People v. Celaya

• Decision Date: 28 April 1987
• Citation: 191 Cal.App.3d 665,236 Cal.Rptr. 489
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Carlos Christopher CELAYA, Defendant and Appellant. H000785.

Page 489

236 Cal.Rptr. 489

191 Cal.App.3d 665

The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Carlos Christopher CELAYA, Defendant and Appellant.

H000785.

Court of Appeal, Sixth District, California.

April 28, 1987.

Howard J. Specter, San Francisco, for defendant and appellant.

John K. Van De Kamp, Atty. Gen., Thomas A. Brady, Deputy Atty. Gen., Sharon G. Birenbaum, Deputy Atty. Gen., San Francisco, for plaintiff and respondent.

PHILLIPS, Associate Justice. ^*

Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction of grand theft. Following denial of defendant's in limine motion to exclude his confession, defendant waived trial by jury and agreed to submit the matter on the transcript of the preliminary hearing. It was agreed the defendant's maximum sentence would be two years in state prison if found guilty. Defendant reserved his appeal right including that relating to his motion to exclude the confession. Defendant was found guilty by the court and was thereafter sentenced to a two-year term in state prison.

Defendant's only contention on appeal is the trial court erred in denying the motion to exclude the confession. We find defendant's contention meritorious and therefore reverse the judgment.

At 12:30 a.m. on January 22, 1985, Anthony Gulizia, Jr., was awakened by a noise in his front yard. He saw a man outside with what appeared to be about four radios. Gulizia called the Santa Clara County Sheriff's Office, and two deputies came by and took a report. About an hour later, Gulizia again saw the same person walking by, going in the opposite direction, carrying a chrome box.

Gulizia put his dog out so it would bark if the person came back again. At about 2:30 or 3:00 a.m., alerted by the dog's barking, Gulizia noticed the same person walking by. He went outside and confronted the man. The man was squatting between a tool box and what appeared to be an ice chest. He told Gulizia his car had broken down, and he had been carrying his things to a friend's house. Gulizia again notified the sheriff's office, and gave them a description of the individual. At the preliminary hearing, Gulizia identified the defendant as the individual.

At 9:00 a.m. the same morning, Albert Quintara noted that his locked van had been broken into, and that several items were missing, including a smoke inhalator, a handgun and ammunition, a portable television-radio, a portable heater, and a tool box. A report was filed with the sheriff. Sergeant Robert Rutgers was assigned to investigate this theft.

On February 8, 1985, defendant accompanied his wife to the Santa Clara County Sheriff's Office. His wife was there on a matter unrelated to this case. Sergeant Rutgers recognized defendant as matching the description of the person wanted in the Quintara theft. He told defendant he would like to talk to him, and defendant accompanied him into the interview room which was in the detective's bureau in an adjacent area in the building.

Sergeant Rutgers obtained defendant's drivers license and ran a check on it. He then advised defendant he was a suspect in relation to the Quintara theft, and his questions were in regard to that case. Defendant was asked if he knew anything about the theft and whether he had any of the stolen property. Although the record does not specifically reflect defendant's answers to these questions, Rutgers testified that defendant "did not deny" involvement in the theft.

Sergeant Rutgers then told defendant he wanted his cooperation one way or another. When defendant asked what he meant, the following discussion occurred.

"A I told him the investigation can proceed either the hard way or the easy way.

Q And did you explain to him what the hard way and easy way was?

A Yes, I did.

Q And what did you mean by that?

A Hard way was that he'd be taken in immediate custody, that he would be booked, that he would be placed in the main jail facility, that a lineup would proceed when I would bring witnesses in for personal identification and from there, upon identification, I would seek a search warrant in reference to obtaining property at 285 Staples where he resided with Wanda Sasser.

The easy way was that I was seeking his cooperation, that although if he had admitted the crime that he was--would be detained for further questioning, however no arrest would take place until the D.A. re-viewed the case, and then in an effort to obtain the victim's property back and he wished to agree and assist in the investigation rather than go through booking procedures.

Q And what did you do then?

A I slightly discussed the case with him and advised him of his Miranda ¹ rights."

At some point before he was Mirandized, defendant admitted the theft, although the record is not clear if it was before or after Sergeant Rutgers told appellant they could proceed "the easy or hard way."

At the preliminary hearing, Sergeant Rutgers also testified concerning this same conversation.

"... I asked him, shall we do this interview the easy or the hard way? And he preferred the easy way. And I said, fine, then you wish to cooperate. He said yes. And you did a vehicle theft, got a gun and air-pack and tools. I want them back. He answered, are you arresting me? I said, no, not now if you can get the items back. He stated, let me see the list. He was reviewing the list which is the crime report by the victim. He stated I can get back all but the green tool box, but I'll try. I'm sure I can get it back. And I stated, now we're going to do it the right way. And he was read his Miranda rights and I received a second statement from him."

Sergeant Rutgers testified further:

"Q You gave him a choice of either cooperating with you, answering your questions and returning the property, or the alternative of being booked in the county jail at that time; is that right?

A That's correct.

Q And then Mr. Celaya said that he would cooperate with you, and he would return the property; is that right?

A Yes, he did.

Q And it was after that conversation that you then read from the card the Miranda warning; is that right?

A In essence, yes."

Sergeant Rutgers then read defendant his Miranda rights. Defendant waived his rights, and said he wanted the interview to continue.

Sergeant Rutgers then took a statement from defendant wherein he admitted burglarizing the truck and said he still had the stolen items. Defendant agreed to work with Sergeant Rutgers to get the items back. Defendant agreed to return with the stolen items on the following Monday. He said he would not run. Sergeant Rutgers then permitted defendant to leave. Defendant neither returned to the sheriff's office on Monday, nor returned any of the stolen items.

Sergeant Rutgers testified defendant fit the description he had of the suspect (dark haired, dark eyes, 5'6"' to 5'8"', 130-140 lbs., 30 years old, male-Mexican.) Sergeant Rutgers also possessed information that a male Mexican had been seen at 285 Staples, where the occupants were otherwise known to be "Caucasians." Sergeant Rutgers also knew this residence was approximately three blocks from the victim's house.

From another case, Sergeant Rutgers knew that defendant's wife, Wanda Sasser, lived at 285 Staples. However, he did not know that they were husband and wife until after he questioned defendant. When defendant and Wanda Sasser came into the Sheriff's office together, all the links were tied up.

The questioning took place in a room specifically used for police interviews. The room was away from the public area; other police officers were present nearby at the time of the interview.

Defendant contends the confession was elicited in violation of his Miranda rights. He maintains it was the result of a custodial interrogation, was coerced and therefore involuntary and was inextricably tied to the prior non-Mirandized interrogation and statement.

It is undisputed defendant made incriminating statements to Sergeant Rutgers before he was advised of his Miranda rights. The primary issue before us therefore, is whether defendant was "in custody" when these initial statements were made. We recently discussed "custody" as it relates to the requirement of Miranda rights in People v. Lopez (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 602, 209 Cal.Rptr. 575. There we said: " 'Custody has become the critical element which triggers the necessity for warning against incrimination, ...' (People v. Manis (1969) 268 Cal.App.2d 653, 667 .) Miranda advisement is required prior to police interrogation 'after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.' (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 444 [, 86 S.Ct. at p. 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d at p. 706].) [p] While Miranda presented the clearest example of custody, namely the official isolation of a criminal suspect in a police station ..., there is no doubt that Miranda applies 'to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way.' ... [p] A further aspect of 'custody' must be examined. Prior decisions have not been consistent in its application, but most have acknowledged an objective test of custody. People v. Ceccone (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 886, 892 , stated that a person is in custody when: '[A]s a reasonable person he is led to believe that he is physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.' (Accord, People v. White (1968) 69 Cal.2d 751, 760 [72 Cal.Rptr. 873, 446 P.2d 993]; People v. Herdan (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 300, 306 ; In re James M. (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 133, 136 ; In re Pablo C. (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 984, 988-989 .) The United States Supreme Court has recently given unequivocal approval to the objective test of custody, stating: '[T]he only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation. [Fn. omitted.]' (Berkemer [v. McCarty (1984) ], supra, 468 U.S. 420, 443-44 [82 L.Ed.2d 317, 336, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3152].)" ...