People v. Clark

• Decision Date: 06 May 2016
• Docket Number: 366 KA 11-01944.
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Jaquan CLARK, also known as Devonte Hampton, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

139 A.D.3d 1368
31 N.Y.S.3d 357
2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 03621

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,
v.
Jaquan CLARK, also known as Devonte Hampton, Defendant–Appellant.

366 KA 11-01944.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

May 6, 2016.

31 N.Y.S.3d 359

Mark D. Funk, Rochester, for Defendant–Appellant.

Sandra Doorley, District Attorney, Rochester (Leah Mervine of Counsel), for Respondent.

PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., CARNI, DeJOSEPH, CURRAN, AND SCUDDER, JJ.

MEMORANDUM:

139 A.D.3d 1368

Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him following a jury trial of eight counts of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25[1], [3] ) and two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (§ 265.03[1][b] ; [3] ). The conviction arose from the murder of four people in late December 2008; one victim was killed on December 23 on Skuse Street in Rochester, and three victims were killed on December 26 at a home on Bernice Street in Rochester. The 17–year–old defendant was arrested on an unrelated warrant on January 6, 2009 and was charged with the two weapon possession counts at that time. It is undisputed that the weapon that defendant possessed on January 6, 2009 was not connected to any of the murders. We agree with defendant that Supreme Court erred in denying that part of his omnibus motion seeking severance of the weapon possession counts from the murder counts

31 N.Y.S.3d 360

because “proof of defendant's commission of the [murders] was not admissible to prove defendant's guilt of criminal possession of the [weapon] or vice versa. The incidents were unrelated in time and place and completely dissimilar in nature” (People v. Gadsden, 139 A.D.2d 925, 926, 528 N.Y.S.2d 955 ). We nevertheless conclude that, because the evidence of the murder counts is overwhelming, there is not a significant probability that defendant would have been acquitted of any of the murder counts if the evidence regarding the weapon possession counts had not been before the jury (see People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 241–242, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213, 326 N.E.2d 787 ; cf. Gadsden, 139 A.D.2d at 926, 528 N.Y.S.2d 955 ).

We reject defendant's contention that the court erred in

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refusing to suppress statements he made to the police during the 26–hour period of videotaped interrogation. It is axiomatic that the length of the interrogation period “does not, by itself, render the statement[s] involuntary” (People v. Weeks, 15 A.D.3d 845, 847, 789 N.Y.S.2d 373, lv. denied 4 N.Y.3d 892, 798 N.Y.S.2d 737, 831 N.E.2d 982 ). Instead, we must view “ ‘the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation’ ” (People v. Knapp, 124 A.D.3d 36, 41, 995 N.Y.S.2d 869 ). The detective ascertained defendant's date of birth, that he had completed the 10th grade and was obtaining his GED, that he could read and write, that he was not under the influence of alcohol or marijuana, and that he had never before been read his Miranda rights. The detective “did not restrict himself to a mere reading of the rights from a card ... [but][i]nstead ... described the rights in more detail and simpler language, verifying that defendant understood [them]” (People v. Williams, 62 N.Y.2d 285, 288, 476 N.Y.S.2d 788, 465 N.E.2d 327 ). We conclude that the court properly determined that defendant voluntarily waived his Miranda rights (see People v. Huff, 133 A.D.3d 1223, 1224, 19 N.Y.S.3d 378 ). We further conclude that his will was not overborne by coercive police tactics (cf. People v. Guilford, 21 N.Y.3d 205, 212, 969 N.Y.S.2d 430, 991 N.E.2d 204 ; Knapp, 124 A.D.3d at 47–48, 995 N.Y.S.2d 869 ). Contrary to defendant's contention, the tactics used by the police, i.e., telling defendant that they thought he was a “good kid,” stating that he would feel better when he told the truth, and challenging the inconsistencies in his statement with the evidence, were not improper or unusual where, as here, there is no evidence that defendant was of subnormal intelligence or susceptible to suggestion (cf. Knapp, 124 A.D.3d at 47–48, 995 N.Y.S.2d 869 ; see generally People v. Johnson, 52 A.D.3d 1286, 1287, 859 N.Y.S.2d 539, lv. denied 11 N.Y.3d 738, 864 N.Y.S.2d 396, 894 N.E.2d 660 ). Indeed, defendant never admitted that he committed the offenses, and he changed his version of events regarding the murders at the Bernice Street home, admitting that he was present when the murders were committed by someone else, only when confronted with fingerprint evidence establishing that he was at the home. Defendant thereafter admitted that he was present at the Skuse Street murder when he implicated another person for that murder. He explained that it was that other person who also had committed the murders at the Bernice Street home, and not the three people whom he initially implicated, but whom the police established had alibis for the time those murders were committed. The record establishes that defendant was provided with food, water, cigarettes, and bathroom breaks throughout the period (see Huff, 133 A.D.3d at 1225, 19 N.Y.S.3d 378 ; People v. Collins, 106 A.D.3d 1544, 1545, 964 N.Y.S.2d 393, lv. denied

31 N.Y.S.3d 361

21 N.Y.3d 1072, 974 N.Y.S.2d 321, 997 N.E.2d 146 ; cf. Guilford, 21 N.Y.3d at 210, 969 N.Y.S.2d 430, 991 N.E.2d 204 ; People v. Anderson, 42 N.Y.2d 35, 40, 396 N.Y.S.2d 625, 364 N.E.2d 1318 ). The record further establishes

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that there were two breaks in the interrogation, approximately six and one-half hours and five hours long, respectively, when the police were pursuing leads and that defendant slept during those breaks (see People v. McWilliams, 48 A.D.3d 1266, 1267, 852 N.Y.S.2d 523, lv. denied 10 N.Y.3d 961, 863 N.Y.S.2d 145, 893 N.E.2d 451 ). Moreover, we note that the length of the interrogation was in large part owing to “the nature of the crime[s] and defendant's conflicting and constantly changing stories to the police,” which the police investigated and attempted to verify (People v. Steward, 256 A.D.2d 1147, 1147, 684 N.Y.S.2d 109, lv. denied 93 N.Y.2d 879, 689 N.Y.S.2d 441, 711 N.E.2d 655 ). Although...