People v. Cooper
| Decision Date | 21 May 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 304610,304610 |
| Parties | PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILBERN WOODROW COOPER, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
UNPUBLISHED
Oakland Circuit Court
Before: CAVANAGH, P.J., and SAAD and RIORDAN, JJ.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial conviction of first-degree felony murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b). Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. We affirm.
The victim was murdered in September of 1978. His body was discovered by his roommate, Paul Jenkins, who was not home during the murder. The victim was lying in a pool of blood in his bedroom with his hands tied behind his back with an electrical cord. He was shot seven times in the head, and sustained an injury to his groin. A pillow was discovered next to the victim's body and was riddled with bullet holes, residue, burns, and blood.
While the police conducted an initial investigation in 1978, they did not discover any evidence of a forced entry or ransacking. The police interviewed Jenkins, who informed them that the victim was involved in a cult and was probably murdered for having sex with married women. Jenkins allegedly owed a debt to John Anderson, defendant's roommate, although Jenkins denied this at the time of trial. The police also interviewed Billy Lolley. Lolley had encountered the victim either the day of the murder or the day before, as the victim worked at a real estate agency owned by Jenkins, and the victim had shown Lolley a house. While the detectives pursued several leads, they cleared all of their suspects without discovering who killed the victim.
In November of 2006, however, Lolley contacted the Farmington Hills Police Department about the murder, seeking to clear his conscience. Lolley told the police that someone had offered defendant $3,000 to kill a man and defendant, in turn, offered Lolley $1,500 to be the driver. Lolley refused the offer, thinking that defendant may have been joking. Yet, after the murder, defendant told Lolley that he had killed the victim. Defendant explainedthat he laid the victim down on the floor, put a pillow on his head, and shot him repeatedly in the head. Defendant confessed to Lolley that they had meant to kill Jenkins but had accidently killed the victim. Anderson warned Lolley to keep quiet or they would kill Lolley or his children.
The police interviewed defendant several times, and defendant's statements were admitted at trial. Defendant was convicted of first-degree felony-murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Defendant now appeals on several grounds.
Defendant argues that his statements to the police were inadmissible because he asserted his right to remain silent and his statements were involuntary.
"A trial court's findings of fact on a motion to suppress are reviewed for clear error, while the ultimate decision on the motion is reviewed de novo." People v Brown, 297 Mich App 670, 674; 825 NW2d 91 (2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "Clear error exists if the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." People v Miller, 482 Mich 540, 544; 759 NW2d 850 (2008) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "We review constitutional questions de novo." People v Sadows, 283 Mich App 65, 67; 768 NW2d 93 (2009).
A defendant's invocation of his right to remain silent must be unequivocal and unambiguous. Berghuis v Thompkins, ___ US ___; 130 S Ct 2250, 2260; 176 L Ed 2d 1098 (2010). "[I]f a person chooses silence over speech . . . the police must scrupulously honor the right to remain silent." People v Williams, 275 Mich App 194, 198; 737 NW2d 797 (2007). "If the police continue to interrogate the defendant after he has invoked his right to remain silent, and the defendant confesses as a result of that interrogation, the confession is inadmissible." People v White, 493 Mich 187, 194; 828 NW2d 329 (2013) (quotation marks omitted).
Defendant first contends that he invoked his right to remain silent during the initial custodial interview with the police at Bay City in the afternoon of March 2, 2010, and any statements he made in the interview were inadmissible. Defendant does not dispute that he was read his Miranda1 rights before the initial interrogation began. He highlights the following statement, however, near the end of the interview when he allegedly asserted his right to remain silent: "See, that's why I don't want to talk to you guys about this because who do I have to collaborate [sic] anything I have to say?" Defendant's statement was not an unequivocal and unambiguous invocation of his right to remain silent. While defendant indicated his preference was not to speak with the police unless someone could corroborate his statements, a preference is not an unequivocal or unambiguous assertion of the right to remain silent.
Defendant, however, argues that he again asserted his right to remain silent in a subsequent interview and, hence, his statements in that interview also were inadmissible. After the March 2nd afternoon interview at Bay City, defendant was transported to the Farmington Hills Police Department. The police reminded him of his Miranda rights, but defendant continued to talk with them that evening. Approximately an hour into the interview, the officers asked if defendant and others had gone to the house to beat up someone and then one of the men accompanying defendant unexpectedly shot the victim. When asked if that is what happened, defendant stood up and stated: "No, we're done." He twice stated: "Take me back to my cell," and requested to go to the bathroom. While the police officers continued to question him and received limited responses, several minutes later defendant again indicated that he did not have anything further to say. The police continued to question defendant until he stated: "Thank you for your time, I'm not talking anymore."
During this interview, defendant unambiguously and unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent. Defendant stood up and clearly informed the police officers that he was done talking, thereby asserting his right to remain silent. Berghuis, 130 S Ct at 2260 (). Defendant did not qualify his statement or limit his refusal to speak to one topic in particular. Moreover, while there is no "blanket prohibition against further interrogation after a person cuts off questioning . . . [w]hether a custodial statement obtained after a person decides to remain silent is admissible depends on whether the right to cut off questioning was scrupulously honored by the police." Williams, 275 Mich App at 198. Relevant factors include whether there is a significant time lapse between the invocation of the right to remain silent and the restarting of questioning, and whether defendant was again advised of his Miranda rights. Here, the police officers, without pause, continued to interrogate defendant even after he repeatedly asserted that he was done talking and wished to be taken back to his cell.
However, the trial court's failure to suppress the statements from this interview was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. This Court reviews "preserved issues of constitutional error to determine whether they are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." People v Dendel (On Remand), 289 Mich App 445, 475; 797 NW2d 645 (2010). "A constitutional error is harmless if it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error." Id. (quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). Of significant importance here is that defendant did not make any further admissions after invoking his right to remain silent during this interview. In fact, defendant denied knowing the victim and denied shooting him.
There also was substantial evidence at trial from which a rational jury could find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt absent the error. In an earlier interview in Bay City, defendant admitted to breaking into the house where the victim resided a few days before the murder with the intent to hurt Jenkins, and that he had taken an extension cord from a lamp with the plan of tying up Jenkins. He also admitted that he was on the porch the night of the murder. At trial, Lolley testified that defendant confessed to the killing, admitting that he tied the victim up and Considering this evidence, any error in admitting evidence of defendant's limited statements after he invoked his right to remain silent was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Lastly, defendant challenges the admission of his statements from the final interview he gave to police on the morning of March 3, 2010.2 This issue has been waived. Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right that extinguishes any error and precludes appellate review. People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 215; 612 NW2d 144 (2000).
In the direct examination of Detective Richard Wehby, the prosecution did not ask about the March 3rd interview. During cross-examination, however, defense counsel initiated a line of questioning regarding the detective's false representations to defendant about DNA evidence during the March 2nd interview at Bay City. The following colloquy ensued:
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