Peoples v. Corners

• Decision Date: 23 December 1985
• Citation: 176 Cal.App.3d 139,221 Cal.Rptr. 387
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. James Allen CORNERS, Defendant and Respondent. Crim. 13854.

Page 387

221 Cal.Rptr. 387

176 Cal.App.3d 139

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. James Allen CORNERS, Defendant and Respondent.

Crim. 13854.

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

Dec. 23, 1985.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Jane N. Kirkland, Supervising Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and appellant

Latimer, Kenkel & Bussey and Jerry J. Kenkel, Chico, for defendant and respondent.

CARR, Associate Justice.

The issue presented in this appeal is whether a defendant who is convicted of unlawfully leaving the scene of an injury-accident but acquitted of criminal wrongdoing for the accident itself may be ordered to pay restitution to the injured person. Defendant James Corners was charged with assault with a deadly weapon by use of an automobile and infliction of great bodily injury (Pen.Code, §§ 245, subd. (a)(1), 12022.7) and with unlawfully leaving the scene of an accident in which a person was injured (Veh.Code, §§ 20001, 20003). ¹ A jury found defendant guilty of

the hit-and-run violation but acquitted him of the assault charges. The trial court placed defendant on five years probation and denied the People's request to order the payment of restitution to the injured person. The People in this appeal challenge the court's refusal to order the requested restitution. We conclude the court properly refused to order restitution and shall affirm.

FACTS ²

On July 14, 1982, an altercation took place between defendant and Roger Cetina at a bowling alley. A third person, Rex Kleinert, became involved in the altercation. After some pushing and shoving defendant began driving away in his van. Kleinert climbed onto the back of the van to obtain its license number. After Kleinert jumped off the van, defendant drove over a curb and across a sidewalk and landscaped area and hit or ran over Kleinert, severely injuring him. Defendant left the scene without stopping to identify himself or render aid.

There is no evidence in the record before us that Kleinert's injuries were aggravated in any manner by defendant's failure to stop and render assistance. We therefore assume Kleinert's injuries stemmed solely from being struck by defendant's van.

DISCUSSION

Trial courts have broad discretion under Penal Code section 1203.1 to prescribe conditions of probation, including the payment of restitution to the victim of the crime of which defendant was convicted. ³ (People v. Richards (1976) 17 Cal.3d 614, 619, 131 Cal.Rptr. 537, 552 P.2d 97.) Such discretion is not unlimited, however. (Ibid.) Generally, a condition of probation is invalid if it " '(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality....' " (People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486, 124 Cal.Rptr. 905, 541 P.2d 545.)

Unlike other jurisdictions, California courts do not limit restitution to the actual losses caused by the crime of which defendant was convicted. "But courts must tread lightly in this area lest they be reduced to 'mere collection agencies' [citations], and restitution must in each case be narrowly tailored to serve a purpose described in section 1203.1." (People v. Richards, supra, 17 Cal.3d at pp. 619-620, 131 Cal.Rptr. 537, 552 P.2d 97, italics added.) As the court in Richards explains: "The major goal of section 1203.1 is to rehabilitate the criminal. Restitution imposed in a proper case and in an appropriate manner may serve the salutary purpose of making a criminal understand that he has harmed not merely society in the abstract but also individual human beings, and that he has a responsibility to make them whole." (Id., at p. 620, 131 Cal.Rptr. 537, 552 P.2d 97.) However, "[d]isposing of civil liability cannot be a function of restitution in a criminal case. To begin with, the criminal justice system is essentially incapable of determining that a defendant is in fact civilly liable, and if so, to what extent. A judge may infer from a jury verdict of guilt in a theft case that a defendant is liable to the crime victim. But a trial court cannot properly conclude that the defendant owes money to a third party for other unproved or disproved crimes or conduct. A party sued civilly has important due process rights, including appropriate pleadings, discovery, and a right to a trial by jury on the specific issues of liability and damages. The judge in the criminal trial should not be permitted to emasculate those rights by simply declaring his belief that the defendant owes a sum of money." (Ibid.)

No matter how compelling the evidence of civil liability may be, the jury in a criminal case makes no finding of such liability. At the criminal trial, defendant need only raise a reasonable doubt regarding the elements of the crime charged. No duty is placed upon him, nor could it be, to prove that he is not civilly liable. Any legal conclusion in a criminal trial that he is so liable contravenes defendant's due process rights. (Id., at p. 621, 131 Cal.Rptr. 537, 552 P.2d 97.)

"Thus, 'Restitution or reparation is not a substitute for a civil action to recover damages' [citation], and a defendant's duty of restitution cannot be predicated merely on a purported debt." (Ibid.) However, as "California courts have approved the imposition for rehabilitative purposes of restitution not limited to the loss caused by the offense of which the defendant was convicted," the question is whether an order to pay restitution serves "a demonstrably rehabilitative purpose." (Id., at pp. 621-622, 131 Cal.Rptr. 537, 552 P.2d 97.)

In Richards, defendant was charged with two counts of grand theft involving two different persons arising out of the sale of mining claims and quitclaim deeds. The jury convicted defendant as to one sale, but found him not guilty of the charge arising from a sale to one William Ward. The trial court placed defendant on probation and imposed a condition that he pay $925 in "restitution" to Ward.

In reversing the order of restitution, the Supreme Court found no evidence that defendant committed the acts toward Ward with the same state of mind as the acts for which he was convicted. Thus, "making defendant pay restitution to Ward would [not] in any way rehabilitate him for his proved criminal behavior toward Mrs. Garbuio [the victim of the other crime]." (17 Cal.3d at pp. 623-624, 131 Cal.Rptr. 537, 552 P.2d 97.)

It is irrelevant that the burden of proof is lighter in a civil case. "It is a criminal proceeding in which the defendant, protecting his liberty, will be acquitted if he raises a reasonable doubt of his guilt. In the course of convincing a jury to doubt his guilt on one charge, a defendant should not have the additional task of persuading the judge regarding the subsequent sentencing disposition on other charges." (Id., at p. 624, 131 Cal.Rptr. 537, 552 P.2d 97.)

The court distinguised the case of People v. Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d 481, 124 Cal.Rptr. 905, 541 P.2d 545, in which the defendant, a law firm investigator, negotiated with an insurance carrier for the settlement of a claim for personal injuries of the daughter of a former client of the firm, after the firm withdrew from the case. Defendant received a check for $1,278 on the daughter's behalf, which her mother signed. Although the amount was to be applied to the payment of medical bills, defendant did not pay them. The mother received an additional check from the insurance carrier and paid $500 of the proceeds to defendant, which he represented was for this employer's attorney fees. Defendant pocketed the money for himself. Defendant was charged with grand theft as to each transaction. He was acquitted of a theft charge arising from the $1,278 transaction and was convicted on the $500 transaction. The court placed defendant on probation and ordered him to pay restitution for the total funds, including those represented by the charge of which he was acquitted.

The People, relying on the lesser burden of proof in a civil tort action, argued the evidence was sufficient to support a civil judgment in the amount of the $1,278. The court rejected this argument. "The flaw ... is that restitution cannot be based on mere civil claims; it must relate to past or future criminal conduct. Here we do not have criminal acts uncharged or untried, or victims uncomplaining or unknown [citation]; in this instance criminal acts were charged, the cause fully tried, and the defendant exonerated by the jury of criminal responsibility for the $1,278. Ordinarily such result would preclude inclusion of that item in the restitution order." (People v. Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 487, 124 Cal.Rptr. 905, 541 P.2d 545.)

The court, however, held there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court's ordering restitution of the full funds under the particular circumstances of that case. As the court observed, "additional circumstances were developed in the unusually prolonged probation hearing conducted by the meticulous trial judge. Unlike the typical abbreviated probation and sentence proceeding, this matter occupied nearly two court days; the People presented seven witnesses and the defendant two on that issue alone.... [p] At the conclusion of the probation hearing the trial judge declared that while he gave consideration to defendant's acquittal of the theft of the $1,278, under the state of the record he did not deem the verdict to have absolved defendant of the 'false statements about where those proceeds went and for what purpose.' The judge was convinced 'that Mr. Lent in his testimony before the jury perjured himself as respects the disposition of the proceeds of this $1,278 check.' And, finally, the court found that the total 'culpability of Mr. Lent is not displayed in the setting of this case but is reflected further in the evidence [produced] at the formal probation hearing.' " (Ibid.)

In People v....