People v. Clark
| Decision Date | 06 April 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 2014KN014252.,2014KN014252. |
| Citation | 13 N.Y.S.3d 851 (Table) |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of New York, v. Stanley CLARK, Defendant. |
| Court | New York Criminal Court |
Defendant was arraigned on the above docket on March 1, 2014, at which time the People served notice of a statement pursuant to CPL § 710.30(1)(a). The People subsequently withdrew that statement notice. On January 23, 2015, a date the case was before the court for hearings and trial, the People provided defendant with notice of a different statement that he allegedly made at the police precinct approximately 15 minutes after the time of occurrence as stated in the Information.
By motion dated February 13, 2015, defendant moves to preclude the People from offering any evidence regarding that statement, arguing that the notice is invalid, as it was provided outside the fifteen-day time frame prescribed in CPL § 710.30. On its face, the January statement notice includes a concession that it was not within the statutory fifteen day period. However, in their March 16, 2015 response to defendant's motion, the People indicate that they seek only to use the statement in question for purposes of impeachment, should the defendant choose to testify at trial. In anticipation of using the statement in this way, the People request that the Court hold a hearing as to the voluntariness of the statement.
The timing constraints of CPL § 710.30 apply only to statements which the prosecution intends to “offer at trial,” that is, as part of its direct case (see People v. Goodson, 57 N.Y.2d 828 [1982] ; People v. Harris, 25 N.Y.2d 175, 177 [1969], affd Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 [1971] ; People v. Rigo, 273 A.D.2d 258 [2d Dept 2000] ; People v. Doe, 179 A.D.2d 686 [2d Dept 1992] ).
It is clearly “the better practice” for the People to provide the defendant with some prior notice of their intention to cross-examine him regarding prior statements he allegedly made to the police (People v. Rudolph, 134 A.D.2d 539, 539–40 [2d Dept 1987] ; see also People v. Barrie, 74 A.D.2d 576, 577 [2d Dept 1980] ; cf. People v. Connor, 157 A.D.2d 739 [2d Dept 1990] [] ).
A statement may be used for impeachment purposes even where it is otherwise suppressed from use in the People's direct case due to late notice, Miranda violations, or right to counsel violations—provided only that the statement was voluntary, as that term is defined by CPL § 60.45 (People v. Maerling, 64 N.Y.2d 134, 140 [1984] ; People v. Ricco, 56 N.Y.2d 320, 323, 326 [1982] ; People v. Padron, 134 A.D.2d 625 [2d Dept 1987] ). People v. Masullo, 158 A.D.2d 548, 549 (2d Dept 1990) ; People v. Mathurine, 43 Misc.3d 222, 226 [Crim Ct Richmond County 2013] ). Thus, there is no specific timing requirement for the People to give notice of such statements, as long as the defendant has an opportunity to contest their voluntariness.
Evidently aware that defendant will be entitled to a hearing if he claims that his statement was involuntary, “no matter what facts he puts forth in support of that claim” (People v. Weaver, 49 N.Y.2d 1012, 1013 [1980] ; People v. Bingham, 144 A.D.2d 682, 683 [2d Dept 1988] ...
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