People v. Coyle
| Decision Date | 31 March 1959 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of The State of New York v. Joseph COYLE, Defendant. City Magistrates' Court of New York City, Borough of Manhattan |
| Court | New York Magistrate Court |
Frank S. Hogan, Dist. Atty., New York County, New York City (Peter J. O'Connor, Asst. Dist. Atty.), for the People.
John L. Coster, New York City, for defendant, petitioner.
VINCENT P. RAO, City Magistrate.
Petition in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis to vacate a judgment of conviction entered against defendant on April 17, 1957.
From an examination of the court records it appears that defendant Joseph Coyle, 26 years of age, and an adolescent were arrested on April 16, 1957 and charged with disorderly conduct in violation of section 722, sub-division 8 of the Penal Law. On the following day both were arraigned in Adolescent Court, Borough of Manhattan. During the arraignment the defendant Coyle interposed a plea of guilty to the charge and on April 29, 1957 he was sentenced to serve 10 days in the City Prison and the execution of sentence was suspended.
Defendant Coyle makes this application and submits a transcript of the minutes of the entire proceedings to this Court on the argument of this motion.
In his moving papers defendant states that following his arrest he was arraigned on April 17, 1957; that he pleaded guilty to the charge; that he did not fully realize what the plea of guilty meant; that he was not unequivocally advised of his rights to be represented by counsel; that defendant did not waive his rights to counsel; that he spoke to an individual who he believed was in some way connected with the court and was advised to plead guilty since no publicity would be forthcoming and that defendant did not need counsel as this was a police offense and not a crime.
The People in opposition to this motion submit an affidavit of an Assistant District Attorney who relying on the presumption of regularity attendant upon judicial proceedings asserts that the defendant was informed of his right to the aid of counsel at every stage of the proceedings and of his right to obtain counsel.
It therefore appears that the defendant predicates his motion on two grounds: first, that an unknown person advised defendant to plead guilty; that nothing would come of it; that he really did not need counsel as this was merely a police offense and not a crime. This allegation involves an opinion of an unknown person and is obviously not a ground recognized for granting a writ of error coram nobis. The second ground advanced by defendant is that he did not realize what the plea of guilty meant; that he was not unequivocally advised of his right to be represented by counsel and that defendant did not waive his right to counsel. If this ground be sustained and defendant has thereby been denied due process, the judgment of conviction should be vacated.
The only error, if determined to be such, appears on the face of the record, that is, in the minutes of the proceedings when defendant was arraigned and concerns itself as to whether defendant was informed of his rights to counsel; whether he was afforded reasonable time to obtain the aid of counsel and whether or not he intelligently waived his right to be represented by counsel.
It has been held that where defendant has been denied due process of law by judicial interference with the right to counsel, he is entitled to the remedy of coram nobis even though the errors appear on the face of the record. Bojinoff v. People, 299 N.Y. 145, 85 N.E.2d 909; People v. Koch, 299 N.Y. 378, 381, 87 N.E.2d 417, 418.
During the argument of the motion the People conceded that the transcript of the minutes submitted with the moving papers was a true and correct record of the entire proceedings. Since any dispute as to the facts were resolved by this and other concessions made on behalf of the People and there remains only an issue of law for the Court to decide, no hearing is necessary. People v. Richetti, 302 N.Y. 290, 97 N.E.2d 908; People v. Sardo, 15 Misc.2d 69, 178 N.Y.S.2d 691.
The minutes of the proceedings that took place at the time of defendant's arraignment disclose the following:
The Court Officer having read the charge verbatim to the defendant, then addressed the defendant as follows:
'The Court: Coyle, you're twenty-six?
'Defendant (Coyle): Yes, sir.
'The Court: Nash, you're twenty?
'Defendant (Nash): Yes, sir.
'Defendant (Coyle): I dont't know.
'Defendant (Nash): I don't know.
'The Court: Any family or friends that you want to talk with before you want to do anything on this case?
'Defendant (Coyle): Do we have to have a lawyer?
'Defendant (Coyle): Guilty, no doubt.
'The Court: You're both guilty?
'Defendant (Coyle): Yes.'
Although the defendant was advised of his right to counsel, it cannot be said, in view of the court's insistence that defendant interpose a plea that defendant intelligently waived such right. This manner of notifying defendant has been held to constitute reversible error. People v. Berg, 200 Misc. 203, 105 N.Y.S.2d 694; People v. Marincic, 2 N.Y.2d 181, 158 N.Y.S.2d 569.
The defendant has the right guaranteed to him under both the State and Federal Constitutions to defend in person or with counsel of his own choosing. U. S. Constitution, 14th Amend.; N.Y. State Constitution, Article I, Section 6. This same guarantee is also found in section 8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and both this section and Article I, section 6 of the State Constitution have been implemented by the provisions of section 699 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 699 makes it mandatory upon the Magistrate in cases involving misdemeanors and offenses...
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