People v. Coon

• Decision Date: 02 November 2006
• Docket Number: 16558.
• Citation: 34 A.D.3d 869,2006 NY Slip Op 07925,823 N.Y.S.2d 566
• Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, v. TIMOTHY COON, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

34 A.D.3d 869

823 N.Y.S.2d 566

2006 NY Slip Op 07925

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, v. TIMOTHY COON, Appellant.

16558.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Third Department.

Decided November 2, 2006.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Madison County (DiStefano, J.), rendered September 6, 2005 convicting defendant following a nonjury trial of the crime of assault in the first degree.

Mugglin, J.

Defendant used a butcher knife to twice cut the neck and throat of his sister (hereinafter the victim). As a result, he was indicted for intentional assault in the first degree, depraved indifference assault in the first degree, assault in the second degree for recklessly causing serious physical injury and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. After a nonjury trial, County Court's verdict included findings that defendant failed to prove the defense of mental disease or defect by a preponderance of the evidence, but that because of his voluntary use of crack cocaine, he suffered an atypical idiopathic reaction to the substance such that, at the time of the attack, he was experiencing cocaine intoxication delirium. As a result, County Court found that defendant was unable to form any specific criminal intent necessary to support either the intentional assault or criminal possession of a weapon charges. County Court also found that defendant's actions were reckless and that since voluntary intoxication does not negate recklessness (see Penal Law § 15.05 [3]), defendant was guilty of depraved indifference assault (see Penal Law § 120.10 [3]). Based on this finding, County Court found it unnecessary to address the third count of the indictment. Defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 15 years with five years of postrelease supervision and now appeals.

We find merit to defendant's argument that the proof was insufficient to establish depraved indifference assault. It is now settled that, where a defendant's conduct endangers only a single person, to sustain a charge of depraved indifference there must be proof of "wanton cruelty, brutality or callousness directed against a particularly vulnerable victim, combined with utter indifference to the life or safety of the helpless target of the perpetrator's inexcusable acts" (People v Suarez, 6 NY3d 202, 213 [2005]). Although County Court found that defendant acted with heightened recklessness, depraved indifference is a culpable mental state (see People v Feingold, 7 NY3d 288, 294 [2006]) and this element is not established merely by proof of reckless conduct (see People v Suarez, supra at 214). While defendant's conduct was reprehensible, the evidence does not establish wanton cruelty, brutality or callousness. Moreover, as defendant was too intoxicated to form a...