People v. Carter

• Decision Date: 03 December 2015
• Docket Number: No. 117709.,117709.
• Citation: People v. Carter, 43 N.E.3d 972 (Ill. 2015)
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Kelvin CARTER, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

43 N.E.3d 972

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant

v.Kelvin CARTER, Appellee.

No. 117709.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 3, 2015.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, and Anita Alvarez, State's Attorney, Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Michelle Katz, Annette Collins, Michelle Grimaldi–Stein, and Brian K. Hodes, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Alan D. Goldberg, Deputy Defender, and Jennifer L. Bontrager, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, Chicago, for appellee.

OPINION

Justice KARMEIERdelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1This case comes before the court from an appellate court decision holding that remand is required “because the circuit judge's sua sponte dismissal of [defendant-petitioner's]petition for relief from judgment on the merits was premature given that the petition was not properly served on the State.”2014 IL App (1st) 122613, ¶ 1, 380 Ill.Dec. 271, 8 N.E.3d 441.For the following reasons, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant, Kelvin Carter, was found guilty of the 2002 murder of Edmond Allen.Identification evidence was supplied by four occurrence witnesses.The circuit court ultimately imposed a 20–year prison sentence in addition to a 25–year enhancement, which was statutorily mandated because of the court's determination that defendant had personally discharged a firearm during the commission of the crime.The court had initially sentenced defendant to a 30–year term of imprisonment, but immediately amended its determination, imposing the 20–year minimum instead after realizing that defendant was subject to the enhancement.The appellate court affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence in 2006(People v. Carter,No. 1–04–1385, 363 Ill.App.3d 1193, 334 Ill.Dec. 808, 917 N.E.2d 634(2006)(unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 )) and this court denied leave to appeal (People v. Carter,221 Ill.2d 647, 306 Ill.Dec. 276, 857 N.E.2d 675(2006)(table)).

¶ 4 Thereafter, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition alleging, inter alia, that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel, and that the State had engaged in multiple instances of prosecutorial misconduct.Defendant's petition was summarily dismissed, the circuit court finding it frivolous and patently without merit.The appellate court affirmed (People v. Carter,No. 1–07–2160, 389 Ill.App.3d 1144, 364 Ill.Dec. 645, 976 N.E.2d 1208(2009)(unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 )) and this court denied leave to appeal (People v. Carter,233 Ill.2d 570, 335 Ill.Dec. 637, 919 N.E.2d 356(2009)(table)).

¶ 5 On May 9, 2012, defendant mailed a “Motion to Vacate Judgment” in which he argued that the 25–year firearm enhancement to his sentence was void because the trial court only found him guilty of murder.Defendant also argued that the trial court was bound by its initial statement of 30 years' imprisonment regardless of the statutorily required enhancement.Defendant attached a “Proof/Certificate of Service” to his pleading, alleging that he placed it in the “institutional mail” at the Menard Correctional Center.He listed as addressees, the “Clerk of Court” and “State's Atty. Office,” both of “2650 S. California Avenue,” Chicago, Illinois.The record shows a copy of defendant's pleading was stamped “received” by the circuit clerk on May 15, 2012.It was docketed on May 29, 2012, to be called on June 5, 2012.

¶ 6The circuit court called the matter on June 5, 2012, but the record of proceedings indicates that only the judge and court reporter were present.A docket entry on that date evinces the circuit court's quizzical assumption that defendant intended the pleading as a petition pursuant to section 2–1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure(735 ILCS 5/2–1401(West 2012) ).The docket and transcript for that date show that the case was scheduled for “court review” on July 10.On July 10, the court dismissed the petition on the merits.The cover page of the transcript of proceedings indicates that an assistant State's Attorney was present in the courtroom when the court announced that defendant's “2–1401 petition is dismissed,” but the transcript does not show that the assistant State's Attorney took any action.In a written order entered July 10, the circuit court recited the law applicable to section 2–1401 proceedings and concluded with this observation and finding:

“[P]etitioner contends that his firearm enhancement is void because the court did not find him guilty of personally discharging the firearm but only found him guilty of first degree murder.However, petitioner was found guilty of count two of his indictment which states that Kelvin Carter, without lawful justification shot and killed Edmond Allenwhile armed with a firearm, knowing that such an act created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to Edmond Allen.”(Emphasis in original.)

Neither party filed a postjudgment motion in the circuit court; thus, issues of sufficiency of service and notice to the State were never addressed.

¶ 7 In the words of the appellate court, on appeal, defendant-petitioner argued “that this court must remand this case to the circuit court because the court's sua sponte dismissal of his section 2–1401 petition on the merits was premature, given that the petition was not properly served on the State.”2014 IL App (1st) 122613, ¶ 8, 380 Ill.Dec. 271, 8 N.E.3d 441.The appellate court observed: “According to the proof of service attached to the section 2–1401 petition, defendant mailed his petition on May 9, 2012, and attempted to serve the State by placing the documents in the institutional mail at the Menard Correctional Center ‘properly addressed to the parties listed above for mailing through the United States Postal Service.’ ”Id.

¶ 8The appellate court noted that the State's response was two-fold.First, because an assistant State's Attorney was in court at the time that the petition was dismissed, and thus had actual knowledge of the petition, the State waived improper service by not objecting to it.As such, the petition was ripe for adjudication when it was dismissed for failure to state a cause of action more than 30 days after it was received by the court.Id.¶¶ 9, 16.Second, alternatively, the State suggested, “it is not clear from the record on appeal that defendant's service did not comply with the requirements of Rule 105(b).”Id.¶ 13.

¶ 9The appellate court rejected the latter suggestion, stating: “the record clearly shows” that petitioner's proof of service indicated “he attempted to serve the State by placing the documents in the institutional mail at the Menard Correctional Center * * * for mailing through the United States Postal Service.”(Internal quotation marks omitted.)The appellate court continued, in a conclusive and dispositional vein: “There is nothing in the record that contradicts this information, nor does either party offer anything * * *.”Id.¶ 14.

¶ 10 Then, without speaking to the merits of defendant's petition—which defendant apparently never argued—or the substance of the circuit court's ruling thereon, the appellate court reversed and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the circuit court erred in prematurely dismissing petitioner's section 2–1401 petitionsua sponte before the petition had been properly served on the State.Id.¶ 25.The court reasoned that result was dictated by our decisions in People v. Vincent,226 Ill.2d 1, 312 Ill.Dec. 617, 871 N.E.2d 17(2007), andPeople v. Laugharn,233 Ill.2d 318, 330 Ill.Dec. 780, 909 N.E.2d 802(2009) :

“Because Laugharn and Vincent demand that we base our determination as to whether the circuit court prematurely sua sponte dismissed a section 2–1401 petition by looking at the date of service, it necessarily follows that proper dismissal, either with or without prejudice, cannot be achieved without service * * *.SeeIll.S.Ct. R. 105(a)(eff. Jan. 1, 1989);Laugharn,233 Ill.2d at 323–24[330 Ill.Dec. 780, 909 N.E.2d 802];Vincent,226 Ill.2d at 5[312 Ill.Dec. 617, 871 N.E.2d 17].”2014 IL App (1st) 122613, ¶ 25, 380 Ill.Dec. 271, 8 N.E.3d 441.

¶ 11 Having rejected the State's arguments in opposition to reversal, the appellate court determined that the appropriate disposition was to vacate the judgment of the circuit court—which had found defendant's petition lacked merit—and remand for further proceedings (id.¶ 26).

¶ 12 ANALYSIS

¶ 13We review de novo the dismissal of a section 2–1401 petition(Vincent,226 Ill.2d at 18, 312 Ill.Dec. 617, 871 N.E.2d 17 ), the interpretation of court rules (In re Thomas,2012 IL 113035, ¶ 56, 356 Ill.Dec. 769, 962 N.E.2d 454 ), and questions of law generally (People v. Williams,188 Ill.2d 365, 368–69, 242 Ill.Dec. 260, 721 N.E.2d 539(1999) ).

¶ 14 At the outset, we note that Illinois Supreme Court Rule 106 governs the methods of notice to be used for petitions filed pursuant to section 2–1401, providing that “[n]otice of the filing of a petition under section 2–1401 * * * shall be given by the same methods provided in Rule 105.”Ill.S.Ct. R. 106(eff. Aug. 1, 1985).Rule 105(b) states that notice may be served, inter alia, by certified or registered mail.Ill. S.Ct. R. 105(b)(eff. Jan. 1, 1989).Once notice has been served, the responding party has 30 days to file an answer or otherwise appear.Ill. S.Ct. R. 105(a)(eff. Jan. 1, 1989).

¶ 15 As appellate panels have aptly noted, the notice requirements of Rule 105 are designed to prevent a litigant from obtaining new or additional relief without first giving the defaulted party a renewed opportunity to appear and defend.People v. Saterfield,2015 IL App (1st) 132355, ¶ 20, 393 Ill.Dec. 646, 34 N.E.3d 1174.“ ‘The object of process is to notify a party of pending...