People v. Coslet

• Decision Date: 01 June 1977
• Docket Number: No. 48750,48750
• Citation: 7 Ill.Dec. 80,364 N.E.2d 67,67 Ill.2d 127
• Parties: , 7 Ill.Dec. 80 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Linda Kay COSLET, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 67

364 N.E.2d 67

67 Ill.2d 127, 7 Ill.Dec. 80

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Linda Kay COSLET, Appellee.

No. 48750.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 1, 1977.

William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Michael G. Carroll and Edward P. Miller, State's Attys., Tuscola (James B. Zagel and Jayne Carr, Asst. Attys. Gen., and G. Michael Prall and Robert C. Perry, Ill. State's Attys. Assn., Springfield, of counsel), for the People.

Richard J. Wilson and Daniel D. Yuhas, Deputy State Appellate Defenders, Springfield, for appellee.

CLARK, Justice.

After a jury trial in the circuit court of Douglas County, defendant, Linda Kay Coslet, charged with murder and represented by court-appointed counsel and co-counsel, was convicted of one count of voluntary manslaughter and one count of concealment of a homicidal death involving the demise of her husband, Jackie Lloyd Coslet. The Appellate Court for the Fourth District, while rejecting defendant's contentions in her appeal to that tribunal, reversed these convictions on the basis of an issue of conflict of interest not raised in the initial briefs and remanded the cause for a further evidentiary hearing on that issue and a potential new trial. (People v. Coslet (1976), 39 Ill.App.3d 302, 349 N.E.2d 496.) On the State's appeal to our court, we must resolve whether such a result is mandated by either the suspected conflict of interest or any other issue before this court.

We have examined the record regarding the discovery and instruction issues presented to and decided by the appellate court in this case (39 Ill.App.3d 302, 303-04, 349 N.E.2d 496). We agree that neither of the issues constitutes grounds for reversal even though the State's response to the discovery motion of the defendant leaves much to be desired. Rather than finding no harm due to lack of surprise on the part of the defense we believe the X rays, not having been disclosed to defendant and being of vital importance to the proof or disproof of the State's case, should not have been admitted without allowing the defense time to prepare a defense report as to the X rays. Any effect the exclusion or discrediting of the X rays and the roentgenologist's testimony would have had in creating a defect in the State's proof of the criminal agency element of the corpus delicti (People v. Manske (1948), 399 Ill. 176, 77 N.E.2d 164) was negated by defendant's clear and unequivocal admission of guilt in open court in her attempt to present a defense of self-defense, since a defendant may, by judicial confession, waive the production of all evidence of his guilt (People v. Green (1959), 17 Ill.2d 35, 42, 160 N.E.2d 814, cert. denied (1960), 361 U.S. 972, 80 S.Ct. 605, 4 L.Ed.2d 551).

Though the appellate court quite adequately summarized the facts relevant to a disposition of the issues raised by the parties, we will expand briefly upon the facts of importance in ruling on the conflict-of-interest issue raised by the court itself. Raymond Lee, Jr., an attorney practicing in Tuscola, Illinois, was appointed on September 4, 1973, by the circuit court of Douglas County to represent the defendant in the case presently before this court. On September 11, 1973, defendant, as wife of Jackie Lloyd Coslet, petitioned for the Tuscola National Bank to be named administrator of his estate. The following day the bank accepted this office, and Mr. Lee, as attorney for the bank, thus became attorney for the administrator of Mr. Coslet's estate.

During the course of defendant's trial, Mr. Lee served as attorney in both capacities. Subsequent to defendant's convictions on December 17, 1973, the administrator filed a petition in the probate division of the circuit court seeking to (1) bar defendant, by virtue of her voluntary manslaughter conviction, from receiving title to the whole marital premises as surviving joint tenant, (2) sell those premises, (3) pay debts and expenses of the estate, and (4) disburse the remainder to those entitled to it by law, namely, half the remainder to defendant as her portion of the joint tenancy and the other half among the heirs at law, including defendant. This petition was granted by a specially appointed judge, defendant's trial judge having recused himself, on January 21, 1975. Contending defendant should have been completely barred from inheriting, the heirs other than defendant filed objections to this order. The dismissal of those objections was the basis for an appeal in a separate case in which the Appellate Court for the Fourth District has rendered an opinion. (In re Estate of Coslet (1976), 39 Ill.App.3d 305, 349 N.E.2d 496.) Not having this case before us, we refrain from commenting upon it.

In 1914, this court considered it to be "firmly established" that, once an attorney has been retained and received the confidence of a client, he cannot serve adverse interests regardless of how innocent his motives or how good his intentions. (People v. Gerold (1914), 265 Ill. 448, 477, 107 N.E. 165.) The termination of the attorney's employment by the client does not affect the application of this rule regarding the general subject matter as to which the attorney has been retained. 265 Ill. 448, 478, 107 N.E. 165.

This court adopted a per se conflict-of-interest rule in People v. Stoval (1968), 40 Ill.2d 109, 112, 239 N.E.2d 441, whereby allegations and proof of prejudice are unnecessary in cases where a defense counsel, without the knowledgeable assent of the defendant, might be restrained in fully representing the defendant's interests due to his or her commitments to others, with even closer scrutiny being applied where counsel is appointed for defendant. (40 Ill.2d 109, 113, 239 N.E.2d 441.) The test is not and cannot be based only upon the source of a financial gain by the attorney. A rule based solely on financial gain would not only be unworkable in the everyday practice of law but would also have no necessary correlation with the conflicts of interest that arise in such practice. The Stoval rule, based upon actual commitments to others, is both workable and necessarily correlates with such conflicts. See People v. Kester (1977), 66 Ill.2d 162, 166-69, 5 Ill.Dec. 246, 361 N.E.2d 569.

To determine whether attorney Lee was in a Stoval conflict situation with regard to the defendant, it is necessary merely to examine the purposes of an administrator of an estate, thereby indicating the role of an administrator's attorney. This court clearly set forth these purposes in Cotterell v. Coen (1910), 246 Ill. 410, 413, 92 N.E. 911, as providing for and insuring: (1) the conservation of the personal assets of the estate, including the collection of all debts due the decedent; (2) the payment of all debts due the decedent; and (3) the proper distribution of the residue among the heirs at law according to the applicable statute of descent and distribution.

Defendant's right of survivorship to properties held by her and her husband as joint...