People v. Carbajal, 09CA1119.

• Decision Date: 16 August 2012
• Docket Number: No. 09CA1119.,09CA1119.
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Dean CARBAJAL, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

312 P.3d 1183

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Dean CARBAJAL, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 09CA1119.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. V.

July 5, 2012.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 16, 2012.

John W. Suthers, Attorney General, Matthew S. Holman, First Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff–Appellee.

Dean Carbajal, Pro Se.

Opinion by Judge LOEB.

¶ 1 Defendant, Dean Carbajal, appeals the trial court's order denying his petition to discontinue sex offender registration. We reverse and remand the case to the trial court with directions to grant defendant's petition.

¶ 2 In this case, we are required to consider the interplay between two Colorado statutory frameworks: (1) the statute relating to deferred judgments and sentencing, set forth in section 18–1.3–102, C.R.S.2011; and (2) the Colorado Sex Offender Registration Act, sections 16–22–101 to –115, C.R.S.2011, specifically, section 16–22–113, C.R.S.2011, relating to petitions to discontinue sex offender registration. At the outset, we note that this case presents a record of unique and very unusual circumstances. This is not a case where events occurred as expressly laid out by the General Assembly in the applicable statutory provisions. Instead, this case began with a trial court error which led to an extended and convoluted procedural history (which included further trial court errors), and eventually resulted in the charges against defendant and his deferred judgment being dismissed with prejudice by our supreme court. Moreover, as discussed below, neither the deferred judgment statute nor the sexual offender registration statutory framework expressly addresses the situation we are faced with here. Nevertheless, on the record before us, and for the reasons discussed below, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion by denying defendant's petition to discontinue the requirement that he register as a sex offender.

I. Background and Procedural History

A. Charges and Plea Agreement

¶ 3 Defendant was charged with sexual assault in Delta County District Court in August 1999.

¶ 4 On August 30, 2001, defendant entered into a plea agreement resolving six cases (including this case) from Delta, Montrose, and San Miguel Counties. He entered guilty pleas to a charge of second degree sexual assault in this case, and charges of possession of a schedule II controlled substance and a bail violation in the Montrose County case. The remaining cases and charges were dismissed. On the same day, for the drug possession and bail violation from Montrose County, the trial court imposed a four-year prison term with three years of mandatory parole. For the sexual assault charge in this case, the trial court imposed a deferred judgment with four years supervision to run consecutively to the prison term in the Montrose case. The deferred judgment was subject to various conditions, including, as pertinent here, registration as a sex offender during the period of deferral, entering and completing a sex offender treatment program, and paying the restitution ordered as part of his sentence.

¶ 5 In December 2001, the trial court expressly set the deferred judgment (along with the supervised conditions that accompanied it) to begin after defendant served his prison sentence in the Montrose case.

¶ 6 Defendant was released from prison in the Montrose case in July 2004 and began three years of mandatory parole. Pursuant to the plea agreement and the court's prior orders, his deferred judgment also began running at that time and, thus, was set to expire in July 2008.

B. Revocation Proceedings

¶ 7 On an unknown date, defendant's parole in the Montrose case was revoked, and he returned to prison. As a result of the parole revocation, in April 2006, the People filed a petition to revoke defendant's deferred judgment in this case because he was allegedly terminated from sex offender treatment (presumably because he was in prison), and the People requested that the trial court impose judgment and sentence in this case.

¶ 8 In July 2006, the trial court held a hearing on the People's petition. The People requested that the court extend defendant's deferred judgment for two years. The court concluded it lacked authority to extend it. The People then reframed their proposed extension as a condition of supervision stipulated to by the parties and requested that the deferred judgment start over as of the date of the hearing. The court agreed and continued defendant's deferred judgment to July 2010, and the People withdrew their revocation petition.

¶ 9 Between July 2006 and April 2007, defendant filed numerous motions challengingthe continued legality of his deferred judgment. As pertinent here, in August 2007, defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus for relief from his deferred judgment. The trial court denied the petition, defendant appealed that order, and the supreme court eventually accepted jurisdiction of his appeal in September 2007. In 2007 and 2008, additional petitions to revoke the deferred judgment for various alleged violations were also filed by the People. Eventually, it was revoked and the matter was set for resentencing. However, before that hearing could occur, the supreme court issued its decision dismissing the case entirely, as more fully discussed below.

C. People v. Carbajal

¶ 10 In December 2008, the supreme court announced its opinion in People v. Carbajal, 198 P.3d 102 (Colo.2008)( Carbajal I ). Initially, the court noted that, although defendant's request for relief from his deferred judgment was titled as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, it was “more accurately described as a challenge to the trial court's jurisdiction.” Id. at 105.

¶ 11 Defendant argued, and the court agreed, that the trial court had exceeded its jurisdiction by impermissibly extending his deferred judgment “well beyond the statutory limits.” Id. The court noted three examples of the trial court's impermissible actions: (1) starting the deferred judgment after defendant's prison sentence in the Montrose case was completed (approximately three years after his plea in this case), rather than on the date of his guilty plea, as required by the statute; (2) holding a hearing on the People's first revocation petition which was filed eight months after defendant's deferred judgment statutorily ended; and (3) continuing the deferred judgment an additional two years beyond the statutory maximum. Id. at 106–07.

¶ 12 The court held that section 18–1.3–102

strictly controls a trial court's authority to impose a deferred judgment, and a trial court lacks authority to impose a deferred judgment outside the statute's limits. Once a defendant pleads guilty to a felony, the deferred judgment statute allows the trial court to continue the defendant's case without entering judgment for up to four years from the date of the plea, and implement probation-like supervision conditions in return for the continuance.

Id. at 105–06 (citing § 18–1.3–102(1), C.R.S.2011).

¶ 13 In construing section 18–1.3–102(2), C.R.S.2011, the court held that if the People wish to revoke a defendant's deferred judgment, they must file their revocation petition no later than thirty days after the four-year time period expires. Id. at 106. Further, if a defendant serves four years of deferred judgment supervision for a felony without revocation or permissible extension, his or her guilty plea must be withdrawn and his case must be dismissed with prejudice. Id.

¶ 14 Regarding the first petition for revocation filed in April 2006, the supreme court noted that the deferred judgment statute divested the trial court of its authority to hear revocation petitions filed more than thirty days after a deferred judgment expires. Id. at 106–07. Thus, it concluded that the People's petition was filed eight months after defendant's deferred judgment ended by operation of law. Id. at 107.

¶ 15 The court then considered the trial court's action of restarting the deferred judgment by stipulation and concluded that the trial court lacked authority to sanction the agreed-upon extension. Id. The court reasoned as follows:

The deferred judgment statute dictates [defendant's] deferred judgment began on August 30, 2001, the date he entered his plea, and ran until August 30, 2005, four years later. The People were allowed to file a revocation petition before September 29, 2005 [an additional thirty days as prescribed by the statute], but the trial court lacked authority to consider petitions filed after that date. The trial court had authority to extend [defendant's] deferred judgment one hundred and eighty days for restitution, but could not otherwise extend it beyond four years, despite any stipulations by the parties.

Id.

¶ 16 The supreme court thus found that the trial court improperly started the deferredjudgment nearly three years after his plea and continued it for nearly seven years after his plea, heard a revocation petition filed eight months after the statutory limit, and acquiesced to a stipulated two-year extension. Id.

¶ 17 Accordingly, the supreme court concluded that by improperly extending defendant's deferred judgment, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction, and it directed that court to dismiss defendant's deferred judgment with prejudice. Id.

D. Events Leading to This Appeal

¶ 18 Subsequent to his deferred judgment being dismissed with prejudice by the trial court on December 15, 2008, and pursuant to section 16–22–113(1)(d), C.R.S.2011, defendant filed a petition to discontinue sex offender registration, which is the subject of this appeal.

¶ 19 Pursuant to the statutory requirement in section 16–22–113(2)(c), C.R.S.2011, the trial court held a hearing on April 7, 2009. The court noted that defendant had given the proper notices as required by statute, and that no objections had been filed. The court then asked if the People had any objection to defendant's discontinuance...