People v. Copeland

• Decision Date: 18 October 1993
• Citation: 197 A.D.2d 629,602 N.Y.S.2d 683
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Philip COPELAND, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 683

602 N.Y.S.2d 683

197 A.D.2d 629

The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Philip COPELAND, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

Second Department.

Oct. 18, 1993.

Feldman and Feldman, Hauppauge (Steven A. Feldman, of counsel), for appellant.

Philip Copeland, appellant, pro se.

Richard A. Brown, Dist. Atty., Kew Gardens (Barry A. Schwartz and Aprilanne Agostino, of counsel), for respondent.

Before THOMPSON, J.P., and RITTER, SANTUCCI and JOY, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Demakos, J.), rendered May 16, 1989, convicting him of murder in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant argues, as did his codefendant (see, People v. Scott, 197 A.D.2d 644, 602 N.Y.S.2d 681 [decided herewith], that during the jury selection process, the prosecutor improperly exercised several of his peremptory challenges in order to remove black prospective jurors. We find that during the jury selection process, the defendants failed to articulate and develop all the grounds, both factual and legal, supporting their claim. Their perfunctory statement that 10 excluded prospective jurors were black did not establish the existence of facts and other relevant circumstances sufficient to raise an inference that the prosecutor had used his peremptory challenges to exclude individuals because of their race (see, People v. Scott, supra; see also, People v. Childress, 81 N.Y.2d 263, 268, 598 N.Y.S.2d 146, 614 N.E.2d 709; People v. Smith, 81 N.Y.2d 875, 597 N.Y.S.2d 633, 613 N.E.2d 539).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, we find that the People satisfied their burden of disproving the defendant's alibi defense beyond a reasonable doubt (see, People v. Victor, 62 N.Y.2d 374, 477 N.Y.S.2d 97, 465 N.E.2d 817). Although the defendant presented several alibi witnesses, it cannot be said that the trier of fact improperly discredited their testimony (see, People v. Domond, 193 A.D.2d 692, 598 N.Y.S.2d 974 [2d Dept., 1993]; People v. Edens, 181 A.D.2d 741, 581 N.Y.S.2d 614). Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the...