People v. Huff

• Decision Date: 13 November 2015
• Citation: 133 A.D.3d 1223,2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 08262,19 N.Y.S.3d 378
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Demetrius A. HUFF, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

133 A.D.3d 1223
19 N.Y.S.3d 378
2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 08262

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,
v.
Demetrius A. HUFF, Defendant–Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

Nov. 13, 2015.

19 N.Y.S.3d 379

Kathryn Friedman, Buffalo, for Defendant–Appellant.

Demetrius A. Huff, Defendant–Appellant Pro Se.

Frank A. Sedita, III, District Attorney, Buffalo (Nicholas T. Texido of Counsel), for Respondent.

Opinion

MEMORANDUM:

133 A.D.3d 1223

On appeal from a judgment convicting him following a jury trial of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [1]), defendant contends that Supreme Court erred in denying his motion to suppress physical evidence seized from the attic of the home where he resided with his grandmother. We reject that contention. Following a hearing, the court credited the testimony of a detective that the grandmother had voluntarily consented to the search. Although the detective was unable to obtain a written consent to the search, “[i]t is well settled that consent can be established by conduct” (People v. Sinzheimer,15 A.D.3d 732, 734, 790 N.Y.S.2d 554, lv. denied5 N.Y.3d 794, 801 N.Y.S.2d 815, 835 N.E.2d 675). According to the detective who

133 A.D.3d 1224

testified at the hearing, the grandmother, who had a master's degree, was pleasant and cooperative, she let the detectives into the house, and she led them directly to the attic and unlocked the door to the attic for them. Only after the inculpatory evidence was found did the grandmother become aggravated and refuse to sign the consent form. Although the grandmother testified that she let the detectives into her home only after they told her they had a search warrant, the

19 N.Y.S.3d 380

testifying detective denied telling the grandmother that they had a search warrant.

The court credited the testimony of the detective, and “ ‘[i]t is well settled that [t]he suppression court's credibility determinations ... are granted deference and will not be disturbed unless unsupported by the record’ ” (People v. May,100 A.D.3d 1411, 1412, 953 N.Y.S.2d 767, lv. denied20 N.Y.3d 1063, 962 N.Y.S.2d 614, 985 N.E.2d 924). Crediting such testimony, we conclude that the People met their burden of establishing “ ‘that the consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied’ by the actions of the law enforcement authorities” (People v. Quagliata,53 A.D.3d 670, 671, 861 N.Y.S.2d 792, lv. denied11 N.Y.3d 834, 868 N.Y.S.2d 609, 897 N.E.2d 1093, quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,412 U.S. 218, 248, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854). The grandmother manifested her consent to the search by her willingness to cooperate and her conduct in leading the officers to the attic and unlocking the door thereto (see People v. McCray,96 A.D.3d 1480, 1481, 946 N.Y.S.2d 744, lv. denied19 N.Y.3d 1104, 955 N.Y.S.2d 559, 979 N.E.2d 820; People v. Allah,54 A.D.3d 632, 632, 863 N.Y.S.2d 682, lv. denied12 N.Y.3d 755, 876 N.Y.S.2d 707, 904 N.E.2d 844; Quagliata,53 A.D.3d at 672, 861 N.Y.S.2d 792; cf. People v. McFadden,179 A.D.2d 1003, 1004, 579 N.Y.S.2d 273, appeal dismissed79 N.Y.2d 996, 584 N.Y.S.2d 436, 594 N.E.2d 930).

Defendant further contends that the court erred in refusing to suppress his statements to the police. At the suppression hearing, a detective testified that defendant was read and waived his Mirandarights before the initial interview. Although the actual card could not be located and thus was not presented at the hearing, the court credited the detective's unrebutted testimony, and such a credibility determination is entitled to great deference (see People v. Prochilo,41 N.Y.2d 759, 761, 395 N.Y.S.2d 635, 363 N.E.2d 1380). “[T]he warnings given by this experienced [detective] were adequate and fully conveyed to defendant his rights. No more is required” (People v. Vega,225 A.D.2d 890, 891, 639 N.Y.S.2d 511, lv. denied88 N.Y.2d 943, 647 N.Y.S.2d 177, 670 N.E.2d 461).

We reject defendant's contention that his statements were not voluntarily given because he was 17 years old at the time of the interview, allegedly suffered from a learning disability and was unaccompanied by his grandmother to the interview.

133 A.D.3d 1225

“A court generally must look to the totality of the circumstances to determine the voluntariness of an inculpatory statement ... ‘The factors to be examined in determining the totality of the circumstances surrounding a defendant's confession include the duration and conditions of detention, the attitude of the police toward the defendant, and the age, physical state, and mental state of the defendant’ ” (People v. Brown,113 A.D.3d 785, 785, 978 N.Y.S.2d 862, lv. denied23 N.Y.3d 1018, 992 N.Y.S.2d 801, 16 N.E.3d 1281; see People v. Kemp,266 A.D.2d 887, 888, 698 N.Y.S.2d 140, lv. denied94 N.Y.2d 921, 708 N.Y.S.2d 361, 729 N.E.2d 1160). In this case, defendant “was legally an adult ... Thus, there was no requirement that defendant's [guardian] be present during the police questioning” (People v. Lewis,277 A.D.2d 1010, 1011, 716 N.Y.S.2d 204, lv. denied96 N.Y.2d 736, 722 N.Y.S.2d 803, 745 N.E.2d 1026). Moreover, there was no evidence that defendant was isolated from his grandmother as a result of “official deception or trickery” (People v. Salaam,83 N.Y.2d 51, 55, 607 N.Y.S.2d 899, 629 N.E.2d 371). Although defendant contends that he suffered from a learning disability, the grandmother testified at the

19 N.Y.S.3d 381

hearing that defendant was able to complete age-appropriate school work. We thus conclude that “there is insufficient evidence in the record to support [defendant's] assertion that [he] had [a learning disability] or subnormal intelligence and, therefore, could not knowingly or intelligently waive his rights” (People v. Herr,203 A.D.2d 927, 928, 611 N.Y.S.2d 389, affd.86 N.Y.2d 638, 635 N.Y.S.2d 159, 658 N.E.2d 1032).

Defendant also challenges the voluntariness of the statement based on the seven-hour interrogation that preceded his first statement. We conclude, however, that the duration of the interview did not render the resulting statement involuntary. Defendant was given breaks to use the bathroom and smoke cigarettes, and he was offered food and beverages (see People v. Clyburn–Dawson,128 A.D.3d 1350, 1351, 7 N.Y.S.3d 770; People v. Figueroa–Norse,120 A.D.3d 913, 914, 991 N.Y.S.2d 201, lv. denied25 N.Y.3d 1071, 12 N.Y.S.3d 623, 34 N.E.3d 374; People v. Collins,106 A.D.3d 1544, 1545, 964 N.Y.S.2d 393, lv. denied21 N.Y.3d 1072, 974 N.Y.S.2d 321, 997 N.E.2d 146). We thus conclude “that the People proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's statements were voluntary” (Kemp,266 A.D.2d at 888, 698 N.Y.S.2d 140).

Contrary to defendant's further contention, we conclude that the court properly granted the People's motion to vacate defendant's earlier plea of guilty to a reduced charge of manslaughter in the first degree. In accordance with that earlier plea agreement, defendant had agreed to testify truthfully against the codefendant in exchange for being permitted to plead guilty to the reduced charge. After defendant entered his plea and was called to testify at the codefendant's trial, however, defendant denied all the facts that he had previously

133 A.D.3d 1226

admitted in his statements and plea colloquy. It is well settled that “[c]onditions agreed upon as part of a plea bargain are generally enforceable, unless violative of statute or public policy” (People v. Hicks,98 N.Y.2d 185, 188, 746...