People v. Coughlin
| Decision Date | 28 April 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 09CA0947.,09CA0947. |
| Citation | 304 P.3d 575 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Chad Patrick COUGHLIN, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
John W. Suthers, Attorney General, John T. Lee, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff–Appellee.
Douglas K. Wilson, Colorado State Public Defender, Ryann S. Hardman, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant–Appellant.
Opinion by Judge LOEB.
Defendant, Chad Patrick Coughlin, appeals the judgment of conviction entered upon jury verdicts finding him guilty of attempted second degree murder, second degree assault, and fighting in public. We affirm.
The charges in this case arose from a physical altercation that occurred in the parking lot of a sports bar. Around 1 a.m. on May 4, 2008, one of the bar's bouncers, P.S., drove his SUV into the parking lot entrance. P.S. encountered defendant, defendant's girlfriend, and a male friend standing in the entrance, and therefore, he was required to drive around the group to reach a parking spot.
Once he parked, P.S. was approached by defendant's girlfriend, and the two exchanged heated words through the open driver's side window. Although the details of the encounter between P.S. and defendant's girlfriend were disputed at trial, the girlfriend ended up falling backwards onto the ground. Defendant does not dispute that, at this point, he borrowed a knife from the friend and approached the SUV.
A fight broke out between defendant and P.S., resulting in P.S. tackling defendant to the ground. P.S. repeatedly punched defendant in the face, and defendant stabbed P.S. multiple times with the knife, once in his neck, three times in his back, and once in his arm. Another employee of the sports bar, a cook who had just finished his shift, witnessed the fight from the back deck of the bar and promptly ran over to pull P.S. off of defendant. Defendant and his friend, who did not participate in the fight, then fled the scene.
The prosecution charged defendant with attempted first degree murder and second degree assault based on P.S.'s injuries. The friend was charged with accessory to attempted murder for lending defendant the knife, and he ultimately pleaded guilty to the charge in exchange for probationary sentences in this case and in two additional pending cases. As a condition of the friend's plea agreement, the friend was required to testify against defendant.
At trial, nearly all of the facts surrounding the fight were hotly disputed, and the testimony from P.S., the friend, the girlfriend, and the cook was often conflicting. According to the prosecution's theory of the case, defendant first stabbed P.S. through the open driver's side window of the SUV and continued to stab P.S. when P.S. jumped out of the vehicle and tackled defendant to the ground. Defendant did not testify at trial, but according to the defense theory of the case, all stab wounds were inflicted in self-defense, only after P.S. pinned defendant to the ground and began punching him in the face.
At the conclusion of a three-day trial, the jury found defendant guilty of attempted second degree murder (which the court submitted to the jury after dismissing the attempted first degree murder charge), second degree assault, and the lesser nonincluded offense of fighting in public. The court sentenced defendant to a twenty-year prison term, a ten-year prison term, and a six-month jail term for the respective offenses, to run concurrently, and to five years mandatory parole. This appeal followed.
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying his challenge for cause to prospective juror D. We disagree.
We review a trial court's ruling on a challenge for cause to a prospective juror for an abuse of discretion. Carrillo v. People, 974 P.2d 478, 485 (Colo.1999). This is a “very high standard of review” that gives deference to the trial court's assessment of the credibility of prospective jurors. Id. at 485–86. “It recognizes the trial court's unique role and perspective in evaluating the demeanor and body language of live witnesses, and it serves to discourage an appellate court from second-guessing those judgments based on a cold record.” Id. at 486. A trial court's resolution of a challenge for cause will only be overturned if the record presents no basis to support it. People v. Pigford, 17 P.3d 172, 177 (Colo.App.2000).
Before the prosecution began its voir dire, the court administered an oath to the entire jury pool and read aloud several grounds that would prevent a prospective juror from serving. The court specifically asked, “Are any of you incapable by reason of physical or mental disability of rendering satisfactory jury service?” One prospective juror responded by advising the court of his diabetic condition and his “very severe hearing problem and understanding.” The court then asked if there was “[a]nybody else.” No one responded. The court finished with its preliminary questions of the entire pool and seated twenty-two prospective jurors in the jury box. Those jurors who were not initially seated, including juror D, were nevertheless advised to “pay attention to what's going on” because of the likelihood that additional prospective jurors would be called to the jury box.
Midway through voir dire, the court excused five seated prospective jurors and called five replacements, including prospective juror D. The court asked general questions of the five replacements and then invited each juror to tell counsel a bit about his or her background. Prospective juror D explained that he currently worked for King Soopers, that he was retired from construction work, and that he had three adult children. His juror questionnaire corroborated this information. He also told the court,
The prosecutor's entire questioning of juror D was as follows:
Defense counsel followed up on the prosecutor's questioning of prospective juror D as follows:
Shortly after this exchange, defense counsel completed voir dire of the replacement jurors and challenged prospective juror D for cause. The entirety of the challenge for cause was as follows:
Mr. [D], but just on the ability to sit as a juror in a case particularly of this length.
The court denied the challenge for cause, stating that “applying the standard in 13–71, I don't believe that is met as to Mr. [D].”
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying his challenge for cause to prospective juror D, because he expressed an inability to follow the evidence and a difficulty sitting down for “a couple of days at a time.” Defendant further contends that, because he used a peremptory challenge to excuse prospective juror D and later exhausted his remaining peremptory challenges, the court's denial of his challenge for cause requires automatic reversal of his convictions. We perceive no error.
Initially, we address the People's argument that defendant failed to preserve for appellate review his contention that prospective juror D should have been excused due to his inability to follow the evidence.
Defendants who believe a challenge for cause should or should not be granted have an obligation to make their positions known. People v. Asberry, 172 P.3d 927, 930 (Colo.App.2007). People v. Cevallos–Acosta, 140 P.3d 116, 121 (Colo.App.2005) (quoting People v. Russo, 713 P.2d 356, 361 (Colo.1986)). All challenges for cause to prospective jurors must be raised in the trial court prior to the swearing in of the jury to try the case. SeeCrim. P. 24(b)(2).
Based on our review of defendant's challenge to prospective juror D, we perceive no indication that the challenge was grounded on his purported inability to follow the evidence or on any other mental deficiency that might have interfered with his ability to serve as a juror.
To the contrary, the challenge for cause to juror D was expressly limited to his physical well-being. After learning from juror D that (1) he could have trouble remembering the evidence, and (2) he sometimes got cramps throughout his body, counsel moved to challenge juror D for cause “but just on the ability to sit as a juror in a...
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