People v. Corpany

• Decision Date: 04 October 1993
• Docket Number: No. 93SA31,93SA31
• Citation: 859 P.2d 865
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John Frederick CORPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 865

859 P.2d 865

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John Frederick CORPANY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 93SA31.

Supreme Court of Colorado En Banc.

Oct. 4, 1993.

John Suthers, Dist. Atty., Fourth Judicial Dist., Daniel H. May, Chief Deputy Dist. Atty., Colorado Springs, for plaintiff-appellant.

David F. Vela, State Public Defender, James P. Tate, Deputy State Public Defender, Colorado Springs, for defendant-appellee.

Justice ERICKSON delivered the Opinion of the Court.

This is an interlocutory appeal pursuant to C.A.R. 4.1. The prosecution seeks to reverse a suppression order entered by the El Paso County District Court in the prosecution of John Frederick Corpany for possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) and for unlawfully carrying a concealed weapon (a butterfly knife and a .38 caliber Derringer pistol). The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on Corpany's motion to suppress the evidence and concluded that the methamphetamine found in his fanny pack was unconstitutionally seized. ¹ We affirm the trial court's ruling.

I

Sometime around midnight on March 12, 1992, Officer Jerry Steckler of the Colorado Springs Police Department observed a vehicle driven by Patrick Nicks weaving between two traffic lanes. Three individuals including Corpany, were passengers in the vehicle. Nicks and his wife were seated in the front seat of the automobile. Corpany was in the right rear seat. Corpany's girlfriend was in the left rear seat.

Because the automobile was weaving between lanes, Officer Steckler actuated his red and blue lights and siren to effectuate a traffic stop and issue a citation. Officer Steckler saw two passengers look back into the rear view mirror of their vehicle at his police car. He also testified that he "observed two passengers on the right side of the vehicle bending over as if they were putting something under the vehicle seat." ² Officer Steckler advised the police dispatcher of his location and requested a backup unit.

Nicks pulled into the apartment complex parking lot where he lived. The sole basis for the traffic stop was Nicks' failure to stay in a single lane of traffic. Officer Steckler acknowledged that apart from the traffic infraction, there was no crime in progress and that he was not investigating a reported crime that had occurred or was about to occur. He admitted he had no reason to suspect that the four individuals in Nicks' automobile were in that area of Colorado Springs for any unlawful purpose.

When Officer Steckler asked Nicks for his driver's license, Nicks stated that he did not have his driver's license with him, but produced the registration papers for the automobile. Corpany and his girlfriend also stated that they had no identification with them, while Nicks' wife said that her identification was in her purse.

Officer Steckler then ordered all four individuals out of the automobile so that he could "check to see what they had put under the seat." With the four occupants outside of the vehicle, Officer Steckler searched under the front seat and found a leather purse and a fanny pack. The fanny pack was approximately ten inches long, six inches wide, and four to five inches deep. As Officer Steckler removed the fanny pack from under the seat, Corpany said "the butt pack is mine."

Officer Steckler felt the fanny pack and could tell "it was stuffed with various items inside that I couldn't identify." Even though Officer Steckler found no evidence of weapons when he felt the fanny pack, he opened all of the small zippered compartments to "check for weapons [and] find out if there was identification inside the fanny pack." ³ Once Officer Steckler opened the fanny pack, he found Corpany's driver's license. He also found two pharmaceutically folded pieces of paper in a small zippered compartment of the fanny pack. Officer Steckler told Corpany that he would have to test the contents of the folded paper for methamphetamine. Corpany replied, "you don't have to, its meth."

At that point, Officer Steckler placed Corpany under arrest. A backup officer, who had arrived at the scene, ordered Corpany to remove his jacket so that it could be searched. Corpany informed the police officer that there was a gun in his jacket. The officer removed a loaded .38 caliber Derringer pistol and a butterfly knife from the pocket of Corpany's jacket. The backup officer subsequently ran a warrants check that revealed Corpany was the subject of an outstanding warrant for failing to appear in court on a careless driving charge. ⁴

II

Corpany made a motion to suppress statements taken from him and all of the evidence seized. Corpany claimed that the search and the subsequent seizure of the evidence violated both the United States Constitution and the Colorado Constitution. ⁵ On January 25, 1993, the trial court conducted a pretrial suppression hearing at which Officer Steckler and other witnesses testified.

The trial court concluded, in resolving a conflict in the evidence, that there was no probable cause or reasonable grounds to suspect that the fanny pack contained methamphetamine or any other type of drug. ⁶ Based on its finding that Officer Steckler "did not detect what, in his opinion, would be any weapons in the fanny pack," the trial court also concluded that Officer Steckler could not search the fanny pack without consent. ⁷ Accordingly, the trial court granted the motion to suppress the methamphetamine. The trial court also suppressed Corpany's statements following the illegal search of the fanny pack as fruit of the poisonous tree.

In the absence of a clear statement that a suppression ruling is grounded on the Colorado Constitution, as opposed to the United States Constitution, we presume a trial court relied on federal constitutional law in reaching its decision. People v. McKinstrey, 852 P.2d 467, 469 (Colo.1993); People v. Inman, 765 P.2d 577, 578 (Colo.1988). ⁸ Thus, the sole issue in this interlocutory appeal is whether the Fourth Amendment requires suppression of the evidence. The prosecution asserts that the search of the fanny pack was constitutionally permissible based on the reasonable suspicion that supported a protective search of the passenger compartment of the automobile. We disagree.

III

A

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, ----, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 2135, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993); McKinstrey, 852 P.2d at 469. Warrantless searches and seizures are unreasonable, subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. Dickerson, 508 U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2135. One exception was recognized in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), which permits a warrantless search on the basis of reasonable suspicion, rather than probable cause. The prosecution relies on the exception delineated in Terry for searches based on reasonable suspicion to support its assertion that the search of Corpany's fanny pack was constitutionally permissible.

Under Terry, a police officer can briefly stop a suspicious person and make reasonable inquiries to confirm or dispel his suspicions. Id. at 30-31, 88 S.Ct. at 1884-85. ⁹ The officer may also conduct a pat- down search of the individual to determine whether the person is carrying a weapon, as long as the officer is justified in believing that the person may be armed and presently dangerous. Terry, 392 U.S. at 24, 88 S.Ct. at 1881. People v. Martinez, 801 P.2d 542, 544-45 (Colo.1990) (stating that "[o]nly when the circumstances provide an officer with a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person is armed and dangerous may the officer conduct a pat-down search for the purpose of his protection and others in the vicinity"). ¹⁰

The purpose of the limited Terry search is not to discover evidence of crime, but to allow an officer to pursue an investigation without fear of violence. Dickerson, 508 U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2136; Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1923, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972); Martinez, 801 P.2d at 544; People v. Ratcliff, 778 P.2d 1371, 1376 (Colo.1989). Accordingly, the scope and character of the Terry search must be reasonably related to its sole purpose--"the protection of the police officers and others nearby." Ratcliff, 778 P.2d at 1377 (quoting Terry ). If the protective search goes beyond what is necessary to determine whether a suspect is armed, it is no longer valid under Terry and the fruits of the search will be suppressed. Dickerson, 508 U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2136; Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65-66, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968).

In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983), the Supreme Court upheld the search of the passenger compartment of an automobile and the subsequent seizure of contraband by applying the Terry exception for protective searches based on reasonable suspicion. Long held that in the context of a roadside encounter, police officers may conduct a protective search for weapons not only of the driver's person but also of the passenger compartment of the vehicle. Id. at 1049, 103 S.Ct. at 3480-81.

However, the Court in Long "stress[ed] that [its] decision does not mean that the police may conduct automobile searches whenever they conduct an investigative stop." Id. at 1049 n. 14, 103 S.Ct. at 3481 n. 14. Instead, under Long, a police officer may conduct a search of the passenger compartment only if he possesses a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts that the suspect is dangerous and may gain immediate control of weapons. Id. at 1049, 103 S.Ct. at 3481.

Because the protective search of the automobile is justified solely by the danger that weapons stored in the vehicle could be used against officers or bystanders, it is "limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden." Id...