People v. Carpentier

• Decision Date: 01 April 1994
• Docket Number: No. 10,Docket No. 97268,10
• Citation: 521 N.W.2d 195,446 Mich. 19
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Louis E. CARPENTIER, Jr., Defendant-Appellee. Calendar,
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 195

521 N.W.2d 195

446 Mich. 19

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Louis E. CARPENTIER, Jr., Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 97268.

Calendar No. 10, April Term, 1994.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued April 6, 1994.

Decided Aug. 2, 1994.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Thomas L. Casey, Sol. Gen., Arthur A. Busch, Pros. Atty., Donald A. Kuebler, Chief, Research, Training and Appeals, and Gladys Christopherson, Asst. Pros. Atty., Flint, for people.

Earl R. Spuhler, Fenton, and Kenneth Malkin, Bay City, for defendant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Thomas L. Casey, Sol. Gen., John D. O'Hair, Pros. Atty., and Timothy A. Baughman, Chief, Research, Training and Appeals, Detroit, for amicus curiae Wayne County Prosecutor's Office.

Kenneth M. Malkin, Bay City, for amicus curiae Crim. Defense Attys. of Michigan.

OPINION

BRICKLEY, Justice.

This case asks us to determine, in the context of a collateral challenge of juvenile adjudications used for purposes of subsequent recidivist sentencing and where the relevant juvenile records have been expunged, which party bears the initial burden of proving that the underlying convictions were procured without counsel or a proper waiver of counsel. Because we conclude that the alleged error is a jurisdictional defect not subject to the prerequisites of MCR 6.508(D)(3), judicial review of defendant's collateral challenge is appropriate and the circuit court decision dismissing for lack of "good cause" is reversed. Similarly, while we affirm the reasoning of the Court of Appeals we do not remand because, applying the mandates of People v. Moore, 391 Mich. 426, 216 N.W.2d 770 (1974), defendant has failed to meet his initial burden of proof that a constitutional violation occurred.

Specifically, we hold that Moore, when properly interpreted and extended to the facts of this case, prohibits the extraordinary relief sought by defendant. Because defendant presented neither (1) prima facie proof that his prior juvenile adjudications were procured in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), nor (2) evidence that his request for such proof was refused by the sentencing court, or that the sentencing court failed to reply to his request, he has failed to satisfy his initial burden of showing that the circuit court erred by relying on prior juvenile adjudications in which he was allegedly not represented by counsel for purposes of sentencing.

I

In 1982, defendant Louis E. Carpentier, Jr., armed with a revolver, robbed a bank of over $5,000 during business hours. In 1983, a jury convicted him of armed robbery, ¹ and the court sentenced him to twenty-five to fifty years imprisonment.

Defendant appealed the length of his sentence as excessive under People v. Coles, 417 Mich. 523, 339 N.W.2d 440 (1983), rev'd People v. Milbourn, 435 Mich. 630, 461 N.W.2d 1 (1990), and the Court of Appeals remanded the case for an articulation of the reasons for the sentence. After remand, the Court affirmed the sentence, holding it justified under Coles. ² This Court denied leave to appeal. ³

In November 1992, defendant again challenged the length of his sentence by filing for relief from judgment under MCR 6.508. Defendant alleged that he should be resentenced because the trial court considered juvenile adjudications that were constitutionally infirm to determine his sentence, in that he was not represented by counsel and did not waive the right to representation at the juvenile adjudications. At the sentencing hearing, defendant was twenty-one years old, and his prior contacts with the juvenile system were noted on the presentence hearing report. ⁴ The defendant verified the accuracy of his juvenile history, and he did not object to the use of those adjudications. While the transcripts of those proceedings existed at the time of his sentencing and during his initial appeal, they were physically destroyed pursuant to administrative policy before the filing of defendant's MCR 6.508 motion.

Finding that defendant had failed to establish "good cause" as required by MCR 6.508(D)(3), the trial court denied his motion. The Court of Appeals, however, concluded that defendant's Sixth Amendment claim "represents, if established, a jurisdictional defect ... and thus the 'good cause' requirement of MCR 6.508(D)(3)(a) is not, by its own terms, applicable." Accordingly, the Court of Appeals ordered the case remanded to the trial court for consideration of defendant's collateral challenge.

This Court granted leave to appeal on February 3, 1994. 444 Mich. 940, 514 N.W.2d 762.

II

Defendant's collateral challenge is brought pursuant to MCR 6.508(D)(3), which provides, in pertinent part:

The defendant has the burden of establishing entitlement to the relief requested. The court may not grant relief to the defendant if the motion

* * * * * *

(3) alleges grounds for relief, other than jurisdictional defects, which could have been raised on appeal from the conviction and sentence or in a prior motion under this subchapter, unless the defendant demonstrates

(a) good cause for failure to raise such grounds on appeal or in a prior motion, and

(b) actual prejudice from the alleged irregularities that support the claim for relief. [Emphasis added.]

It is clear that, by its own terms, the "good cause" and "actual prejudice" prerequisites of MCR 6.508(D)(3) need not be satisfied where a defendant properly alleges a jurisdictional defect in a prior proceeding that resulted in conviction and sentence. It is also apparent that MCR 6.508--which articulates the procedures for obtaining postappeal relief--permits jurisdictionally based challenges to be raised after a criminal appeal has been exhausted. Certainly, if a criminal defendant may obtain postconviction review by establishing "good cause" and "actual prejudice" under MCR 6.508(D)(3), that defendant may alternately procure review by properly alleging the jurisdictional defect contemplated and exempted from the requirements of this rule. See also People v. Johnson, 396 Mich. 424, 442, 240 N.W.2d 729 (1976) ("Defendant may always challenge whether the state had a right to bring the prosecution in the first place").

In this case, the Court of Appeals specifically found that defendant's allegation of a Gideon violation at prior juvenile proceedings established a jurisdictional defect and, accordingly, remanded to the circuit court for consideration of defendant's claim. The Court of Appeals reasoning has recently been affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1732, 128 L.Ed.2d 517 (1994). In Custis, the Court held that, as a matter of federal law, a criminal defendant possesses the constitutional right to collaterally challenge a prior conviction that is used to enhance a sentence when that defendant alleges that the prior conviction was procured in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Reviewing its history of permitting habeas corpus collateral challenges based on alleged right to counsel violations, the Court explained that it had long "attributed a jurisdictional significance to the failure to appoint counsel," and reiterated that this alleged Sixth Amendment violation constituted such a jurisdictional defect:

"If the accused, however, is not represented by counsel and has not competently and intelligently waived his constitutional right, the Sixth Amendment stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and sentence depriving him of his life or his liberty[.] ... The judgment of conviction pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereunder may obtain release by habeas corpus." [Id., --- U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1737 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024-25, (1938)).]

Notably, while affording "jurisprudential significance" to alleged Gideon claims, the Court expressly limited the availability of collateral challenges to these particular Sixth Amendment violations and refused to extend the opportunity for relief to other alleged constitutional infirmities. Custis, --- U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1734 ("We hold that a defendant has no such right [with the sole exception of convictions obtained in violation of the right to counsel] to collaterally attack prior convictions"). This limitation was based, in part, on the "historical basis in [United States Supreme Court] jurisprudence of collateral attacks for treating the right to have counsel appointed as unique...." Id., 114 S.Ct. at 1737-1738. The Court further emphasized that such a limitation was compelled by the ease of administration that accompanied such exceptional claims, and by the federal court's interest in promoting the finality of judgments for other non-Gideon challenges. Id., at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1739.

We find the reasoning of Custis both persuasive and consistent with Michigan common law. Like the federal courts, both the Michigan judiciary singularly, and the citizenry whose collective rights and protections it is obligated to protect, have a compelling interest in championing the finality of criminal judgments. However, and again like the federal courts, Michigan has recognized the unique import of a defendant's constitutional right to counsel. See, e.g., People v. Ingram, 439 Mich. 288, 484 N.W.2d 241 (1992); People v. Crawford, 417 Mich. 607, 614, 339 N.W.2d 630 (1983) (Brickley, J., concurring). The exceptional nature of this constitutional protection counsels for similarly atypical protection. For this reason, we align ourselves with the rationale and result of Custis and hold that an alleged Gideon violation constitutes a jurisdictional defect that may be collaterally challenged by a convicted criminal defendant. ⁵

Because defendant's collateral challenge raises a jurisdictional defect not subject to the "good cause" or "actual prejudice" demands of MCR 6.508(D)(3), ...