People v. Campbell

• Citation: 991 N.Y.S.2d 341,2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 05996,120 A.D.3d 827
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Dario CAMPBELL, appellant.
• Decision Date: 27 August 2014
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

120 A.D.3d 827

991 N.Y.S.2d 341

2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 05996

The PEOPLE, etc., respondent,

v.Dario CAMPBELL, appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Aug. 27, 2014.

Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Jonathan M. Kratter of counsel), for appellant.

Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano, Sharon Y. Brodt, and Roni C. Piplani of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Modica, J.), rendered June 13, 2011, convicting him of assault in the first degree and robbery in the first degree (two counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing (Hollie, J.), of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress his statements to law enforcement officials.

ORDERED that the judgment is modified, as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, by vacating the conviction of assault in the first degree under count five of the indictment, vacating the sentence imposed thereon, and dismissing that count of the indictment; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant's contention that the counts of assault in the first degree under count five of the indictment (Penal Law § 120.10[4] ) and robbery in the first degree under count six of the indictment (Penal Law § 160.15[1] ) were multiplicitous is unpreserved for appellate review ( see People v. Cruz, 96 N.Y.2d 857, 858, 730 N.Y.S.2d 29, 754 N.E.2d 1112; People v. Smalls, 81 A.D.3d 860, 861, 916 N.Y.S.2d 647; People v. Clymer, 26 A.D.3d 443, 809 N.Y.S.2d 207). Nevertheless, under the circumstances presented here, we review this contention in the interest of justice.

“[An indictment] is multiplicitous when a single offense is charged in more than one count” (People v. Alonzo, 16 N.Y.3d 267, 269, 920 N.Y.S.2d 302, 945 N.E.2d 495; see People v. Smalls, 81 A.D.3d at 861, 916 N.Y.S.2d 647; People v. Quinones, 8 A.D.3d 589, 779 N.Y.S.2d 131; People v. Aarons, 296 A.D.2d 508, 745 N.Y.S.2d 487; People v. Senisi, 196 A.D.2d 376, 381–382, 610 N.Y.S.2d 542). Here, the record reflects that the jury charges regarding the count of assault in the first degree under count five of the indictment and the count of robbery in the first degree under count six of the indictment were essentially identical since one cannot commit robbery in the first degree under Penal Law § 160.15(1) without simultaneously committing assault in the first degree under Penal Law § 120.10(4) ( see People v. Smalls, 81 A.D.3d at 861, 916 N.Y.S.2d 647). As such, those charges were multiplicitous ( see id.).

While the People are correct that, in this case, the dismissal of the multiplicitous count of assault in the first degree will not affect “the quantum of punishment to be imposed” (People v. Smith, 113 A.D.2d 905, 908, 493 N.Y.S.2d 623), “the second conviction, even if it results in no greater sentence, is an impermissible punishment” (Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 865, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 84 L.Ed.2d 740). Accordingly, as we did in People v. Smalls, we will vacate the multiplicitous conviction of assault in the first degree under count five of the indictment, vacate the sentence imposed thereon, and dismiss that count of the indictment ( see id. at 861, 916 N.Y.S.2d 647; People v. Aarons, 296 A.D.2d at 508, 745 N.Y.S.2d 487).

Contrary to the defendant's contention that his statements to the police were the product of an unlawful arrest, the hearing court properly found that the police had probable cause to arrest him ( see People v. Prego, 102 A.D.3d 814, 957 N.Y.S.2d 872; People v. Capela, 97 A.D.3d 760, 948...