People v. Ingram

• Decision Date: 01 November 1991
• Docket Number: No. 90698,90698
• Citation: 484 N.W.2d 241,439 Mich. 288
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Marion B. INGRAM, Defendant-Appellee. ,
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 241

484 N.W.2d 241

439 Mich. 288

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Marion B. INGRAM, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 90698, November Term, 1991.

Calendar No. 10.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued November 5, 1991.

Decided May 1, 1992.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Gay Secor Hardy, Sol. Gen., William A. Forsyth, Kent County Pros. Atty., Timothy K. McMorrow, Chief Appellate Atty., Nadine Renee Dahm, Asst. Pros. Atty., Grand Rapids, for plaintiff-appellant.

E. Craig Smith, Grand Rapids, for defendant-appellee.

OPINION

RILEY, Justice.

In this case we are asked to determine whether failure by a plea-taking court to adhere to applicable plea-taking requirements during the plea proceeding provides a defendant the opportunity to challenge the validity of a conviction so obtained in a collateral attack. ¹ Collateral attacks, as opposed to direct appeals, require consideration of the interests of finality and of administrative consequences.

Therefore, for the reasons set forth in People v. Crawford, 417 Mich. 607, 614-616, 339 N.W.2d 630 (1983) (Brickley, J., concurring), we conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing defendant's conviction. Accordingly, we reverse.

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

On May 8, 1987, defendant Marion B. Ingram was arrested for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor or while having a blood alcohol content of 0.10 percent (OUIL). M.C.L. Sec. 257.625; M.S.A. Sec. 9.2325. Defendant was charged in the Kent Circuit Court with OUIL, third offense. The complaint made reference to four underlying OUIL convictions. Two of these convictions were obtained in the 5th District Court, one in 1977 and the other in 1983. The third conviction was obtained in the 61st District Court in 1982, the fourth in the Ottawa Circuit Court in 1983. On March 18, 1988, defendant moved for reduction of the charged offense to OUIL, second offense, claiming that three of the four prior plea-based convictions were invalid for the purpose of establishing the factual predicate for OUIL, third offense. Defendant conceded the validity of the Ottawa Circuit Court plea-based conviction.

On April 22, 1988, Kent Circuit Judge George S. Buth ruled that the two 5th District Court prior convictions were infirm (having been obtained without counsel). However, Judge Buth ruled that the 1982 61st District Court conviction was not infirm (because defendant had been represented by counsel) and could be used to establish the factual predicate for OUIL, third offense. Because two valid underlying OUIL convictions remained, defendant's motion to reduce the charged offense was denied. On December 6, 1988, the Court of Appeals denied defendant's application for interlocutory review of this issue.

On March 1, 1989, defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty of OUIL, third offense, preserving the right to appeal the validity of his prior 61st District Court conviction. Circuit Judge Dennis C. Kolenda, to whom the case had been reassigned, accepted defendant's plea.

On June 6, 1989, Judge Kolenda denied defendant's motion for reconsideration of the issue concerning the validity of the 61st District Court prior conviction, concluding that a claim that a court failed to adhere to the applicable plea-taking requirements during the plea proceeding does not provide defendant the opportunity to challenge by later attack. On July 5, 1989, rather than appealing, defendant filed a motion in the 61st District Court to withdraw his 1982 guilty plea which was used to establish the factual predicate for OUIL, third offense in the present case. On August 8, 1989, 61st District Judge James B. Howard vacated the guilty plea, set the conviction aside, and reinstated the 1982 case for trial.

On September 20, 1989, Judge Kolenda denied defendant's motion to withdraw his 1989 plea of guilty to OUIL, third offense. Defendant then filed an application for leave to appeal in the Court of Appeals. However, while the application was pending, the circuit court found that defendant had violated the terms of his delayed sentence status. Therefore, on November 27, 1989, the court revoked that status and sentenced him to eighteen months to five years in prison. On February 5, 1990, defendant's pending application for leave to appeal was dismissed without prejudice. Defendant then appealed as of right.

On December 17, 1990, the Court of Appeals reversed the defendant's conviction and remanded the case for entry of a conviction of OUIL, second offense, and resentencing thereon, 186 Mich.App. 615, 465 N.W.2d 39 (1990).

On March 22, 1991, this Court granted leave to appeal. ²

II. ANALYSIS

Federal and state courts, have consistently found that considerations of finality and administrative consequences must become part of the process with which we assure the achievement of proceedings that are consistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure. ³ Such considerations have been found to be of particular significance in cases where courts have been confronted with the concerns surrounding the procedural issue of collateral attack of plea-based convictions. ⁴ We agree and therefore hold that failure of a plea-taking court to adhere to applicable plea-taking requirements during the plea proceeding does not provide a defendant the opportunity to challenge by collateral attack. ⁵ The validity of such a plea, where the defendant was represented by an attorney when entering the plea or when the defendant intelligently waived the right to counsel, including the right to court-appointed counsel if indigent, is unassailable. ⁶

The issue of collateral attack was not directly presented to, nor addressed by, the Courts in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), People v. Jaworski, 387 Mich. 21, 194 N.W.2d 868 (1972), or People v. Yost, 433 Mich. 133, 445 N.W.2d 95 (1989). The only time that this Court has addressed the issue of a collateral attack of a prior plea-based conviction was in People v. Crawford.

In Crawford, the majority stated:

"A conviction defective under Jaworski can be challenged by a timely motion by the defendant to quash the supplemental information or to strike from the supplemental information the defective conviction. To be timely, such a motion must be made before a defendant's plea of guilty or nolo contendere is accepted." Id. 417 Mich. at 613-614, 339 N.W.2d 630.

However, because the defendant did not make a timely motion, the Crawford Court affirmed his conviction. Thus, by refusing to allow a collateral attack, the Court was not called upon to actually implement the holding it seemed to announce in the above-quoted paragraph. Rather, the Court conceded in its holding that it did not have the factual underpinnings from which to make a ruling regarding the propriety of a collateral attack of a prior plea-based conviction.

However, today, with the issue directly before us, we adopt Justice Brickley's analysis in his concurring opinion in Crawford, reasoning that only those prior plea convictions taken in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), should be subject to collateral attack.

"Denial of the right to counsel mandated by Gideon is a deprivation of rights altogether different from the issues before us here. The denial of the right to counsel impugns the integrity of the conviction, raising doubts about the guilt of the accused. It is for that reason, and that reason only, that the use of a counselless conviction is forbidden in collateral proceedings notwithstanding that the defendant did not raise the issue on direct review. The requirement of a record waiver of the right to remain silent, to cross-examine witnesses against him, and to be tried by a jury which is required by Boykin- Jaworski, while undoubtedly important, pales beside the right to counsel.

"The United States Supreme Court has never forbidden the use of Boykin -violative convictions in state recidivist proceedings. A majority of this Court does so today because Boykin rights are of constitutional stature. Such reasoning begs the question. The right to be free from unreasonable searches, the right to effective assistance of counsel, the right to a properly instructed jury, and countless other rights are also of a constitutional nature. Are we now to assume that all violations of constitutional rights not raised during direct review of a conviction may now be reviewed during habitual offender proceedings? I agree with Justice Stevens, writing for a unanimous Supreme Court in United States v. Timmreck, 441 US 780, 784, 99 S Ct 2085 [2087] 60 L Ed 2d 634 (1979) (failure to advise defendant of a special parole term as required by F R Crim P 11 cannot be raised collaterally) when he states:

" 'For the concern with finality served by the limitation on collateral attack has special force with respect to convictions based on guilty pleas.

" ' "Every inroad on the concept of finality undermines confidence in the integrity of our procedures; and, by increasing the volume of judicial work, inevitably delays and impairs the orderly administration of justice." ' " People v. Crawford, supra 417 Mich. at 615-616, 339 N.W.2d 630.

We are also in agreement with Justice Brickley's conclusion:

"The adoption by the majority of this rule does nothing to further the interests of finality. Instead of providing incentive for raising claims on direct review where proper relief can be afforded and the error corrected, the majority allows a claim dormant for ten years to be resurrected when the defendant's tactical considerations so require." Id. at 616, 339 N.W.2d 630.

Moreover, we find the reasoning presented by Justice Brickley in Crawford consistent with the reasoning of the Courts in Boykin and Jaworski. Neither Boykin nor Jaworski dealt with collateral attacks. These cases were decided in the context of direct appeals. Boykin and Jaworski provide...