People v. Connelly

• Decision Date: 15 July 1974
• Citation: 316 N.E.2d 706,35 N.Y.2d 171,359 N.Y.S.2d 266
• Parties: , 316 N.E.2d 706 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. William CONNELLY, Appellant. The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Linda AHRENS, Also Known as Linda Palmateer, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 266

359 N.Y.S.2d 266

35 N.Y.2d 171, 316 N.E.2d 706

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. William CONNELLY, Appellant.

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Linda AHRENS, Also Known as Linda Palmateer, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

July 15, 1974.

Noel Tepper, Poughkeepsie, for William Connelly, appellant.

William J. Ciolko, Public Defender (Marshall L. Brenner, Poughkeepsie, of counsel), for Linda Ahrens, appellant.

Albert M. Rosenblatt, Dist. Atty. (Jennifer L. Van Tuyl, Asst. Dist. Atty., of counsel), for respondent.

WACHTLER, Judge.

The defendants allegedly sold cocaine to an undercover State trooper on February 4, 1972. They were indicted for criminally selling a dangerous drug in the third degree (Consol.Laws, c. 40, Penal Law, § 220.35), criminal possession of a dangerous drug in the fourth degree (Penal Law, § 220.15) and possession of a dangerous drug in the sixth degree (Penal Law § 220.05).

Following arraignment the defendants moved to inspect the Grand Jury minutes claiming that the evidence submitted was legally insufficient to support the charges. The court complied and after reviewing the evidence dismissed the indictment on the ground that 'the evidence before the Grand Jury was not legally sufficient to prove a chain of evidence showing that the alleged dangerous drug analyzed at the State Police Laboratory was the alleged dangerous drug possessed and/or sold by the defendant(s) so as to establish the commission by (them) of the alleged offenses charged.' The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the indictment holding that 'the evidence * * * was legally sufficient.'

An indictment, of course, must rest on 'legally sufficient (evidence)' (Consol.Laws, c. 11--a, CPL 190.65, subd. 1), that is admissible or 'competent evidence which, if accepted as true, would establish every element of an offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof' (CPL 70.10, subd. 1). If the evidence does not establish 'the offense charged or any lesser included offense' (CPL 210.20, subd. 1, par. (b)) the indictment must be dismissed.

Here Officer De Grood, the undercover agent who made the purchase, testified before the Grand Jury that he went to the defendants' premises and asked Connelly if he had any cocaine and Connelly said that he did. Connelly then sent the defendant Linda Ahrens into the bedroom. According to De Grood, 'She came out with six packs of tinfoil and told me to take my pick. Connelly said he wouldn't handle the money * * * (so) I picked out one and gave the Twenty Five Dollars to Linda (who) turned around and handed it to Connelly.' This testimony established a prima facie circumstantial case of possession and sale and the indictment should be sustained (People v. Peluso, 29 N.Y.2d 605, 324 N.Y.S.2d 404, 273 N.E.2d 134).

The trial court also erred in holding that the narcotics and the laboratory report had not been sufficiently connected with the defendants to be considered competent Grand Jury evidence. Officer De Grood informed the Grand Jury that after making the purchase he 'marked the evidence' and brought it to the police station in Poughkeepsie where he 'placed it in the evidence locker.' The following day he turned it over to Investigator McCauley who testified that he mailed it to the State Police Laboratory in Albany for analysis. The packet was returned by mail together with a certified laboratory report indicating that the substance contained cocaine. McCauley identified the packet and the report and they were received in evidence.

Real evidence is admissible when it is 'sufficiently connected with the defendants to be relevant to an issue in the case' (People v. Mirenda, 23 N.Y.2d 439, 453, 297 N.Y.S.2d 532, 542, 245 N.E.2d 194, 201; People v. Kinney, 202 N.Y. 389, 95 N.E. 756). If the object was taken from the defendant or found at the scene of the crime, the foundation is laid once it is shown that the thing offered is the one recovered and that its condition is substantially unchanged (People v. Flanigan, 174 N.Y. 356, 66 N.E. 988). The fact that it might have passed through several hands in the interim is of little significance when the object possesses unique characteristics or markings and is not subject to material alteration which is not readily apparent. In these cases simple identification should suffice (People v. Flanigan, Supra). But when the item itself is not patently identifiable or is capable of being replaced or altered, admissibility generally requires that all those who have handled the item 'identify it and testify to its custody and unchanged condition' (People v. Sansalone, 208 Misc. 491, 493, 146 N.Y.S.2d 359, 361).

In theory at least, under this so-called chain of evidence approach " it is necessary to establish a complete chain of evidence, tracing the possession of the exhibit * * * to the final custodian, and * * * if one link in the chain is entirely missing, the exhibit cannot be introduced' or made the basis for the testimony or report of an expert or officer' (Ann., Evidence--Sample from Human Body, 21 A.L.R.2d 1216, 1220). In practice the chain has been kept within reasonable limits by for instance rejecting the notion that when an exhibit has been mailed for analysis each postal employee who handled the item should be considered a necessary link (...