People v. Cardenas

• Decision Date: 27 March 2014
• Docket Number: Court of Appeals No. 11CA1954
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Dallas CARDENAS, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

338 P.3d 430

2014 COA 35

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff–Appellee

v.Dallas CARDENAS, Defendant–Appellant.

Court of Appeals No. 11CA1954

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. V.

Announced March 27, 2014

John W. Suthers, Attorney General, Michael D. McMaster, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Law Office of Suzan Trinh Almony, Suzan Trinh Almony, Broomfield, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant

Opinion

Opinion by JUDGE BERNARD

¶ 1 Does proof that a defendant arranged for another person to purchase sexual services performed by a child satisfy the elements of the crime of trafficking in children? Based on the statute's plain language, we conclude that the answer to this question is “no.” We further conclude that the prosecution must prove something else to satisfy those elements, such as showing that a defendant transferred physical or legal custody of the child to another person permanently or for a defined period in exchange for money or other consideration.

¶ 2 A jury convicted defendant, Dallas Cardenas, of trafficking in children and several other prostitution-related felonies. He contends in this appeal that the evidence submitted at trial was insufficient to satisfy the elements of the crime of trafficking in children. We agree with this contention. We therefore reverse his conviction for that crime, vacate that conviction and the sentence for that conviction, and remand the case to the trial court to enter a judgment of acquittal on that charge.

¶ 3 But we disagree with defendant's argument that the trial court erred when it admitted evidence about a tattoo on his arm. Therefore, we affirm defendant's convictions for pimping an adult, pimping a child, pandering a child, and inducing child prostitution.

I. Background

¶ 4 The victim, a seventeen-year-old girl, met defendant, an eighteen-year-old man, at a rave in March 2010. They became friends. In May 2010, the victim spent some nights at defendant's apartment.

¶ 5 Defendant offered the victim a “business” proposition in which they would be partners. He suggested that he post advertisements on the Internet stating that the victim would provide massages. The callers who responded to the advertisements “would be expecting sex.” The victim tacitly agreed to this business model.

¶ 6 In May 2010, defendant arranged to post the first advertisement on an adult services website that referred to the victim as “Texas Girl.” It stated: “My name is [ ]. I love the city life and trying new things and meeting new people. I do front, back, and full body massage[s], and I have the hands of a[g]oddess!” The advertisement added that persons interested in purchasing massages could call a telephone number. The number belonged to the victim's cellular telephone.

¶ 7 Men started calling soon after the advertisement was posted. Defendant listened to the conversations on the telephone's speaker. He coached the victim to ask the callers to “talk dirty” to her in an effort to weed out undercover police officers. (Defendant apparently labored under the mistaken impression that police officers are not allowed to “talk dirty” in the course of their undercover investigations.) He also instructed her to tell the callers that her rates were $150 for one-half hour and $175 for one hour.

¶ 8 The victim met with six or seven of these callers over the course of the next few days. A third person drove defendant and the victim to the place where the victim had arranged to meet the callers. She engaged in sex acts with each of these men. She then gave all the money that the men paid her to defendant, and he returned some of it to her.

¶ 9 The victim invited one of her friends, who was eighteen years old, to stay with her at defendant's apartment. Defendant convinced the friend to participate in the criminal business, too, and the friend engaged in several acts of prostitution.

The criminal business collapsed when the police arrested the friend during a sting operation. The friend's statements led the police to defendant, the victim, and others who were part of the business.

¶ 11 A grand jury indicted defendant for the class two felony of trafficking in children because the victim was seventeen years old. It also indicted him for the class three felonies of pimping a child, pimping an adult, pandering a child, inducing child prostitution, and trafficking in adults.

¶ 12 At trial, the friend testified that, during the time when defendant was pimping her, she went with him to a tattoo parlor. Defendant got a tattoo on his forearm of the letters “MOB.” Defendant told the friend that “MOB” meant “[m]oney [o]ver [b]itches.”

¶ 13 Defendant's counsel objected to this testimony. He argued that it was irrelevant and “unduly prejudicial.” The trial court overruled the objection.

¶ 14 Defendant asked the trial court to enter a judgment of acquittal on the trafficking in children and trafficking in adults charges. He argued that the prosecution's evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to prove the elements of those offenses. The court denied this request. (The jury hung on the trafficking in adults charge during its deliberations. The prosecution later dismissed that charge.)

¶ 15 There are two jury instructions that are pertinent to our analysis. First, Instruction 16 listed the elements of the crime of trafficking in children:

1. That the defendant,

2. in the State of Colorado, between and including May 1, 2010, and May 22, 2010,

3. knowingly,

4. sold, exchanged, bartered, or leased a child under the age of 18 years, and

5. received any money or consideration for the child under the age of 18 years.

¶ 16 Instruction 20 provided the following definitions that defendant had requested:

“BARTER” is defined as exchanging goods or services without using money.

“LEASE” is defined as a contract by which one owning such property grants to another the right to possess, use[,] and enjoy it for a specified period of time in exchange for periodic payment of a stipulated price, referred to as rent.

“SELL” is defined as to dispose of by sale.

“EXCHANGE” is defined as to part with, give[,] or transfer for an equivalent.

¶ 17 (The trial court overruled the prosecution's objections to these definitions. The prosecution has not filed a cross-appeal contesting that ruling.)

¶ 18 While the jury was deliberating, it asked the trial court the following questions, and the court gave the following answers:

• Question: “Does one human need to own or control another person to sell, exchange[,] barter[,] or lease [him or her]?”

• Answer: “[The court] can only refer you to the definitions in [I]nstruction 20.”

• Question: “Is there a legal definition of trafficking?”

• Answer: “Trafficking is defined by its elements as set forth in [Instruction 16]. That is the only definition [the court] can give you under the law.”

¶ 19 The jury convicted defendant of trafficking in children, pimping an adult, pimping a child, pandering a child, and inducing child prostitution. The court sentenced him to eight years in prison for trafficking in children, a concurrent eight-year sentence for pimping an adult, and concurrent four-year sentences for pimping a child, pandering a child, and inducing child prostitution.

II. Trafficking in Children

¶ 20 Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal on the trafficking in children charge because the evidence was not sufficient to support a conviction on that charge. We agree.

¶ 21 “[J]udgment of acquittal must be entered where the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's verdict of guilty.” People v. Sprouse, 983 P.2d 771, 776 (Colo.1999) ; see also Crim. P. 29. Courts review this evidence “in the light most favorable to the prosecution.” Dempsey v. People, 117 P.3d 800, 807 (Colo.2005). But, the evidence must be both “substantial and sufficient to support the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We “review the record de novo to determine whether the evidence before the jury was sufficient both in quantity and quality to sustain the convictions.” Id. ; Montes–Rodriguez v. People, 241 P.3d 924, 927 (Colo.2010).

¶ 22 And when the inquiry involves issues of statutory construction and application, we also review those issues de novo. Montes – Rodriguez, 241 P.3d at 927. In construing a statute, we strive to “effectuate the legislature's intent.” Id. We first consider the “plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language.” People v. Voth, 2013 CO 61, ¶ 21, 312 P.3d 144 (internal quotation marks omitted). We refer to recognized dictionary definitions to determine the ordinary meaning of words. Griego v. People, 19 P.3d 1, 9 (Colo.2001). We avoid interpretations that would lead to “illogical or absurd result[s].” Frazier v. People, 90 P.3d 807, 811 (Colo.2004). And, where a provision exists as part of a “statutory scheme,” it “must be understood, when possible, to harmonize the whole.” BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Patterson, 185 P.3d 811, 813 (Colo.2008).

¶ 23 A person commits trafficking in children if he “[s]ells, exchanges, barters, or leases a child and receives any money or other consideration or thing of value for the child as a result of such transaction.” § 18–3–502(1)(a), C.R.S.2013. A child is “a person under eighteen years of age.” § 18–3–502(2). The statute does not define the terms “sell,” “exchange,” “barter,” or “lease.”

¶ 24 We conclude that section 18–3–502's plain language prohibits the sale, exchange, barter, or lease of a child, but not the sale, exchange, barter, or lease of a child's services . We reach this conclusion for the following reasons.

¶ 25 The ordinary meaning of the verbs “sell,” “exchange,” “barter,” and “lease” involves the transfer of a right of ownership or possession. See Voth, ¶ 21 (We first consider the “plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Griego, 19 P.3d at 9 (we refer to dictionary definitions to determine the...