People v. Cheruku, H033498 (Cal. App. 10/28/2009)

• Decision Date: 28 October 2009
• Docket Number: H033498
• Parties: THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. HARI CHERUKU, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

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THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. HARI CHERUKU, Defendant and Appellant.

H033498

Court of Appeals of California, Sixth Appellate District

October 28, 2009

Not to be Published in Official Reports

Appeal from the Santa Clara County, Super. Ct. No. EE220771.

ELIA, J.

Appellant Hari Cheruku (Cheruku) purports to appeal from an order "denying [his] motion to reconsider his motion to vacate the conviction in this case pursuant to Penal Code section 1016.5."¹ We conclude that no appeal lies. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal.

Background

On April 18, 2002, the Santa Clara County District Attorney filed an information in which appellant was charged with one felony count of false imprisonment (Pen. Code, §§ 236-237, count one) and one count of misdemeanor sexual battery (Pen. Code, § 243.4, subd. (d)).

On April 29, 2002, Cheruku entered a plea of no contest to both counts. On May 30, 2002, the court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Cheruku on three years probation on condition that he serve 12 months in county jail on the felony count. On April 17, 2008, Cheruku filed a motion to vacate the judgment for violation of Penal Code section 1016.5.² By lengthy written order filed July 10, 2008, Judge Garibaldi denied the motion. Thereafter, on September 25, 2008, Cheruku filed a motion to reconsider his motion to vacate his conviction. On the same date, after hearing argument from the parties, Judge Garibaldi again denied Cheruku's motion to vacate.

Subsequently, on October 15, 2008, Cheruku filed a notice of appeal from "the order of the Superior Court dated September 25, 2008."

Discussion

In their respective briefs, the parties argued whether the motion to vacate was properly denied. We requested supplemental briefing on two issues; specifically, under what authority the superior court could reconsider Cheruku's motion to vacate; and if the superior court lacked that authority, was the notice of appeal timely as to the July 2008 order denying his motion to vacate.³

Cheruku asserts that no court has ever prohibited a court from reconsidering a denial of a motion to vacate and many courts have recognized that a court has broad inherent powers to reconsider its rulings. In support of this proposition Cheruku cites to cases such as Asbestos Claims Facility v. Berry & Berry (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 9, 19-24 (Asbestos Claims) and Cottle v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1377-1378.⁴

Asbestos Claims, supra, 219 Cal.App.3d 9 was a complex asbestos litigation case. (Id. at p. 13.) A law firm had been appointed by two trial courts to schedule discovery matters for all defendants in both courts. After a fee dispute arose between the law firm and the defendants, the law firm brought motions in both courts to compel payment of its fees. The trial courts granted the motions and ordered defendants to pay immediately certain past due bills, and all future bills within 30 days. (Id. at pp. 13-14.) The defendants appealed. (Id. at p. 13.)

On appeal, the defendants contended that the fee orders had to be reversed because the underlying orders establishing the designated defense counsel system were unlawful. The defendants argued that the system was unauthorized by case law, statute, or court rule. (Asbestos Claims, supra, 219 Cal.App.3d at p. 18.) The appellate court held that the orders appointing the firm to handle discovery matters for all defendants and requiring defendants to pay the firm's fees were within the inherent administrative powers of the trial courts. (Id. at p. 23.)

In reaching this holding, the First District Court of Appeal noted "all courts have inherent supervisory or administrative powers which enable them to carry out their duties, and which exist apart from any statutory authority. [Citations.]" (Asbestos Claims, supra, 219 Cal.App.3d at p. 19.) The court went on, "That inherent power entitles trial courts to exercise reasonable control over all proceedings connected with pending litigation, including discovery matters, in order to insure the orderly administration of justice." (Ibid., italics added.)

Similarly, in Cottle v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.App.4th 1367 (Cottle), numerous property owners and renters in a residential subdivision brought an action against developers for personal injuries, emotional distress, and property damage arising from the defendants' construction and development of the subdivision on a site that had been a depository of hazardous wastes and byproducts. The trial court determined that the case was a complex litigation case and required each plaintiff to file a detailed statement establishing a prima facie claim for personal injury. Plaintiffs' statements indicated that it was virtually impossible to link, with reasonable medical probability, any specific plaintiff's injury or symptom to exposure to specific toxic substances. Thereafter, the court issued an order precluding plaintiffs from submitting evidence at trial that their personal physical injuries were caused by exposure to chemicals at the subdivision. (Id. at pp. 1371-1372.)

On appeal, the plaintiffs contended that the trial court had no authority for the procedure employed by the court. (Cottle, supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 1376.) The Second District Court of Appeal held that in a complex litigation case that has been assigned to a judge for all purposes, case law and various statutory provisions give courts broad and inherent powers and serve as the sources for the authority to issue an evidence exclusion order. (Ibid.) The court noted, "courts have inherent equity, supervisory and administrative powers [citation] as well as inherent power to control litigation before them. [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 1377, italics added.)

Citing People v. Castello (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1248 (Castello), Cheruku argues that the court's inherent "`powers include authority to rehear and reconsider rulings.' " In Castello, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th 1242, the defendant pleaded guilty to nine counts of grand theft of personal property. Initially, the trial court found true an allegation that Castello suffered a prior conviction in Florida under the three strikes law. However, on subsequent motion by Castello, the court reversed this finding and held the prior did not constitute a valid "conviction." (Id. at p. 1245.) Thereafter, the court sentenced Castello to eight years, four months in state prison, with 410 days' credit for time spent in custody. The People appealed the sentence based on the court's invalidation of the prior conviction allegation, contending that the trial court lacked power to reconsider its finding under Code of Civil Procedure section 1008. (Id. at pp. 1245-1246.)

In Castello, Justice Huffman for the unanimous Fourth District Court of Appeal found that Code of Civil Procedure section 1008 does not apply in criminal matters, but instead, that "[i]n criminal cases there are few limits on a court's power to reconsider interim rulings." (Castello, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 1246, italics added.)⁵ Similar to the preceding two cases, in Castello, there was no final judgment, but only interim orders.

Nevertheless, our Supreme Court has instructed that "[o]rders and judgments are deemed final in the superior court, and not subject to reconsideration by that court, to preserve confidence in the integrity of judicial procedures and to avoid the delays and inefficiencies associated with repeated examination and relitigation of the same facts and issues. [Citation.] The concept of finality `rests upon the sound policy of limiting litigation by preventing a party who has had one fair adversary hearing on an issue from again drawing it into controversy and subjecting the other party to further expense in its reexamination.' [Citations.] This court has recognized that `[e]ndless litigation, in which nothing was ever finally determined, would be worse than occasional miscarriages of justice. . . .' [Citations.]" (People v. DeLouize (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1223, 1232, (DeLouize).)

In DeLouize, the defendant was charged with three counts of lewd acts with a minor and one count of continuing sexual abuse of a minor. For sentencing purposes, the information alleged, that the defendant had previously been convicted of the felony of robbery. After a trial, the jury returned verdicts finding defendant guilty of three counts of lewd acts with a minor. The defendant waived a jury trial on the prior conviction allegation, and, after presentation of evidence, the trial court found the allegation true. (DeLouize, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1227.)

Thereafter, the defense filed a motion for a new trial on the ground that the trial court had committed reversible instructional error. On the day set for pronouncement of judgment, the trial court granted the defense motion for a new trial. Although the prosecution could have appealed the order granting a new trial, it did not so do. (DeLouize, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1227.)

After the expiration of the 60 days within which the prosecution could have filed a timely notice of appeal, the prosecution brought a motion requesting reconsideration of the order granting a new trial, citing intervening judicial decisions. The court granted the motion to reconsider and reinstated the jury verdicts. (DeLouize, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1227.) Thereafter, the trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 17 years in state prison and the defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment. (Id. at p. 1228.)

The Court of Appeal affirmed in a partially published opinion concluding that the trial court had authority to reconsider its ruling granting a motion for a new trial; and that it properly exercised its discretion so to do. (DeLouize, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1228.) The Supreme Court granted defendant's petition for review, limiting the issue to be briefed and argued to whether the superior court retained jurisdiction to vacate its order granting defendant's motion...