People v. Corson

• Decision Date: 17 January 2013
• Docket Number: No. 11CA0241.,11CA0241.
• Citation: 411 P.3d 28
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. David Will CORSON, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

411 P.3d 28

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.David Will CORSON, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 11CA0241.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. VI.

Jan. 17, 2013.

John W. Suthers, Attorney General, Christine Brady, Assistant Attorney General, Corelle Spettigue, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff–Appellee.

Law Office of Ingrid J. DeFranco, Ingrid J. DeFranco, Brighton, Colorado, for Defendant–Appellant.

Opinion by Judge LICHTENSTEIN.

¶ 1 Defendant, David Will Corson, appeals the district court's order denying his Crim. P. 35(c) motion for postconviction relief which alleged that the nondisclosure of the complaining witness's juvenile adjudications rendered his plea invalid and his counsel ineffective. We conclude that because juvenile adjudications in a prosecution witness's criminal history are discoverable and must be disclosed as part of the prosecution's discovery obligations, the court must reevaluate Corson's motion. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Background

¶ 2 In 2001, Corson worked as a substance abuse counselor at a juvenile facility. K.B., a seventeen-year-old resident of the facility, alleged that Corson and she had engaged in a sexual relationship while she resided at the facility. Corson was subsequently charged with two counts: sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust and sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust—pattern of abuse.

¶ 3 Corson filed several discovery motions requesting impeachment information relating to K.B.'s criminal history, including juvenile adjudications, and other information that could lead to the discovery of character evidence probative of untruthfulness under CRE 608. The prosecution moved to strike these motions, asserting they requested information automatically discoverable under Crim. P. 16. The response also objected "to any information sought by [Corson] which [was] not explicitly discussed in Rule 16, Parts (a), (b) and (c)."

¶ 4 Corson also filed a discovery motion that requested K.B.'s medical and treatment records and alerted the prosecution that, "based on information and belief, [K.B.] has a reputation for making untruthful statements as well as having a past criminal history." The prosecution's response stated that "[the prosecution] ha[d] provided all information pertaining to the victim, which [was] in the possession of the Office of the District Attorney" and characterized the request as "nothing more than a fishing expedition." The court never ruled on Corson's discovery motions.

¶ 5 A few days prior to his scheduled jury trial, Corson pleaded guilty to sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust in exchange for dismissal of the pattern of abuse count. The court sentenced Corson to an indeterminate sentence of ten years to life of intensive supervised sex offender probation.

¶ 6 Corson subsequently filed for postconviction relief pursuant to Crim. P. 35(c), initially seeking to withdraw his plea based on newly discovered evidence of K.B.'s recantation of her allegations against Corson.¹ However, after receiving consent from K.B. to review her file at the juvenile facility, Corson discovered evidence showing K.B. had previously made false allegations of sexual assault and had resulting juvenile adjudications for false reporting that the prosecution had not disclosed to the defense. Corson amended his Crim. P. 35(c) motion to also assert that the prosecution's nondisclosure of this exculpatory evidence and its affirmative misrepresentation that it had disclosed all discoverable information rendered his plea invalid and his counsel ineffective, and violated his rights to due process.

¶ 7 The district court held a hearing on Corson's motion. As pertinent here, Corson presented documentary evidence of the discovery requests and the prosecution's responses. He also introduced defense counsel's affidavit and testimony that the prosecutor did not disclose K.B.'s criminal history, including false reporting of a sexual assault, and that the prosecutor had affirmatively told him that "there was no related discoverable information." Yet the same prosecutor had secured K.B.'s juvenile adjudication for false reporting.

¶ 8 A defense expert testified that once the prosecution represented that the requested information did not exist, defense counsel could not have ethically impeached K.B. at trial with such information. Defense counsel testified that he assessed the case without evidence of K.B.'s history of false reporting of sexual assault and resulting juvenile adjudications, and recommended that Corson accept a plea. He also testified that he would not have advised Corson to accept a plea had the prosecution disclosed this evidence, but instead would have recommended that Corson take the case to trial. Corson likewise testified that he would not have entered a plea, but would have insisted on going to trial.

¶ 9 The prosecution conceded at the hearing that the false reporting adjudication and related police reports were not disclosed to the defense. However, it presented testimony of other witnesses that Corson had access to, and he was aware of, information in K.B.'s file concerning her history of false reporting and juvenile adjudications. The prosecution also asserted that some of the requested information, such as treatment records or unrelated juvenile adjudications, was not discoverable because it was not in its possession or control.

¶ 10 The court issued a written order denying Corson's Crim. P. 35(c) motion. As pertinent here, in an oral ruling during the hearing, the court found that "as a matter of law juvenile adjudications are not subject to discovery." Perhaps, for this reason, the court's written order did not address whether the prosecution's failed to comply with its discovery obligations, and hence, whether the guilty plea was induced by misrepresentation. With regard to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the court concluded that because Corson already knew about K.B.'s history of false reporting, he failed to prove that his attorney's performance fell below the level of reasonably competent assistance, or that he would have insisted on proceeding to trial had his attorney advised him of K.B.'s history. This appeal followed.

II. Discussion

¶ 11 Corson contends that the district court erred in denying his motion, asserting that his guilty plea was unintelligent and involuntary because (1) the prosecution failed to comply with its discovery obligations under Crim. P. 16 and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and (2) the prosecution made an affirmative misrepresentation regarding the existence of exculpatory evidence that induced this plea. He also contends that the prosecution's nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence and its affirmative misrepresentation concerning its existence caused defense counsel to erroneously assess the case, rendering counsel ineffective.

¶ 12 We conclude that, while the district court issued a very detailed and thoughtful written order, it nonetheless mistakenly believed that juvenile adjudications were not discoverable, and perhaps due to this misapprehension, the court did not evaluate whether the prosecution complied with, or misrepresented its compliance with, its disclosure obligations.

¶ 13 Because each of Corson's contentions on appeal is premised on the alleged noncompliance and misrepresentation concerning discovery, we conclude that additional findings are required on these matters. Consequently, we reverse the order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 14 In reviewing the denial of a motion for postconviction relief following a hearing, we defer to the district court's factual findings, so long as they are supported by the record; we review its conclusions of law de novo.

People v. Stovall, 2012 COA 7, ¶ 18, 284 P.3d 151 (citing Carmichael v. People, 206 P.3d 800, 807–08 (Colo.2009) ). A challenge to the validity of a guilty plea presents a mixed question of law and fact, see Sanchez–Martinez v. People, 250 P.3d 1248, 1254 (Colo.2011), as does a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Valdez, 178 P.3d 1269, 1278 (Colo.App.2007).

B. Prosecution's Duty to Disclose

¶ 15 Corson contends that his plea was unintelligent and involuntary and his counsel was rendered ineffective because the prosecution failed to comply with its discovery obligations under Crim. P. 16 and Brady. We conclude that the case must be remanded to permit the district court to address this claim.

¶ 16 It is well settled that a prosecutor has both a statutory and a constitutional obligation to disclose to the defense any material, exculpatory evidence he or she possesses. See Crim. P. 16(I)(a)(2) ; Brady, 373 U.S. at 86–88, 83 S.Ct. 1194. Exculpatory evidence includes evidence that bears on the credibility of a prosecution witness. People v. Bradley, 25 P.3d 1271, 1276 (Colo.App.2001) (citing People v. Dist. Court, 793 P.2d 163, 166 (Colo.1990) ).

¶ 17 In its written ruling, the trial court did not address whether the prosecution was required to disclose the juvenile adjudications or other impeachment evidence, and, hence, whether Corson's guilty plea was induced by the prosecution's affirmative representation regarding the existence of exculpatory evidence. However, in an oral ruling, the court found that "as a matter of law juvenile adjudications are not subject to discovery." This ruling was an incorrect statement of the law.

¶ 18 Evidence requested by the defense is discoverable, regardless of whether it contains information admissible at trial, as long as its contents are relevant to the conduct of the defense. See People v. District Court, 790 P.2d 332, 338 (Colo.1990). And a prosecutor has a constitutional obligation to disclose evidence favorable to an accused, even without a request, if that evidence is...