People v. C.H. (In re C.H.)

• Decision Date: 30 August 2016
• Docket Number: A146120
• Citation: 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 775,2 Cal.App.5th 1139
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: IN RE C.H., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. The People, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. C.H., Defendant and Appellant.

2 Cal.App.5th 1139

206 Cal.Rptr.3d 775

IN RE C.H., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.The People, Plaintiff and Respondent

v.C.H., Defendant and Appellant.

A146120

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 3, California.

Filed August 30, 2016

Patricia Noel Cooney, Berkeley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Eric D. Share, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Huy T. Luong, Deputy Attorney General for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Siggins

, J.

C.H. argues that following the reduction of his 2011 felony to a misdemeanor, the trial court was obligated to expunge a DNA sample he originally provided pursuant to Penal Code section 296.1

.¹ His argument is premised upon his interpretation of Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, enacted by the voters in 2014. Proposition 47 permitted C.H. to petition the court to redesignate his felony as a misdemeanor, and provides that once redesignated his crime is a misdemeanor “for all purposes.” (§ 1170.18, subdivision (k).) Because misdemeanants are not required by law to provide a DNA sample for the state database, C.H. says his existing sample should be expunged because he is no longer a felon. We disagree.

Proposition 47's directive to treat a redesignated offense as a misdemeanor “for all purposes” employs words that have a well-defined meaning and have never applied to alter a crime's original status. The provisions of Proposition 47 can be harmonized with our state's DNA collection law, Proposition 69, giving effect to each measure.² Moreover, if there is any fatal conflict between the text of the two measures, Proposition 69 controls because it is the more specific law. Finally, our interpretation gives effect to an underlying purpose of both measures to protect public safety. For these reasons, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

C.H. was arrested in early 2011 following his participation in a physical altercation with a loss prevention officer at Kohl's Department Store who tried to detain him and one of his friends for shoplifting. C.H. successfully made off with a $46 pair of jeans. He was charged with second degree robbery and assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury. The robbery and assault charges were dismissed after C.H. admitted a felony violation of section 487, subdivision (c), grand theft from a person.

At the 2014 general election, voters passed Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act. (Statement of Vote (Nov. 4, 2014) 2014-general/pdf/2014-complete-sov.pdf> [as of Aug. 30, 2016].) One of its provisions, section 1170.18, permits offenders adjudicated of felony grand theft to petition the court for redesignation of their crimes as misdemeanors. C.H. sought redesignation pursuant to section 1170.18, subdivision (f), and also expungement of his DNA records.³ The court redesignated C.H.'s felony as a misdemeanor but denied his request to expunge his DNA sample. C.H. appeals that denial.

DISCUSSION

A. Statutory Analysis

This case requires us to interpret and apply section 1170.18, part of Proposition 47, which allows offenders who have completed their sentence for certain felonies to apply to the court for designation of those felonies as misdemeanors. (§ 1170.18 subds. (a), (b) & (f).) Once an offense is designated a misdemeanor, section 1170.18 subdivision (k) requires that the crime “shall be considered a misdemeanor for all purposes” except for the prohibition on ownership of a firearm that applies to felons and offenders convicted of specified misdemeanors. C.H. argues that because only felons and certain misdemeanor sex offenders are required by law to provide DNA under section 296, his DNA sample must be expunged and his profile removed from the state database because his redesignated crime is to “be considered a misdemeanor for all purposes.” Because the Penal Code provides a specific scheme for obtaining and expunging DNA, to address this argument we must consider whether section 1170.18 clearly specifies what must happen to an offender's DNA sample and profile when a felony is reduced to a misdemeanor.

The principles for interpreting a proposition enacted by popular vote are the same as those used to interpret a statute enacted by our Legislature. (People v. Park (2013) 56 Cal.4th 782, 796, 156 Cal.Rptr.3d 307, 299 P.3d 1263

(Park ).) “Initially, ‘[a]s in any case of statutory interpretation, our task is to determine afresh the intent of the Legislature by construing in context the language of the statute.’ [Citation] In determining such intent, we begin with the language of the statute itself. [Citation] That is, we look first to the words the Legislature used, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning. [Citation] ‘If there is no ambiguity in the language of the statute, “then the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the language governs.” ’ [Citation] ‘But when the statutory language is ambiguous, “the court may examine the context in which the language appears, adopting the construction that best harmonizes the statute internally and with related statutes.” ’ ” (People v. Superior Court (Zamudio) (2000) 23 Cal.4th 183, 192–193, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 463, 999 P.2d 686.)

All of Proposition 47, including section 1170.18, is silent on whether the redesignation of a felony as a misdemeanor requires that a defendant's DNA be expunged. C.H. asserts the phrase “shall be considered a misdemeanor for all purposes” in section 1170.18, subdivision (k) compels the conclusion that it does. We disagree, and for several reasons, conclude that redesignation of an offense as a misdemeanor has no effect on previously obtained DNA.

First of all, the phrase “a misdemeanor for all purposes” has a well-defined meaning that does not relate back to alter a crime's original status for events occurring before the crime was reduced to a misdemeanor. This language is identical to the language used in section 17 to describe the effect of a judicial declaration that a wobbler offense—which is punishable as a felony until designated a misdemeanor—is to be considered a misdemeanor. (§ 17, subd. (b)(3) [where a crime is a wobbler, “it is a misdemeanor for all purposes ... when ... the court declares the offense to be a misdemeanor”], italics added; see also People v. Rivera (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1100, 183 Cal.Rptr.3d 362

, (Rivera ) [noting how Proposition 47 borrowed section 17's language].)

“[W]hen a wobbler is reduced to a misdemeanor [under section 17], the offense thereafter is deemed a ‘misdemeanor for all purposes.’ ” (Park, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 795, 156 Cal.Rptr.3d 307, 299 P.3d 1263

, italics added; People v. Banks (1959) 53 Cal.2d 370, 381–382, 1 Cal.Rptr. 669, 348 P.2d 102 ; People v. Pryor (1936) 17 Cal.App.2d 147, 152, 61 P.2d 773.) Put differently, redesignation under section 17 makes the wobbler “a misdemeanor from that point on.” (People v. Feyrer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 426, 439, 442, fn. 8, 106 Cal.Rptr.3d 518, 226 P.3d 998 (Feyrer ); People v. Marshall (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 502, 504, 277 Cal.Rptr. 846 [redesignated offense is treated as a misdemeanor after redesignation]; Gebremicael v. California Com'n on Teacher Credentialing (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1477, 1482–1483, 1487, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 777 [same]; People v. Camarillo (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1386, 1390, 1394, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 618 [same];

People v. Rowland (1937) 19 Cal.App.2d 540, 541–542, 65 P.2d 1333

[same].) Critically, however, this “misdemean[or] status [is] not ... given retroactive effect.” (People v. Moomey (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 850, 857, 123 Cal.Rptr.3d 749 (Moomey ); Feyrer, at p. 439, 106 Cal.Rptr.3d 518, 226 P.3d 998 [“the offense is [made] a misdemeanor from that point on, but not retroactively ,” italics added].)

In other words, a court's declaration of misdemeanor status renders an offense a misdemeanor for all purposes, not at all times . Thus, a declaration that a wobbler is a misdemeanor does not “relate back” and alter that offense's original status as a wobbler that is by definition to be treated as a felony until declared otherwise. For this reason, a court's order declaring a wobbler to be a misdemeanor does not call into question a defendant's burglary conviction for entering a building with intent to commit a felony (Moomey, supra , 194 Cal.App.4th at pp. 857–858, 123 Cal.Rptr.3d 749

), a defendant's ineligibility for a diversionary drug sentence due to a prior felony (People v. Marsh (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 809, 812–813, 183 Cal.Rptr. 455 ), a defendant's conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm (People v. Holzer (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 456, 460, 102 Cal.Rptr. 11, overruled on other grounds in People v. Palmer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 856, 860–862, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 13, 15 P.3d 234 ), or the imposition of a sentencing enhancement for a prior felony (See Park, supra , 56 Cal.4th at p. 802, 156 Cal.Rptr.3d 307, 299 P.3d 1263 [“(t)here is no dispute that ... defendant would be subject to the section 667(a) enhancement [for ‘serious' felonies] had he committed and been convicted of the present crimes before the court reduced the earlier offense to a misdemeanor”].)

“ ‘It is a well-recognized rule of construction that after the courts have construed the meaning of any particular word, or expression, and the legislature subsequently undertakes to use these exact words in the same connection, the presumption is almost irresistible that it used them in the precise and technical sense which had been placed upon them by the courts.’ ” (California Commerce Casino, Inc. v. Schwarzenegger (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1424, 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 626

, citing

City of Long Beach v. Payne (1935) 3 Cal.2d 184, 191, 44 P.2d 305.) Because “identical language appearing in separate statutory provisions should receive the same interpretation when the statutes cover the...