People v. Collado

• Decision Date: 25 May 2010
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Dionis COLLADO, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

905 N.Y.S.2d 136

73 A.D.3d 608

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.Dionis COLLADO, Defendant-Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York.

May 25, 2010.

Robert S. Dean, Center for Appellate Litigation, New York (Bruce D. Austern of counsel), for appellant.

Robert M. Morgenthau, District Attorney, New York (Dana Poole of counsel), for respondent.

TOM, J.P., NARDELLI, RENWICK, FREEDMAN, ROMÁN, JJ.

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Maxwell Wiley, J.), rendered March 11, 2009, resentencing defendant, as a second violent felony offender, to an aggregate term of 8 years to be followed by 5 years postrelease supervision (PRS) for his 2005 conviction on two counts of robbery in the second degree, reversed, on the law, and the matter remanded for resentencing, including further proceedings with respect to defendant's predicate felony status.

In 2000, defendant pleaded guilty to attempted robbery in the second degree and was sentenced to a determinate term of two years, which did not include a period of PRS. After his release, the Department of Correctional Services imposed a period of PRS, and defendant then committed the robberies of which he now stands convicted. Based on the 2000 robbery conviction, defendant was adjudicated a second violent felony offender, and in 2005 he was sentenced to the concurrent terms of 8 years now under review. A five-year period of PRS was noted on the commitment sheet but was not orally pronounced. After our affirmance in 2008 (47 A.D.3d 547, 849 N.Y.S.2d 558), the Court of Appeals, citing ( People v. Sparber, 10 N.Y.3d 457, 859 N.Y.S.2d 582, 889 N.E.2d 459 [2008] ), modified to the extent of remitting to Supreme Court for resentencing (11 N.Y.3d 888, 873 N.Y.S.2d 258, 901 N.E.2d 752). Thereafter, defendant moved to set aside the sentence in the 2000 case (CPL 440.20). The sentencing court granted that motion and resentenced defendant "nunc pro tunc" for the purpose of correcting the Sparber error, imposing the minimum period of PRS and holding that correcting the sentence did not preclude use of the 2000 crime as a predicate felony in connection with sentencing in the instantcase. The court then went on to impose the resentence now under review for the 2005 conviction, "whether or not [defendant] is a second felony offender."

Where a defendant receives an enhanced sentence based upon a predicate felony offense and the sentence imposed for the predicate offense is vacated due to the failure to pronounce a term of PRS, the resentencing date controls whether the earlier crime qualifies as a predicate offense under Penal Law § 70.06(1)(b)(ii) ( see People v. Acevedo, 75 A.D.3d 255, 901 N.Y.S.2d 239,decided simultaneously herewith). Where, as here, resentencing on an earlier crime occurs after the present offense was committed, the earlier crime does "not qualify as a predicate conviction for purposes of sentencing" in multiple offender status ( People v. Wright, 270 A.D.2d 213, 215, 706 N.Y.S.2d 29 [2000], lv. denied 95 N.Y.2d 859, 714 N.Y.S.2d 10, 736 N.E.2d 871 [2000] ).

The People argue that under ( People v. Williams, 14 N.Y.3d 198, 899 N.Y.S.2d 76, 925 N.E.2d 878 [2010] ), the sentencing court lacked jurisdiction to resentence defendant on the 2000 case because the modified sentence included a period of PRS. They contend that the resentencing proceedings are thereby rendered a nullity and that the original sentence date controls for purposes of the predicate status of the conviction.

Williams bars the imposition of a period of postrelease supervision after a defendant has been released from incarceration and after his direct appeal has been completed. Because an upward modification of a defendant's sentence at this juncture violates the constitutional protection against double jeopardy, it constitutes a mode of procedural error that does not require the defendant to preserve it for appellate review. The same reasoning does not extend to the People, who are not within the ambit of the protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Nor have the People identified any procedure entitling them to contest the resentencing court's jurisdiction at this late date. Notably, they did not object to resentencing on the predicate offense, but actively sought the imposition of a period of PRS. Nor did they appeal from resentencing in the instant matter. Since this Court's review is restricted to issues "which may have adversely affected the appellant" (CPL 470.15[1] ), we cannot consider the People's alternative argument in favor of affirmance ( see People v. Karp, 76 N.Y.2d 1006, 565 N.Y.S.2d 751, 566 N.E.2d 1156 [1990] ). Moreover, defendant does not object to the modified sentence. Therefore, the issue of the sentencing court's jurisdiction is not before us.

Upon remand, the People may seek to demonstrate that a different prior felony conviction constitutes a predicate felony.

All concur except NARDELLI, J. who dissents in a memorandum as follows:

NARDELLI, J. (dissenting).

I dissent for the reasons I stated in my dissent in People v. Acevedo (--- A.D.3d ----, 901 N.Y.S.2d 239), decided herewith.

On June 29, 2000, defendant was convicted, on his plea of guilty, of attempted robbery in the second degree, a violent class D felony (Penal Law § 70.02 [1] [c] ). The court neglected to impose postrelease supervision, which was mandated by Penal Law § 70.45 as then in effect. He was resentenced on March 11,...