People v. Campbell, No. 85SA313
Docket Nº | No. 85SA313 |
Citation | 738 P.2d 1179 |
Case Date | June 15, 1987 |
Court | Supreme Court of Colorado |
Page 1179
v.
Earl CAMPBELL, Defendant-Appellee.
En Banc.
Rehearing Denied July 13, 1987.
Barney Iuppa, Dist. Atty., Robert M. Brown, Chief Deputy Dist. Atty., Gary Hoffman, Deputy Dist. Atty., Colorado Springs, for plaintiff-appellant.
David F. Vela, State Public Defender, Pamela Stross Kenney, Marilyn S. Chappell, Deputy State Public Defenders, Denver, for defendant-appellee.
VOLLACK, Justice.
The People appeal from an order of the El Paso District Court dismissing charges against the defendant based on denial of his right to a speedy trial. We reverse and remand for reinstatement of the mandatory sentence originally imposed by the trial court.
I.
After the robbery of a pharmacy in Colorado Springs in September 1982, the defendant was charged with aggravated robbery of a controlled substance, section 18-4-303, 8B C.R.S. (1986); conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, section 18-2-201, 8B C.R.S. (1986); crime of violence, section 16-11-309, 8A C.R.S. (1978 & 1985 Supp.); and habitual criminal, section 16-13-101, 8A C.R.S. (1986). A jury trial was held in May 1983, and the defendant was convicted of all counts, including the habitual criminal charges.
New counsel was appointed after the trial, and in November 1983, the defendant filed a motion for new trial. In April 1984 the trial court sentenced the defendant to
Page 1180
life imprisonment 1 and denied the defendant's motion for new trial. In May 1984 the defendant filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's denial of his motion for new trial. The trial court granted this motion for reconsideration in June 1984, and set the matter for hearing. At the hearing in September 1984, the trial court granted the motion for new trial on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel.By February 1985 the defendant's new trial had not yet commenced, and he filed a motion to dismiss. A hearing on the motion was held in March 1985. In April 1985, the defendant's motion to dismiss was granted on the grounds of violation of his rights to due process and effective assistance of counsel, and his right to remain silent.
The People filed a motion for reconsideration, which was granted. Upon reconsideration, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss on May 14, 1985. The defendant filed a motion asking the court to reconsider its May 14, 1985, order. At a hearing in August 1985, the trial court again ordered the charges against the defendant dismissed based on the violation of his right to a speedy trial. The People filed a notice of appeal on September 11, 1985.
The issues raised on appeal are (1) whether the trial court had jurisdiction to reconsider and reverse its own denial of the defendant's first motion for new trial; (2) if the trial court had such jurisdiction, whether it erred in granting the motion for new trial on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) if the trial court had jurisdiction, whether it erred in granting the defendant's motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds.
The first issue is dispositive of the case, so we decline to address the second and third issues. We reverse the trial court's order and remand for reinstatement of the sentence imposed by the trial court.
II.
The People argue that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to act once it had sentenced the defendant and denied his motion for new trial. The defendant contends that the trial court retained jurisdiction until notice of appeal was filed. The issue presented is narrow: Once a defendant's motion for new trial has been denied and sentence imposed, does the sentencing court retain jurisdiction to enter rulings on subsequent motions? We hold that it does not.
Principles previously applied by this court apply here, although we have not before addressed these particular facts. We are asked to define the trial court's jurisdictional authority when two actions have been taken by the court: (1) sentence has been imposed on the defendant, and (2) his motion for new trial has been denied.
First, we address sentencing of the defendant. If the sentence imposed "is a valid one, the trial court loses jurisdiction to change the sentence." Smith v. Johns, 187 Colo. 388, 390, 532 P.2d 49, 50 (1975). "[A] trial court loses jurisdiction upon imposition of a valid sentence except under the circumstances specified in Crim.P. 35." People v. Wiedemer, 692 P.2d 327, 329 (Colo.App.1984). Crim.P. 35 governs postconviction remedies, correction of an illegal sentence, reduction of a sentence, and other grounds of postconviction review. Because the motions presented here were not Crim.P. 35 motions for postconviction review, that rule does not apply. 2 The legality of the sentence itself is not at issue here. The trial court thus lost jurisdiction to reconsider its denial of a motion for new trial when it imposed a valid sentence upon the defendant.
Second, we look at the denial of defendant's first motion for new trial. The general rule is that once a trial court enters a final judgment in a proceeding, it has no power to take further action. Brooke v.
Page 1181
People, 139 Colo. 388,...To continue reading
Request your trial-
People v. Bueno, Supreme Court Case No. 13SC1017
...more than just a verdict or finding of guilt: "The judgment in a criminal case includes imposition of the sentence." People v. Campbell, 738 P.2d 1179, 1181 (Colo. 1987) (relying on the definition of "judgment" in Crim. P. 32(b)(3) to construe Crim. P. 35 ), superseded by statute on other g......
-
People v. Hargrave, No. 06CA0212.
...390, 532 P.2d 49, 50 (1975) (trial court had no jurisdiction to change a sentence after it entered a valid sentence); People v. Campbell, 738 P.2d 1179, 1180 (Colo.1987) (trial court had no jurisdiction to reconsider the defendant's motion for a new trial following the imposition of a valid......
-
People v. Rosales, No. 03CA0077.
...a valid sentence, judgment is final, and the trial court loses jurisdiction except as specified in Crim. P. 35. People v. Campbell, 738 P.2d 1179 (Colo.1987); People v. Dillon, supra; Smith v. Johns, 187 Colo. 388, 532 P.2d 49 (1975). Once judgment is final and a defendant's appeal has been......
-
People v. Vance, No. 95SA394
...People v. Young, 814 P.2d 834, 836-38 (Colo.1991); and that an order granting a new trial is not a final judgment. People v. Campbell, 738 P.2d 1179 (Colo.1987); C.A.R. 1(a)(1). However, section 16-12-102(1) was amended effective June 3, 1993 and now specifically provides that an order of t......