People v. Caminito

• Court: New York Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: FULD; FROESSEL; CONWAY; FROESSEL; CONWAY
• Citation: 3 N.Y.2d 596,170 N.Y.S.2d 799,148 N.E.2d 139
• Decision Date: 23 January 1958
• Parties: , 148 N.E.2d 139 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Santo CAMINITO, Appellant. The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Charles NOIA, Appellant.

Page 799

170 N.Y.S.2d 799 3 N.Y.2d 596, 148 N.E.2d 139 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,
v.
Santo CAMINITO, Appellant.
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,
v.
Charles NOIA, Appellant. Court of Appeals of New York. Jan. 23, 1958.

Page 801

[148 N.E.2d 141] [3 N.Y.2d 597] Maurice Edelbaum, New York City, for appellants.

[3 N.Y.2d 598] Edward S. Silver, Dist. Atty., Brooklyn (William I. Siegel, Brooklyn, of counsel), for respondent.

Page 802

FULD, Judge.

Concerned though we are with appeals in two separate cases, one involving Santo Caminito, the other, Charles Noia, we treat them together since they stem from the same prosecution and involve facts common to both.

Caminito, Noia and Frank Bonino were indicted in 1941 for the murder of one Hammeroff. At the trial, the only evidence of guilt consisted of confessions signed by each defendant in which he acknowledged participation in an attempted robbery of Hammeroff terminating in his fatal shooting. Concluding that the confessions were not coerced, as the defendants contended,[3 N.Y.2d 599] and that their contents were true, the jury found the three defendants guilty of felony murder and the trial judge, upon the jury's recommendation, sentenced each to life imprisonment. Only Caminito and Bonino appealed and their judgments of conviction were affirmed (265 App.Div. 960, 38 N.Y.S.2d 1019, 291 N.Y. 541, 50 N.E.2d 654, motions for reargument denied 296 N.Y. 1004, 73 N.E.2d 579, 297 N.Y. 882, 79 N.E.2d 277, certiorari denied (as to Bonino) 333 U.S. 849, 68 S.Ct. 654, 92 L.Ed. 1131, (as to Caminito) 348 U.S. 839, 75 S.Ct. 46, 99 L.Ed. 662). Some years later, Caminito sought redress in the federal courts by way of habeas corpus; the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, reversing the District Court, sustained the writ on the ground that it appeared, upon facts 'not disputed,' that Caminito's confessions had been coerced. (See United States ex rel. Caminito v. Murphy, 2 Cir., 222 F.2d 698, 699-700, reversing, D.C., 127 F.Supp. 689, certiorari denied 350 U.S. 896, 76 S.Ct. 155, 100 L.Ed. 788.) Following this determination, Caminito was remanded (by order of the District Court) to the Kings County Court 'for such other and further proceedings as justice may require upon the indictment * * * against him * * * for the crime of Murder in the First Degree' and, some short time later, Caminito, urging that the evidence before the grand jury was insufficient, moved to set aside the indictment. The County Court granted the motion, but the Appellate Division reversed.

The fact a judgment of conviction has been reversed and a new trial ordered does not mean that there must be a new trial. The defendant possesses a right to challenge the indictment because of an asserted lack of evidence before the grand jury even after reversal and the grant of a new trial. (See, e. g., People v. Mullens, 298 N.Y. 606, 81 N.E.2d 332; People v. Nitzberg, 289 N.Y. 523, 530-531, 47 N.E.2d 37, 41, 145 A.L.R. 482.) Such a reversal does not, however, give the defendant any greater right than that which he had before the first trial. In other words, he may have the indictment set aside only if on its face the record before the grand jury reveals that the evidence did not spell out a prima facie case of guilt. (See, e. g., People v. Donahue, 309 N.Y.

Page 803

6, 7, 127 N.E.2d 725, 726; People v. Sweeney, 213 N.Y. 37, 44, 45-46, 106 N.E. 913, 916, 917.) As we recently wrote in the Donahue case (supra, 309 N.Y. 6, 7,...