People v. Coyle

CourtNew York Magistrate Court
Citation184 N.Y.S.2d 214,18 Misc.2d 262
Decision Date31 March 1959
PartiesPEOPLE of The State of New York v. Joseph COYLE, Defendant. City Magistrates' Court of New York City, Borough of Manhattan

Page 214

184 N.Y.S.2d 214
18 Misc.2d 262
PEOPLE of The State of New York
v.
Joseph COYLE, Defendant.
City Magistrates' Court of New York City, Borough of Manhattan.
March 31, 1959.

Page 215

Frank S. Hogan, Dist. Atty., New York County, New York City (Peter J. O'Connor, Asst. Dist. Atty.), for the People.

John L. Coster, New York City, for defendant, petitioner.

[18 Misc.2d 263] VINCENT P. RAO, City Magistrate.

Petition in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis to vacate a judgment of conviction entered against defendant on April 17, 1957.

From an examination of the court records it appears that defendant Joseph Coyle, 26 years of age, and an adolescent were arrested on April 16, 1957 and charged with disorderly conduct in violation of section 722, sub-division 8 of the Penal Law. On the following day both were arraigned in Adolescent Court, Borough of Manhattan. During the arraignment the defendant Coyle interposed a plea of guilty to the charge and on April 29, 1957 he was sentenced to serve 10 days in the City Prison and the execution of sentence was suspended.

Defendant Coyle makes this application and submits a transcript of the minutes of the entire proceedings to this Court on the argument of this motion.

In his moving papers defendant states that following his arrest he was arraigned on April 17, 1957; that he pleaded guilty to the charge; that he did not fully realize what the plea of guilty meant; that he was not unequivocally advised of his rights to be represented by counsel; that defendant did not waive his rights to counsel; that he spoke to an individual who he believed was in some way connected with the court and was advised to plead guilty since no publicity would be forthcoming and that defendant did not need counsel as this was a police offense and not a crime.

The People in opposition to this motion submit an affidavit of an Assistant District Attorney who relying on the presumption of regularity attendant upon judicial proceedings asserts that the defendant was informed of his right to the aid of counsel at every stage of the proceedings and of his right to obtain counsel.

It therefore appears that the defendant predicates his motion on two grounds: first, that an unknown person advised defendant to plead guilty; that nothing would come of it; that he really did not need counsel as this was merely a police offense and not a crime. This allegation involves an opinion of an unknown person and is obviously not a ground recognized for granting a writ of error coram nobis. The second ground advanced by defendant is that he did not realize what the plea of guilty meant; that he was not unequivocally advised of his right

Page 216

to be represented by counsel and that defendant did not waive his right to counsel. If this ground be sustained and defendant has thereby been denied due process, the judgment of conviction should be vacated.

[18 Misc.2d 264] The only error, if determined to be such, appears on the face of the record, that is, in the minutes of the proceedings when defendant was arraigned and concerns itself as to whether defendant was informed of his rights to counsel; whether he was afforded reasonable time to obtain the aid of counsel and whether or not he intelligently waived his right to be represented by counsel.

It has been held that where defendant has been denied due process of law by judicial interference with the right to counsel, he is entitled to the remedy of coram nobis even though the errors appear on the face of the record. Bojinoff v. People, 299 N.Y. 145, 85 N.E.2d 909; People v. Koch, 299 N.Y. 378, 381, 87 N.E.2d 417, 418.

During the argument of the motion the People conceded that the transcript of the minutes submitted with the moving papers was a true and...

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2 practice notes
  • Rosen v. Rosen
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (New York)
    • June 9, 1959
    ...not to her attorney (Rimos v. Rimos, Sup., 81 N.Y.S.2d 347; see also Application of Waxstein and Gelbman, Sup., 130 N.Y.S.2d 285; Kamman [18 Misc.2d 262] v. Kamman, 167 App.Div. 423, 152 N.Y.S. 579). Thus, in view of plaintiff's substantial independent financial resources, it is doubtful, h......
  • People v. Mullhearn
    • United States
    • New York Court of Special Sessions
    • April 4, 1960
    ...court attendant may be delegated to do so, (a practice, incidentally, which has long existed in our Magistrates' Court; People v. Coyle, 18 Misc.2d 262, 184 N.Y.S.2d 214 (Affirmed Sp.Sess.); but what is of great moment is that the defendant must not only be advised of these rights, but that......
2 cases
  • Rosen v. Rosen
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (New York)
    • June 9, 1959
    ...not to her attorney (Rimos v. Rimos, Sup., 81 N.Y.S.2d 347; see also Application of Waxstein and Gelbman, Sup., 130 N.Y.S.2d 285; Kamman [18 Misc.2d 262] v. Kamman, 167 App.Div. 423, 152 N.Y.S. 579). Thus, in view of plaintiff's substantial independent financial resources, it is doubtful, h......
  • People v. Mullhearn
    • United States
    • New York Court of Special Sessions
    • April 4, 1960
    ...court attendant may be delegated to do so, (a practice, incidentally, which has long existed in our Magistrates' Court; People v. Coyle, 18 Misc.2d 262, 184 N.Y.S.2d 214 (Affirmed Sp.Sess.); but what is of great moment is that the defendant must not only be advised of these rights, but that......

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