People v. Cajigas

• Decision Date: 18 July 1997
• Parties: , 1997 N.Y. Slip Op. 97,577 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. Carlos CAJIGAS, also known as Carlito, Defendant.
• Court: New York County Court

Page 789

665 N.Y.S.2d 789

174 Misc.2d 472, 1997 N.Y. Slip Op. 97,577

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. Carlos CAJIGAS, also known as Carlito, Defendant.

Westchester County Court.

July 18, 1997.

Legal Aid Society of Westchester County, White Plains (Stephen J. Pittari, Allan Focarile and Jeanne E. Mettler, of counsel), for defendant.

Jeanine Ferris Pirro, District Attorney of Westchester County, White Plains (Richard E. Weill, of counsel), for plaintiff.

DANIEL D. ANGIOLILLO, Justice.

The defendant Carlos Cajigas has been indicted for four counts of Murder in the First Degree, three counts of Murder in the Second Degree, three counts of Attempted Robbery in the First Degree, three counts of Burglary in the First Degree, Criminal Use of a Firearm in the First Degree, Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree, Criminal Possession of Weapon in the Third Degree and Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Fourth Degree. As of the date of this Decision, the People have yet to exercise their option for seeking the Death Penalty in the instant case. It should be noted that the 120-day period of time in which the People are to make the determination of whether or not to seek the Death Penalty pursuant to CPL § 250.40[2] has been extended to September 10, 1997.

The defendant has made a motion pursuant to the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution; Article 1, Sections 2, 5, 6, and 11 of the New York State Constitution; the New York State Civil Rights Law; CPL 210.35[4], CPL § 190.50[5][a] and CPL 190.50[5][c] for an order dismissing this Indictment due to defective Grand Jury presentation. The defendant maintains that he was deprived of his right to testify before the Grand Jury and that his state and federal rights to be free of cruel and unusual punishment as well as his right to a fair trial, equal protection of the law and due process of law have been violated.

In particular the defendant argues that he was deprived of his right to testify before the Grand Jury for the following reasons: by the prosecution commencing the presentation to the Grand Jury before the date indicated in the notice which the defendant received pursuant to CPL § 190.50; by the prosecutor not indicating to the defendant the exact charges against him until the morning that he was to testify before the Grand Jury; by the prosecution refusing to stay the Grand Jury proceedings; by the prosecution refusing to advise the Grand Jury with respect to "voluntariness" of the statements made by the defendant; and by the prosecution refusing to render legal rulings when requested by the defendant prior to his envisioned testimony. For all of these reasons the defendant argues that he was deprived of his reasonable opportunity to prepare for his testimony and to testify before the Grand Jury. Lastly the defendant indicates that capital cases require a heightened standard of due process.

Before considering the arguments presented by both sides, this Court finds that a brief chronology of events is in order.

Mr. Cajigas was arrested at his home on the night of January 15, 1997 for the Murder of Kathleen Martyn which was alleged to have taken place at her Pelham Manor home on January 6, 1997. On January 16, 1997 the Capital Defender's Office was notified of an expected arraignment by the local court. Pursuant to an agreement between the Capital Defender's Office and Westchester Legal Aid Society, the Legal Aid Society commenced representation of defendant. On the evening of the 16th the Hon. Stephen Huff, after making inquiries pursuant to § 35-b of the Judiciary Law, confirmed that Mr. Cajigas was entitled to capital representation.

Following this arraignment on January 16, 1997, a Felony Hearing was conducted and the defendant was held for the action of the Grand Jury. Thereafter, in a letter dated January 23, 1997 the defendant indicated his intention to testify before the Grand Jury. [See Defense Exhibit "B"]. On that same date the defendant, in a separate letter, asked for specific notice of the charges which would be presented to the Grand Jury and in particular requested notice with respect to whether or not the prosecution would be seeking an Indictment for Murder in the First Degree. [See Defense Exhibit "C"]. The People responded in a letter dated February 10, 1997 advising the defendant in the following fashion: "We wish to advise you that the above-entitled matter will be presented to the Grand Jury of this County on Wednesday, February 26, 1997, at 9:00 A.M." That letter gave no details with respect to what charges would be presented to that Grand Jury. [See Defense Exhibit "D"]. In a letter dated February 20, 1997 the defendant confirmed his intention of testifying before the Grand Jury but requested an adjournment of the Grand Jury presentation. In this letter the defendant waived his rights under CPL § 190.80, requested that he be given a copy of the autopsy report, requested disclosure of any exculpatory evidence, and further requested that all evidence in the case be preserved. [See Defense Exhibit "E"].

On February 24, 1997 the defense submitted an Order to Show Cause to the Hon. John R. LaCava seeking various preservation orders, as well as the unsealing of the search warrants in the instant case, the disclosure of the autopsy report and a request that a Huntley hearing be held pre-Indictment. The Court made this Order to Show Cause returnable on Tuesday, February 25, 1997 at 3:00 P.M. On that same day, February 25, 1997, the defendant received the prosecutor's Affirmation in Opposition to the Order to Show Cause. These papers revealed that the Grand Jury presentation had already commenced and that witnesses had already testified with respect to the defendant's alleged statements. On February 25, 1997 the Hon. John R. LaCava rendered a Decision on this matter which was filed and entered on February 26, 1997. [See Defense Exhibit "K"]. In this Decision Judge LaCava found, inter alia, that "defendant's application to stay further proceedings by the Grand Jury pending the determination of the suppression issues is denied as moot." The Court further noted that the defendant had not advanced any authority which would have allowed such a drastic step.

On the morning of February 26, 1997 the defendant was apprised by the prosecutor's office that it would be seeking an Indictment for Murder in the First Degree. Based upon all of the foregoing at approximately 2:00 P.M. on February 26, 1997, the defense decided that, while the defendant would not technically withdraw his application pursuant to CPL § 190.50, he would not be exercising his right to testify before the Grand Jury. The reasons were stated in a letter which was given to the Assistant District Attorney at that time. [See Defense Exhibit "J"].

The defendant's arguments are that he was not given a reasonable opportunity to testify given the chronology of events in this case, that his request for a delay in the Grand Jury presentation was reasonable considering the circumstances, that he was denied due process of law inasmuch as he was not given reasonable time to appear, that he was denied the right to present mitigating evidence to the Grand Jury which he believed to have been admissible, that the People failed to give adequate notice with respect to the seeking of an Indictment charging the defendant with Murder in the First Degree and also refused to reply to his application for evidentiary rulings in advance of his testifying before the Grand Jury. The defendant also maintains he was unfairly prejudiced by the denial of his request to unseal the search warrants in the instant case.

It is the contention of the defendant that the reasonableness of the opportunity to testify depends upon the facts and circumstances of the individual case. In this case he asserts the allegedly defective notice that he received pursuant to CPL § 190.50, coupled with the People's failure to tell him whether or not he would be charged with Murder in the First Degree until the actual morning of his scheduled testimony, resulted in an unreasonable opportunity to testify.

The defendant concedes he was given notice by the prosecutor on February 10, 1997 that the "matter would be presented to the Grand Jury on Wednesday, February 26, 1997 at 9:30 A.M." Defendant asserts the notice was defective as he was not advised that the presentation had actually begun on Friday, February 21, 1997. The notice served could have been more artfully phrased. However, any impression it may have imparted that testimony would not be presented prior to February 26, 1997 did not thereby cause such notice to be defective.

CPL § 190.50(5)(b) requires the People to give a defendant who has given the requisite written notice of his desire to testify before the Grand Jury "... notice that he will be heard by the grand jury at a given time and place." A defendant does not have a right to be informed of the manner in which a Grand Jury presentment will be made. People v. Adessa, 89 N.Y.2d 677, 683, 657 N.Y.S.2d 863, 680 N.E.2d 134 (1997); People v. Stepteau, 81 N.Y.2d 799, 595 N.Y.S.2d 371, 611 N.E.2d 272 (1993). A defendant merely has a right to be heard by the Grand Jury prior to that body being instructed on the law, deliberating and voting on the charges under consideration. People v. Evans, 79 N.Y.2d 407, 583 N.Y.S.2d 358, 592 N.E.2d 1362 (1992); People v. Stepteau, supra.

The defendant was given notice on February 10, 1997 of his opportunity to appear at the Grand Jury on the scheduled date of February 26, 1997 and testify before that body. That is the limit of his rights pursuant to CPL § 190.50(5). See People v. Adessa, supra. Defendant received approximately sixteen days' advance notice of the time he would be heard. The notice provided was completely adequate and reasonable given the circumstances of this case. See People v. Rivera, 232...