of Butler's automobile. That person testified that on the day before Butler's arrest, he saw him with a "snubnose" gun identical to the one found in the automobile. The prosecution also introduced a statement made by Butler in which he admitted that he knew the revolver was in the automobile but asserted that his companion, Victoria McLoud, had brought the gun into the automobile and that "she was the one who had the gun".
At the trial, Butler, the only witness called by the defense, denied knowledge of the gun's presence in the automobile or any previous possession of the gun.
The trial judge instructed the jury:
The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion. We reverse because the jury was not instructed on an essential element of the offense.
The parties disagree concerning the description of the crime of carrying a concealed weapon which would satisfy a trial court's obligation to charge a jury. The people contend that the elements are that there was a weapon in a vehicle operated or occupied by the defendant and that he knew or was aware of its presence. Butler, who does not contest the legal sufficiency of the evidence against him, contends that such an instruction omits an element of the offense in that a defendant's knowledge that there is a pistol in an automobile and his mere presence in the automobile are not enough. Butler contends that the people The statute provides that a "person who shall carry a pistol * * * whether concealed or otherwise, in a vehicle operated or occupied by him" shall be guilty of a felony. 2
must prove, and therefore the trial court must instruct, that no offense is committed unless the defendant "carried" the pistol. We agree.
The language of the statute is unequivocal. The offense is not committed unless the defendant "carries" the forbidden instrument. The normal and ordinary meaning of this word requires something more than the potentially fortuitous intersection of presence and knowledge. Given the wording of the statute and the absence of any evidence that the Legislature did not intend "carrying" to be an independent element of the offense, a court would not be justified in reading this word out of the statute. 3
A central tenet of the criminal law is that "guilt is personal". 4 An instruction that the accused can be found guilty only if the jury finds that he was carrying a weapon comports with this traditional conception of criminal responsibility. Under the instruction given, which omitted specific reference to carrying as an element, an accused could be convicted if he knew that there was a weapon in direct proximity to him even though he may have had no physical contact with the weapon and no knowledge of its presence in the vehicle until shortly before his arrest.
Reading "carrying" out of the statute would risk the conviction of innocents whose only real crime was the proverbial one of being in the wrong place at the wrong time. The criminal law, however, punishes misdeeds, not misjudgment. An accused must author his own guilt. It cannot be ghost-written by others. The statutory prerequisite that a defendant "carry" a weapon before guilt attaches implements an important principle of the criminal law that should not be yielded except upon truly compelling evidence of a legislative purpose to punish without regard to complicity. 5
We adopt the analysis of Justice Fitzgerald, writing for the Court of Appeals, in People v. Jerome I. Smith, 21 Mich.App. 717, 722, 176 N.W.2d 430 (1970):
The people contend that a review of the "totality of circumstances" indicates that, even if a judge must instruct separately on "carrying" as an element of the offense, the elements of the offense were effectively communicated to the jury. These circumstances include: (1) the judge's reading of both the information and the pertinent provision of the statute defining the offense, (2) the judge's statement of the defense theory that the defendant "was not carrying We conclude that these circumstances, neither separately nor in conjunction, supply an effective antidote for a charge which three times stated that the defendant's knowledge that the pistol was in the vehicle suffices.
the pistol and that he did not know of its presence in the vehicle", and (3) the references in counsel's closing argument to the "carrying" element.
The judge's obligation to instruct the jury regarding the law is not discharged unless he instructs correctly regarding the elements of the offense. 6 Though some might say the need for correct instruction by the judge is self-evident, the policies supporting this rule of law deserve emphasis.
The people have an obligation to prove all the elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 7 If a judge may omit an instruction concerning a necessary element, the people are permitted to circumvent this burden of persuasion. A factual determination entrusted solely to the jury may be effectively taken from it and decided adversely to the defendant, even though the people have failed to meet its evidentiary burden.
A judge's incorrect recitation of the law undermines the purpose of jury instructions. Rather than conforming the jury's fact-finding to the law, an incorrect instruction poses the unacceptable risk of convicting a defendant of a crime unknown to the laws of Michigan. It is not, therefore, surprising that this Court will scrutinize the contested instruction closely and, upon finding that a judge failed to inform a jury of the true nature of the offense charged, will not countenance claims of "harmless error" but will reverse. People v. Reed, 393 Mich. 342, 351, 224 N.W.2d 867 (1975).
This Court has frequently said that a charge to a jury should be viewed in its entirety to determine whether asserted error is prejudicial. 8 But it has not adhered to a "totality of circumstances" doctrine which would...
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People v. Wesley
...instruction poses the unacceptable risk of convicting a defendant of a crime unknown to the laws of Michigan. People v. Butler, 413 Mich. 377, 319 N.W.2d 540 (1982). We believe that the jury may well have convicted these defendants of a fictitious As to the other assignments of error raised......
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People v. Vaughn
...by this Court that indicate that a failure to instruct on an essential element can never be harmless error. In People v. Butler, 413 Mich. 377, 387, 319 N.W.2d 540 (1982), this Court said:A judge's incorrect recitation of the law undermines the purpose of jury instructions. Rather than conf......
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...686 F.2d 418 (6th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 843, 102 S.Ct. 155, 70 L.Ed.2d 128 (1981) (habeas corpus case); People v. Butler, 413 Mich. 377, 319 N.W.2d 540 (1982); State v. Forsyth, 197 Mont. 248, 642 P.2d 1035 (1982); Koltay v. State, 360 So.2d 802 These decisions recognize the dis......
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People v. Green
...and convict defendant of "carrying" a pistol in violation of MCL 750.227(2). However, the Supreme Court in People v. Butler, 413 Mich. 377, 384-385, 319 N.W.2d 540 (1982), concluded that additional proof of "carrying," beyond mere operation of a vehicle with knowledge that it contains a wea......
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...v. Hambright, 388 P.3d 613 (Kan. Ct. App. 2017), rev'd on other grounds, State v. Hambright, 447 P.3d 972 (Kan. 2019); People v. Butler, 319 N.W.2d 540, 547 (Mich. 1982) (Levin, J., concurring) ("When an issue is not presented in the form of a keenly contested and discrete controversy, a co......