People v. Coates

• Decision Date: 14 December 1949
• Docket Number: Cr. 2165
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: PEOPLE v. COATES.

Page 263

212 P.2d 263

95 Cal.App.2d 78

PEOPLE v. COATES.

Cr. 2165.

District Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

Dec. 14, 1949.

Thomas V. Coates, San Quentin, in pro per.

C. K. Curtright, Sacramento, for appellant.

Fred N. Howser, Attorney General, by Doris H. Maier, Deputy, for respondent.

ADAMS, Presiding Justice.

On May 28, 1945, appellant Coates pleaded guilty to a violation of Section 476a of the Penal Code, and was sentenced to imprisonment for the term prescribed by law. On June 2, 1949, he filed in the Superior Court of Shasta County a petition in the nature of an application for a writ of error coram nobis, contending that the judgment against him should be set aside because his plea of guilty had been entered in exchange for probation, and that he was not given a preliminary hearing or confronted by his accuser. A hearing on said application was held at which Coates was represented by counsel appointed by the court. The application was denied and this appeal is from that denial.

In the recent case of People v. Adamson, 34 Cal.2d 320, 210 P.2d 13, the limitations of review by way of writ of error coram nobis were defined, the court saying that it is a remedy of narrow scope the purpose of which is to secure relief where no other remedy exists, from a judgment rendered while there existed some fact which would have prevented its rendition if the trial court had known it, and which, through no negligence or fault of defendant, was not then known to the court; and that an applicant for the writ must show that the facts upon which he relies were not known to him and could not, in the exercise of due diligence, have been discovered by him at any time substantially earlier than the time of his motion for the writ.

Examining appellant's contentions in the light of that decision it is obvious that he has not shown due or any diligence in presenting the facts upon which he relies, since over four years elapsed after his plea was entered before this petition was filed. It is equally obvious that such facts were known to him at the time he was sentenced, for if, as he contends, his plea of guilty was entered because he was promised probation in exchange therefor, he knew that, and he likewise knew whether or not he was given a preliminary hearing and confronted by his accuser. So, even if there were merit in his claim that his plea was induced by promise of probation (which, in fact, he does not allege), or if he was not given a preliminary hearing before a magistrate or justice of the peace, he is not entitled to a reversal of the judgment of conviction in this proceeding. In Re Tedford, 31 Cal.2d 693, 694, 192 P.2d 3, the Supreme Court said that any invalidity of proceedings prior to commitment were deemed waived by failure of defendant to move to set aside the information. To the same effect are People v. Middleton, 103 Cal.App. 135, 138, 283 P. 976 (hearing in Sup.Ct. denied and petition for certiorari to the U.S.Sup.Ct. denied, 281 U.S. 739, 50 S.Ct. 349, 74 L.Ed. 1153); Application of Dorsey, 81 Cal.App.2d 584, 586, 184 P.2d 702; In re Rogers, 91 Cal.App.2d 394, 205 P.2d 667; Pen.Code, secs. 995, 996.

The record before us further shows that at the hearing, at which he was represented by counsel, petitioner's claim that he was offered probation in exchange for a plea of...