People v. Collins

• Decision Date: 09 April 2008
• Docket Number: No. 2-06-0088.,2-06-0088.
• Citation: 886 N.E.2d 1248
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jamal L. COLLINS, a/k/a Jamel Collins, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

886 N.E.2d 1248

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jamal L. COLLINS, a/k/a Jamel Collins, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 2-06-0088.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

April 9, 2008.

Thomas A. Lilien, Deputy Defender, and Kathleen J. Hamill (Court-appointed), Office of the State Appellate Defender, Elgin, for Jamal L. Collins.

Michael J. Waller, Lake County State's Attorney, Waukegan, Lawrence M. Bauer, Deputy Director, State's Attorney Appellate Prosecutor, Elgin, H. Brennon Holmes, Chicago, for the People.

Justice GROMETER delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Lake County, defendant, Jamal L. Collins, a/k/a Jamel Collins, was convicted of first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2000)) in connection with the stabbing death of Jaime Hernandez. On direct appeal, defendant argued, inter alia, that he was prejudiced when the jury foreman sua sponte visited the crime scene during defendant's trial. A majority of this court agreed with this contention, reversed defendant's conviction, and remanded the cause for a new trial. People v. Collins, 351 Ill.App.3d 175, 286 Ill.Dec. 228, 813 N.E.2d 285 (2004). Following a new trial by jury, defendant was convicted of second-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-2(a) (West 2000)). In this appeal, defendant argues that his conviction must be reversed because he was denied his statutory right to a speedy trial (725 ILCS 5/103-5 (West 2000)) on remand. We disagree and therefore affirm.

We initially provide a general background of the events leading to this appeal. Other relevant facts will be discussed as they become pertinent to our analysis. At his first trial, defendant did not deny stabbing Hernandez, but testified that he did so in self-defense. See Collins, 351 Ill. App.3d at 189-90, 286 Ill.Dec. 228, 813 N.E.2d 285 (Kapala, J., dissenting). At the time of the stabbing, both defendant and Hernandez were naval recruits stationed at the Great Lakes Naval Training Center in North Chicago, Illinois. The stabbing occurred near the naval base, and several of the witnesses who were expected to testify at defendant's second trial were Navy personnel.

Upon remand, the parties initially appeared before the court on January 11, 2005. At that time, defendant's attorney, Jed Stone, filed a written speedy-trial demand, answered "ready" for trial, and orally demanded trial. However, the State had difficulty reassembling some of its witnesses as they had been deployed on various assignments throughout the world. Thereafter, defendant persistently answered "ready" for trial and demanded trial, with the exception of two defense motions for continuances, one of which was denied, and the other of which extended the trial date by one day.

Defendant's trial was scheduled to begin on April 19, 2005, within the 120-day speedy-trial term (see 725 ILCS 5/103-5 (West 2000)). However, in the midst of jury selection, the State told the court that Stone was representing Kurt Nash, Jr. (Kurt), in an unrelated criminal case. Kurt was the son of Kurt Nash, Sr. (Detective Nash), a North Chicago police officer. Detective Nash was called as a witness by the State at defendant's original trial, and the State expected him to be a prosecution witness at defendant's second trial. The State told the court that Stone had just informed it that Detective Nash had paid Stone to represent Kurt. The State suggested that Stone's representation of both Kurt and defendant presented a "per se conflict of interest." With respect to the State's claim, the court learned that sometime prior to April 7, 2005, Detective Nash contacted Stone about representing Kurt in a criminal matter. Stone agreed to represent Kurt for a $7,500 fee. Detective Nash later scheduled an appointment to meet with Stone. Although Detective Nash's sister provided the funds to pay Stone, Detective Nash testified that he had agreed to reimburse his sister. Detective Nash also indicated that the "potential" existed for Stone to represent the Nashes in a civil suit resulting from Kurt's arrest. Ultimately, the trial court rejected the State's notion that a per se conflict of interest existed. Nevertheless, the court did find that defendant's entitlement to representation by an attorney of his choice was overcome by the State's showing of a "serious potential for conflict." See People v. Ortega, 209 Ill.2d 354, 283 Ill.Dec. 530, 808 N.E.2d 496 (2004); People v. Holmes, 141 Ill.2d 204, 152 Ill.Dec. 268, 565 N.E.2d 950 (1990). The conflict issue was resolved on May 17, 2005, when defendant agreed to waive any issue relating to a conflict arising from Stone's representation. At that time, the court charged defendant with any delay related to resolving the conflict issue.

By the time the matter was resolved, the State's military witnesses were no longer available, and the State was unable to reassemble them until November 2005. On November 7, 2005, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charges against him on speedy-trial grounds. The trial court denied the motion, again finding that any delay arising from Stone's potential conflict was attributable to defendant. Defendant's trial finally got underway on November 21, 2005, and the jury convicted defendant of second-degree murder. Defendant filed a posttrial motion, arguing, among other things, that his right to a speedy trial had been violated. The trial court denied the motion and sentenced defendant to 19½ years' imprisonment. This appeal ensued.

The principal issue raised on appeal is whether defendant was denied his statutory right to a speedy trial. The purpose of the statutory right to a speedy trial is to "guarantee a speedy trial and not `to open a new procedural loophole which defense counsel could unconscionably use to obstruct the ends of justice.'" People v. Gooden, 189 Ill.2d 209, 221, 244 Ill.Dec. 361, 725 N.E.2d 1248 (2000), quoting People v. George, 71 Ill.App.3d 932, 934, 28 Ill.Dec. 419, 390 N.E.2d 586 (1979). In accordance with this notion, section 103-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/103-5 (West 2000)), also known as the Speedy Trial Act (Act), provides in relevant part that "[e]very person in custody in this State for an alleged offense shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction within 120 days from the date he was taken into custody unless delay is occasioned by the defendant." A defendant who is not tried within the time period designated by the Act must be discharged from custody and the charges dismissed. 725 ILCS 5/103-5(d) (West 2000); People v. Kliner, 185 Ill.2d 81, 114-15, 235 Ill.Dec. 667, 705 N.E.2d 850 (1998).

With respect to the calculation of the speedy-trial term, our supreme court has stated that, "when a defendant prevails in an Illinois court of review, a new statutory 120-day term will commence running when the mandate issues and is docketed in the trial court." People v. Crane, 195 Ill.2d 42, 49 n. 2, 252 Ill.Dec. 687, 743 N.E.2d 555 (2001), citing People v. Worley, 45 Ill.2d 96, 98, 256 N.E.2d 751 (1970); see also People v. Quick, 321 Ill.App.3d 392, 394, 255 Ill. Dec. 157, 748 N.E.2d 1227 (2001); People v. Williams, 272 Ill.App.3d 868, 876-77, 209 Ill.Dec. 354, 651 N.E.2d 532 (1995). Here, our mandate issued on December 30, 2004. However, it was not filed in the trial court until January 4, 2005, and, as noted, the date the mandate is docketed in the trial court is the date from which the speedy-trial term is computed. Crane, 195 Ill.2d at 49 n. 2, 252 Ill.Dec. 687, 743 N.E.2d 555; see also People v. Jones, 104 Ill.2d 268, 284, 84 Ill.Dec. 495, 472 N.E.2d 455 (1984) ("[T]he speedy-trial period begins to run on the date that the mandate is filed and not the date that the mandate is issued by the appellate court"). It is undisputed that a one-day continuance occurring prior to defendant's trial was attributable to defendant. With that continuance taken into consideration, the 120th day following the filing of the mandate was May 5, 2005. Defendant's trial did not start until November 21, 2005, well beyond the 120-day speedy-trial term.

However, as noted above, the Act contemplates the tolling of the speedy-trial term where the delay is attributable to the defendant. 725 ILCS 5/103-5(a), (f) (West 2000); People v. Jones, 273 Ill.App.3d 377, 380, 210 Ill.Dec. 92, 652 N.E.2d 1068 (1995). Thus, the issue in this case becomes whether the trial court erred in attributing to defendant for purposes of calculating the speedy-trial term the delay from April 19, 2005, through the date of trial. The defendant bears the burden of establishing facts that demonstrate a violation of the Act. People v. Hall, 194 Ill.2d 305, 327, 252 Ill.Dec. 653, 743 N.E.2d 521 (2000). Here, defendant asserts various reasons why the delay should not be attributed to him. Principal among these reasons is defendant's claim that it was the State's "groundless claims" about a potential conflict of interest involving Stone that led to the delay. Accordingly, our first task is to determine whether the State's claim was groundless.

In evaluating a claim that counsel is laboring under a conflict of interest that requires disqualification, a trial court must engage in a two-step analysis. Initially, the court must determine whether there is an actual conflict of interest or there is a showing of "serious potential for conflict" between the interests of an attorney and his or her client. Ortega, 209 Ill.2d at 361, 283 Ill.Dec. 530, 808 N.E.2d 496, citing Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 164, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 1700, 100 L.Ed.2d 140, 152 (1988); see also People v. James, 368 Ill.App.3d 433, 436, 306 Ill.Dec. 440, 857 N.E.2d 839 (2006). If a conflict is found to exist, the court must then determine whether the interests threatened by the conflict overcome the presumption favoring defendant's chosen counsel. Ortega, 209 Ill.2d at 361, 283 Ill.Dec. 530, 808 N.E.2d 496. In weighing the...