People v. Craig
| Citation | 131 Mich.App. 42,346 N.W.2d 66 |
| Decision Date | 16 March 1984 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 68291 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Warren CRAIG, Defendant-Appellant. 131 Mich.App. 42, 346 N.W.2d 66 |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan (US) |
[131 MICHAPP 43] Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., Edward Reilly Wilson, Chief, Appellate Asst. Pros. Atty., and Kevin T. Simowski, Asst. Pros. Atty., for the people.
Peter H. Moray, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.
Before KELLY, P.J., and HOOD and SHEPHERD, JJ.
On September 19, 1982, after a preliminary examination, defendant was bound over to circuit court on a charge of breaking into a coin operated device, M.C.L. Sec. 752.811(a); M.S.A. Sec. 28.643(101)(a). Subsequently, the circuit court denied[131 MICHAPP 44] his motion to quash the information. He appeals by leave granted.
At the preliminary examination, the prosecution presented evidence that defendant, then a coach operator, had taken money with a wire metal instrument from a bus fare box while the bus was parked at the SEMTA bus terminal in Inkster. Defendant now argues that a bus fare box is not covered by M.C.L. Sec. 752.811; M.S.A. Sec. 28.643(101), which reads:
Reading only the body of the statute, we could reasonably conclude that defendant's alleged actions are included. A bus fare box may be defined as "a device designed to receive currency or coins". However, we decline to include a bus fare box within the statute because we believe that such interpretation would violate the title-object clause [131 MICHAPP 45] of the Michigan Constitution. 1963 Const., art. 4, Sec. 24. 1
The legal concept of ejusdem generis states that in a statute where general words follow the designation of particular subjects, the meaning of the general words will ordinarily be presumed to be and construed as restricted by the particular designation and as including only things of the same kind, class, character, or nature as those specifically enumerated. People v. Smith, 393 Mich. 432, 436, 225 N.W.2d 165 (1975). As recited above, the title to 1970 P.A. 126 states: "AN ACT relating to coin operated devices, including but not limited to parking meters, coin telephones and vending machines * * *." In the present statute, the general words are "coin operated devices". The more particular words are "parking meters, coin telephones and vending machines". Obviously, the statute is not restricted to only parking meters, coin telephones, and vending machines. It is also obvious, however, that parking meters, coin telephones, and vending machines are of a type clearly different from currency receptacles such as bus fare boxes.
We conclude that a bus fare box is not included in this title. As commonly understood, a "coin operated device" includes such objects as vending machines, pay telephones, pay video games, and slot machines. Other courts have defined a coin operated device as "a device or a machine operated by a coin or by a substitute for a coin", Remington-Rand, Inc. v. Gage, 4 F.Supp. 199, 200 (W.D.N.Y.,1983), and, "In addition to its function as a dispenser, it serves as a salesman", United Postage Corp [131 MICHAPP 46] v. Kammeyer, 581 S.W.2d 716, 721 (Tex.Civ.App., 1979). 2 Black's Law Dictionary, (4th ed.), p. 1243, defines "operation" in turn as "Exertion of * * * an effect brought about in accordance with a definite plan; action; activity". Under these definitions, a coin operated device is the type of object that itself provides the desired service or good by reacting mechanically after the coin is inserted.
A bus fare box is not such a device. Instead, it is merely a receptacle that receives and stores money. 3 While a coin operated device physically requires payment before the service or good is rendered, inserting money in a bus fare box does not trigger a mechanism which provides the service.
Therefore, if we interpreted "a device designed to receive currency or coins" to include a bus fare box, the act would exceed the scope of its title. But the title-object clause requires that the act itself not exceed the scope of its title. Maki v. East Tawas, 385 Mich. 151, 157, 188 N.W.2d 593 (1971). A statute will satisfy this requirement if it fairly indicates to a reasonable and inquiring mind its general scope, intent, and purpose. Green v. Court Administrator, 44 Mich.App. 259, 263-264, 205 N.W.2d 306 (1972). A statute likewise satisfies this requirement "if the act centers to one main general object or purpose which the title comprehensively declares * * * ". Loomis v. Rogers, 197 Mich. 265, 271, 163 N.W. 1018 (1917).
In Maki, supra, the title to the act in question stated that the act would grant governmental immunity for injuries caused by negligence. However,[131 MICHAPP 47] the body of the act itself granted such immunity for "tort liability". The Supreme Court held that this discrepancy violated the title-object clause.
In Bankhead v. Mayor of River Rouge, 387 Mich. 610, 198 N.W.2d 414 (1972), the Supreme Court again held that the clause was violated. There, the title stated that the act would create...
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S.A. v. Pittsburgh Pub. Sch. Dist.
...in their ordinary use constitute a fire hazard" while an electric powerline does not) (emphasis in original); cf. People v. Craig, 131 Mich.App. 42, 346 N.W.2d 66, 67–68 (1983).9 On this note, the District's reliance on case law interpreting this statutory section and similar sections is se......