People v. Carrera
| Citation | 346 Ill.Dec. 507,940 N.E.2d 1111,239 Ill.2d 241 |
| Decision Date | 18 November 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 109294.,109294. |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee,v.Jesus CARRERA, Appellant. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Alexander M. Salerno, of North Riverside, for appellant.Lisa Madigan, Atty. Gen., of Springfield, and Joseph E. Birkett, State's Atty., of Wheaton (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor Gen., Michael M. Glick, Katherine D. Saunders, Asst. Attorneys Gen., of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.
Defendant, Jesus Carrera, pled guilty to a drug offense and was sentenced to probation. After defendant had completed his probation on the drug offense, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) instituted deportation proceedings based upon defendant's guilty plea to the drug offense. Accordingly, defendant filed a petition under the Post–Conviction Hearing Act (the Act) (725 ILCS 5/122–1 et seq. (West 2006)), seeking to challenge his guilty plea. The circuit court of Du Page County dismissed defendant's petition. The Appellate Court, Second District, affirmed. 394 Ill.App.3d 368, 333 Ill.Dec. 684, 915 N.E.2d 755. This court then granted defendant's petition for leave to appeal. 210 Ill.2d R. 315.
On June 28, 2004, defendant pled guilty to one count of unlawful possession of less than 15 grams of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2004)). At the plea hearing, the trial court asked, “ No
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immigration problems, nothing like that?” Defendant's trial counsel answered, The trial court then sentenced defendant to 24 months' probation. Defendant completed his probation on June 26, 2006.
Sometime after his hearing, defendant, a legal resident of the United States, misplaced his green card. Accordingly, he applied to replace the card. On December 6, 2007, the INS took defendant into custody and instituted deportation proceedings against him.
On January 18, 2008, defendant filed a petition for postconviction relief. In his petition, defendant asserted that it was only when he was detained by the INS on December 6, 2007, that he became aware of the immigration consequences of his June 28, 2004, guilty plea. Defendant noted that he had lived in the United States for 40 of his 46 years, had no prior convictions, had never been incarcerated, and supported a wife and four children ranging in age from 8 to 15. Defendant argued that his guilty plea was not voluntary because it was made in reliance upon his counsel's erroneous advice, reiterated in open court, that no immigration consequences would result from the guilty plea. Defendant acknowledged that his petition was not timely, but argued that he was not culpably negligent because the issue of his attorney's ineffective assistance did not become an issue until defendant was detained by the INS.
The trial court found that defendant's petition presented “a gist of a claim for denial of a constitutional right” and advanced the petition to the second stage under the Act. See 725 ILCS 5/122–2–1(b) (West 2006). At the second stage, the State moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that defendant was not entitled to relief under the Act because he was not a “person imprisoned in the penitentiary,” as required under section 122–1(a) in order to bring a claim under the Act. See 725 ILCS 5/122–1(a) (West 2006). In the alternative, the State argued that defendant could not establish that his counsel's performance was deficient, or that he was prejudiced by any alleged deficiency.
At the hearing on the State's motion to dismiss, the trial court stated that the law was “murky,” but that it would err on the side of finding that defendant had standing to file his petition, even though his probation had terminated by the time the petition was filed. However, the trial court found that defense counsel was not “objectively deficient,” so that defendant had not made a substantial showing of a constitutional violation. The trial court therefore granted the State's motion to dismiss defendant's petition.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of defendant's petition, but on a different ground. 394 Ill.App.3d 368, 333 Ill.Dec. 684, 915 N.E.2d 755. The appellate court agreed with the State's argument that defendant did not have standing to bring his claim under the Act because he was not a “person imprisoned in the penitentiary,” as required under section 122–1(a). 394 Ill.App.3d at 370, 333 Ill.Dec. 684, 915 N.E.2d 755. For that reason, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's order granting the State's motion to dismiss defendant's postconviction petition.
At issue in this case is whether defendant has standing to pursue postconviction relief under the Act even though he has served his sentence on the conviction that he seeks to challenge in his postconviction petition. As noted, the appellate court found that defendant lacked standing because he was not “imprisoned in the penitentiary” at the time he filed his petition
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Defendant argues that because he faces deportation as a result of his guilty plea, he should not be precluded from seeking postconviction relief. Our review of the dismissal of defendant's postconviction petition is de novo. People v. Pack, 224 Ill.2d 144, 147, 308 Ill.Dec. 735, 862 N.E.2d 938 (2007).
The Act provides that “[a]ny person imprisoned in the penitentiary may institute a proceeding under this Article * * *.” 725 ILCS 5/122–1(a) (West 2006). In People v. Dale, 406 Ill. 238, 246, 92 N.E.2d 761 (1950), overruled in part on other grounds, People v. Warr, 54 Ill.2d 487, 298 N.E.2d 164 (1973), this court held that the words “imprisoned in the penitentiary” prevented those who had completed their sentences from using the Act's remedial machinery solely to purge their criminal records. Rather, only those whose liberty was actually restrained were entitled to the protection afforded by the Act. Dale, 406 Ill. at 246, 92 N.E.2d 761.
However, this court has held that the Act does not require actual incarceration as a strict prerequisite to instituting a proceeding under the Act. People v. West, 145 Ill.2d 517, 519, 164 Ill.Dec. 912, 584 N.E.2d 124 (1991). Rather, courts in this state have always held that a defendant's liberty interests are paramount when construing the Act. Pack, 224 Ill.2d at 150, 308 Ill.Dec. 735, 862 N.E.2d 938. Consequently, “imprisoned in the penitentiary” has been held to include defendants who have been released from incarceration after timely filing their petition ( People v. Davis, 39 Ill.2d 325, 235 N.E.2d 634 (1968)), and defendants who were on mandatory supervised release at the time their postconviction petitions were filed ( People v. Correa, 108 Ill.2d 541, 92 Ill.Dec. 496, 485 N.E.2d 307 (1985)). In addition, a prisoner serving consecutive sentences has been held to be imprisoned under any one of those sentences for purposes of section 122–1(a). Pack, 224 Ill.2d at 152, 308 Ill.Dec. 735, 862 N.E.2d 938. Likewise, those sentenced to probation or released on parole may file petitions under the Act. People v. Martin–Trigona, 111 Ill.2d 295, 299–300 (1986) (). In each of the preceding cases, “imprisoned” for purposes of section 122–1(a) has been held to include petitioners whose liberty, in some way or another, was curtailed to a degree by the state. Pack, 224 Ill.2d at 152, 308 Ill.Dec. 735, 862 N.E.2d 938.
In Martin–Trigona, the court held that a defendant released on an appeal bond was “imprisoned in the penitentiary” for purposes of filing a petition under the Act. Martin–Trigona, 111 Ill.2d at 300, 95 Ill.Dec. 492, 489 N.E.2d 1356. The court explained that:
“Relief is available under the Act to all persons whose liberty is constrained by virtue of a criminal conviction, and a criminal sentence is relevant only so far as it predicts at what point in time any particular convicted person will be released from the fetters accompanying his conviction so that he is no longer in need of the Act's remedial procedures to secure his liberty.” Martin–Trigona, 111 Ill.2d at 301, 95 Ill.Dec. 492, 489 N.E.2d 1356.
Subsequently, in People v. West, 145 Ill.2d 517, 164 Ill.Dec. 912, 584 N.E.2d 124 (1991), this court held that postconviction relief was unavailable to a petitioner who had fully served his underlying sentence. That sentence was used as an aggravating factor by a sentencing court in Arizona to sentence the petitioner to death. West, 145 Ill.2d at 518, 164 Ill.Dec. 912, 584 N.E.2d 124. The petitioner sought to attack
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his Illinois conviction in order to challenge his Arizona sentence. West, 145 Ill.2d at 518, 164 Ill.Dec. 912, 584 N.E.2d 124. This court held that the petitioner's incarceration in Arizona was not imprisonment within the meaning of the Act, because the defendant had fully served his Illinois sentence and mandatory supervised release period. West, 145 Ill.2d at 519, 164 Ill.Dec. 912, 584 N.E.2d 124. The court explained that “[t]he person must be in prison for the offense he is purporting to challenge.” West, 145 Ill.2d at 519, 164 Ill.Dec. 912, 584 N.E.2d 124.
In Pack, however, the court held that a defendant sentenced to consecutive sentences of 7 and 60 years could challenge the conviction that resulted in the 7–year sentence, after he had served almost 13 years in the penitentiary. Pack, 224 Ill.2d 144, 308 Ill.Dec. 735, 862 N.E.2d 938. The court distinguished our decision in West on the ground that the petitioner in West was not serving consecutive sentences. Pack, 224 Ill.2d at 153, 308 Ill.Dec. 735, 862 N.E.2d 938. Rather, the defendant in West had fully served his sentence and was seeking to challenge his...
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