People v. Carbajal
Decision Date | 06 October 1993 |
Docket Number | No. B076685,B076685 |
Citation | 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 500,19 Cal.App.4th 287 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | Previously published at 19 Cal.App.4th 287, 24 Cal.App.4th 646, 29 Cal.App.4th 827, 34 Cal.App.4th 431 19 Cal.App.4th 287, 24 Cal.App.4th 646, 29 Cal.App.4th 827, 34 Cal.App.4th 431 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Jose CARBAJAL, Defendant and Respondent. |
Michael D. Bradbury, Dist. Atty. Co. of Ventura, Kent Baker and William Radmond, Deputy Dist. Attys., for plaintiff and appellant.
Kenneth I. Clayman, Public Defender, Susan R. Olson and Neil Quinn, Deputy Public Defenders, for defendant and respondent.
Jose Carbajal was convicted of violating Vehicle Code section 20002 subdivision (a) commonly referred to as "hit-and-run." The sole issue is whether restitution to the owner of the parked car struck by respondent is a proper condition of probation. We hold that the trial court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, may order restitution in a "hit-and-run" case.
We transferred the cause pursuant to California Rules of Court rule 62(a) after certification by the Appellate Department of the Ventura County Superior Court.
The municipal court concluded that it was without power to order restitution based on People v. Escobar (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1504, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 579. It did order respondent to pay any civil judgment rendered against him as a result of the collision. People v. Escobar, supra, silent on the impact of Proposition 8, was officially published nearly contemporaneously with an opinion by the Appellate Department of the Ventura County Superior Court, People v. Dailey (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d Supp. 13, 286 Cal.Rptr. 772. In People v. Dailey, supra, the appellate department analyzed the issue of restitution in the context of "hit-and-run," noted the prior cases and the conflicts therein, considered the impact of Proposition 8, and held that restitution was permissible.
In the instant case, with one judge dissenting, the appellate department, relying on the Dailey analysis, held that the trial court had the power to order restitution in a "hit-and-run" case.
In its order for certification, the appellate department said: 1
To the extent that the appellate department "chose" to follow its own previous published opinion as opposed to a contrary Court of Appeal opinion, it was simply without power to do so. This was the identical situation which led our Supreme Court to decide Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 20 Cal.Rptr. 321, 369 P.2d 937. "Decisions of every division of the District Courts of Appeal are binding upon all the justice and municipal courts and upon all the superior courts of this state, and this is so whether or not the superior court is acting as a trial or appellate court." (Id., at p. 455, 20 Cal.Rptr. 321, 369 P.2d 937.)
In any event, we understand the legitimacy of the debate at both the trial court and appellate levels. Although the appellate department asked us, to "resolve the conflict," we point out that only the California Supreme Court can do so. As we shall explain, we agree with the rule and rationale of People v. Dailey, supra.
Several Court of Appeal opinions have held that because fault is not an element of a hit-and-run offense, a trial court cannot impose restitution to the "victim." (See e.g., People v. Escobar, supra, 235 Cal.App.3d 1504, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 579; People v. Corners, supra, 176 Cal.App.3d 139, 221 Cal.Rptr. 387; People v. Lafantasie (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 758, 224 Cal.Rptr. 13; contra People v. Walmsley (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 636, 214 Cal.Rptr. 170 subsequently limited in People v. Lafantasie, supra, 178 Cal.App.3d 758, 224 Cal.Rptr. 13; see also People v. Dailey, supra, 235 Cal.App.3d Supp. 13, 286 Cal.Rptr. 772.)
The settled statement indicates respondent collided with a lawfully parked vehicle causing damage to it and left without leaving his name and other information required by Vehicle Code section 20002 subdivision (a). The obvious purpose of the statute is to protect the owner of the damaged property from financial loss and to prevent an attempt to escape potential liability on the part of the "hit-and-run" driver. (Miglierini v. Havemann (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 570, 573, 49 Cal.Rptr. 795.) Both of these purposes may be served by a restitution order.
(People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 233, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 520, 851 P.2d 802.) In so stating, the Supreme Court recognized the many statutory directives regarding restitution, fines and costs.
Penal Code section 1203.1 provides in pertinent part:
In People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486, 124 Cal.Rptr. 905, 541 P.2d 545, our Supreme Court held: (See also People v. Welch, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 233-234, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 520, 851 P.2d 802.)
A year later our Supreme Court again considered the restitution issue, this time for a defendant who had been found not guilty of an offense for which restitution was sought. The court indicated that (People v. Richards (1976) 17 Cal.3d 614, 619-620, 131 Cal.Rptr. 537, 552 P.2d 97.)
(Id., at p. 620, 131 Cal.Rptr. 537, 552 P.2d 97.)
The Supreme Court did, however, impose a limitation on the exercise of discretion. (People v. Richards, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 622, 131 Cal.Rptr. 537, 552 P.2d 97, emphasis added.)
These rules permit an order of restitution to the victim of a "hit-and-run" where, as here, civil liability is clear. The restitution is "... directly related to that crime." (Id., at p. 622, 131 Cal.Rptr. 537, 552 P.2d 97.) Since flight from the collision gives rise to an inference of fault and avoidance of liability as a state of mind when the offense was committed, the trial court in its discretion may determine that restitution would make a defendant accept responsibility for the harm he caused and the liability he sought to avoid. This is a salutary rehabilitative purpose. We therefore disagree with People v. Lafantasie, supra, and others to the extent they hold, as a matter of law, restitution is not appropriate on a conviction of hit-and-run. 2
Restitution in the "hit-and-run" context is "reasonably related to the crime...." (People v. Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486, 124 Cal.Rptr. 905, 541...
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People v. Carbajal
...Respondent, v. Jose CARBAJAL, Appellant. No. S036146. Supreme Court of California, In Bank. Dec. 30, 1993. Prior report: Cal.App., 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 500. Respondents' petition for review MOSK, PANELLI, KENNARD and BAXTER, JJ., concur. ...