People v. Carbajal

• Citation: 899 P.2d 67,43 Cal.Rptr.2d 681,10 Cal.4th 1114
• Decision Date: 14 August 1995
• Docket Number: No. S036146,S036146
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 899 P.2d 67, 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6421, 95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 10,943 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Jose CARBAJAL, Defendant and Respondent.

Page 681

43 Cal.Rptr.2d 681

10 Cal.4th 1114, 899 P.2d 67, 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6421,

95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 10,943

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Jose CARBAJAL, Defendant and Respondent.

No. S036146.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

Aug. 14, 1995.

Michael D. Bradbury, District Attorney, Kent Baker, William Redmond and Kevin G. Denoce, Deputy District Attorneys, Riverside, for plaintiff and appellant.

Kenneth I. Clayman, Public Defender, Christine L. Briles, Susan R. Olson, Neil Quinn and Bryant A. Villagan, Deputy Public

Defenders, Los Angeles, for defendant and respondent.

Michael P. Judge, Public Defender (Los Angeles), David Meyer, Assistant Public Defender, Albert J. Menaster and Kathy Quant, Deputy Public Defenders, Los Angeles, as amici curiae on behalf of defendant and respondent.

WERDEGAR, Justice.

In this case we are asked to decide whether, when a defendant is convicted of leaving the scene of an accident in violation of Vehicle Code section 20002, subdivision (a) (commonly known as "hit-and-run") ¹, a trial court, in the proper exercise of its discretion, may order restitution as a condition of probation. (All further statutory references are to the Vehicle Code, unless otherwise noted.) We hold it is within the trial court's discretion in such a case to condition probation on payment of restitution to the owner of the property damaged in the accident from which the defendant unlawfully fled. A restitution condition in such a case can be reasonably related to the offense underlying the conviction and can serve the purposes of rehabilitating the offender and deterring future criminality. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 19, 1992, Jose Carbajal was arrested for violating section 20002, subdivision (a). Defendant was driving his car when he collided with an unoccupied vehicle, legally parked on the side of the road, causing damage to the parked car. Defendant drove away without leaving his name and other information required by law. Charged with violation of section 20002, subdivision (a), he pleaded no contest and admitted violating an unspecified condition of probation. ² On March 20, 1992, the trial court dismissed one count of driving with a suspended license in violation of section 14601.1, subdivision (a), placed defendant on probation for three years, and ordered him to pay a $250 fine and any civil judgment arising from the accident. The court reinstated his previous grant of probation on the same terms and conditions as had previously been imposed.

At the time defendant entered his plea of no contest, the People asked the court to order, as a condition of probation, that defendant pay restitution to the person whose car was damaged in the accident. The trial court, citing People v. Escobar (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1504, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 579, denied the request. ³ The People appealed this ruling to the Ventura County Superior Court, Appellate Department. The Appellate Department held, pursuant to People v. Dailey (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d Supp. 13, 286 Cal.Rptr.

772, the [10 Cal.4th 1120] trial court had discretion to order restitution. ⁴ The appellate department certified[899 P.2d 70] the transfer of the case to the Court of Appeal, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 62(a). The Court of Appeal affirmed. We granted defendant's petition for review to resolve the question. ⁵

DISCUSSION

We deal in this case with restitution as a condition of probation. Probation is generally reserved for convicted criminals whose conditional release into society poses minimal risk to public safety and promotes rehabilitation. (Pen.Code, § 1203.1; People v. Welch, (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 233, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 520, 851 P.2d 802.) The sentencing court has broad discretion to determine whether an eligible defendant is suitable for probation and, if so, under what conditions. (Pen.Code, § 1203.1, subd. (b); Cal.Rules of Court, rule 414; People v. Warner (1978) 20 Cal.3d 678, 682-683, 143 Cal.Rptr. 885, 574 P.2d 1237.) The primary goal of probation is to ensure "[t]he safety of the public ... through the enforcement of court-ordered conditions of probation." (Pen.Code, § 1202.7.) As we stated recently, conditions of probation "are routinely imposed when the sentencing court determines, in an exercise of its discretion, that a defendant who is statutorily eligible for probation is also suitable to receive it." (People v. Welch, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 230, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 520, 851 P.2d 802.) In the granting of probation, the Legislature has declared the primary considerations to be: "the nature of the offense; the interests of justice, including punishment, reintegration of the offender into the community, and enforcement of conditions of probation; the loss to the victim; and the needs of the defendant." (Pen.Code, § 1202.7.)

In granting probation, courts have broad discretion to impose conditions to foster rehabilitation and to protect public safety pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.1. (See In re Bushman (1970) 1 Cal.3d 767, 776, 83 Cal.Rptr. 375, 463 P.2d 727, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486, fn. 1, 124 Cal.Rptr. 905, 541 P.2d 545; People v. Dominguez (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 623, 627, 64 Cal.Rptr. 290; People v. Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486, 124 Cal.Rptr. 905, 541 P.2d 545; People v. Richards (1976) 17 Cal.3d 614, 619, 131 Cal.Rptr. 537, 552 P.2d 97.) "The court may impose and require ... [such] reasonable conditions[ ] as it may determine are fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done, that amends may be made to society for the breach of the law, for any injury done to any person resulting from that breach, and generally and specifically for the reformation and rehabilitation of the probationer." (Pen.Code, § 1203.1, subd. (j).) The trial court's discretion, although broad, nevertheless is not without limits: a condition of probation must serve a purpose specified in the statute. In addition, we have interpreted Penal Code section 1203.1 to require that probation conditions which regulate conduct "not itself criminal" be "reasonably related to the crime of which the defendant was convicted or to future criminality." (People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486, 124 Cal.Rptr. 905, 541 P.2d 545.) As with any exercise of discretion, the sentencing court violates this standard when its determination is arbitrary or capricious or " ' "exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being considered." ' [Citations.]" (People v. Welch, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 233, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 520, 851 P.2d 802.)

Restitution has long been considered a valid condition of probation. (People v. Miller (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 348, 352, 64 Defendant correctly notes that article I, section 28, of the California Constitution, also known as Proposition 8, grants victims of crime a constitutional right "to restitution from the wrongdoers for financial losses suffered as a result of criminal acts...." (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (a), italics added.) Under Proposition 8 and its implementing legislation (Pen.Code, § 1203.04), the right to restitution, defendant argues, is limited to losses caused by the crime of which a defendant is convicted. ⁷

                [899 P.2d 71] Cal.Rptr. 20.)  Penal Code section 1203.1 requires trial courts to "consider whether the defendant as a condition of probation shall make restitution to the victim or the Restitution Fund," and requires the court to "provide for restitution in proper cases."  (Pen.Code, § 1203.1, subds.  (b) & (a)(3).) 6  California courts have long interpreted the trial courts' discretion to encompass the ordering of restitution as a condition of probation even when the loss was not necessarily caused by the criminal conduct underlying the conviction.  Under certain circumstances, restitution has been found proper where the loss was caused by related conduct not resulting in a conviction (People v. Miller, supra, 256 Cal.App.2d at pp. 355-356, 64 Cal.Rptr. 20), by conduct underlying dismissed and uncharged counts (People v. Goulart (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 71, 79, 273 Cal.Rptr. 477), and by conduct resulting in an acquittal (People v. Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 483, 124 Cal.Rptr. 905, 541 P.2d 545).   There is no requirement the restitution order be limited to the exact amount of the loss in which the defendant is actually found culpable, nor is there any requirement the order reflect the amount of damages that might be recoverable in a civil action.  (See In re Brian S.  (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 523, 528-532, 534, fn. 4, 181 Cal.Rptr. 778.)
                

We disagree. Penal Code section 1203.04, in addition to requiring restitution for losses resulting from the defendant's criminal acts, further provides that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed to limit the authority of the court to grant or deny probation or provide conditions of probation. " (Pen.Code, § 1203.04, subd. (g), italics added.) In light of this language, we find unconvincing defendant's claim that the electorate in passing Proposition 8, and the Legislature in enacting section 1203.04, intended to narrow the circumstances under which restitution is proper, so as to preclude courts from exercising their discretion to impose restitution for losses not caused by the crime underlying a defendant's conviction. As one court has stated: "In view of the strongly expressed concern for victims suffering losses as a result of a criminal activity an interpretation effectively limiting a victim's rights to restitution would be in derogation of the expressed intent and purposes of Proposition 8 and the provisions adopted by the Legislature to implement this measure." (People v. Baumann (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 67, 83, 222 Cal.Rptr. 32.) We accept this reasoning and conclude that nothing in Proposition 8 or in Penal Code section 1203.04 purports to limit or abrogate the trial court's discretion, under ...