People v. Crawford

• Decision Date: 11 June 1986
• Docket Number: No. 85-1820,85-1820
• Citation: 495 N.E.2d 1025,145 Ill.App.3d 318,99 Ill.Dec. 290
• Parties: , 99 Ill.Dec. 290 PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joseph CRAWFORD, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 1025

495 N.E.2d 1025

145 Ill.App.3d 318, 99 Ill.Dec. 290

PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joseph CRAWFORD, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 85-1820.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

First District, Third Division.

June 11, 1986.

Steven Clark, Deputy Defender, Julie B. Aimen, Asst. Appellate Defender, Chicago, for defendant-appellant.

Richard M. Daley, State's Atty., Chicago, (Joan S. Cherry, Christopher J. Cummings, Robert M. Podlasek, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellee.

Justice McNAMARA delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant Joseph Crawford was charged with unlawful use of a firearm by a felon. Defendant previously had been convicted of voluntary manslaughter. After a trial without a jury, the trial court found defendant guilty of the offense charged and sentenced him to a term of 3 years. On appeal defendant contends that the statute in question is void because it is an arbitrary exercise of the State's police power, that he was denied equal protection and due process of law, and that the statute violates the doctrine of separation of powers.

Because of the nature of the arguments on appeal, only a few facts are necessary. On August 10, 1984, at 12:15 a.m., two Chicago police officers arrested defendant for possession of a loaded .38 caliber, snub-nosed revolver in his waistband. Defendant was standing outside of an apartment building in which he resided. The arrest occurred as the result of a complaint by an unidentified individual who stopped the officers. At trial, the State offered into evidence a certified copy of defendant's 1975 conviction for voluntary manslaughter.

Defendant first contends that the unlawful use of weapons by felons statute, Ill.Rev.Stat. 1984 Supp., ch. 38, par. 24-1.1), violates due process and is therefore unconstitutional because it is an unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of the State's police power. Defendant maintains that the statutory exclusion of all convicted felons from possession of weapons or firearms is overly broad and that it proscribes the possession of weapons without requiring a culpable mental state.

The statute provides as follows:

"Sec. 24-1.1 Unlawful Use of Weapons by Felons:

(a) It is unlawful for a person to knowingly possess on or about his person or on his land or in his own abode or fixed place of business any weapon prohibited under Section 24-1 of this Act or any firearm or firearm ammunition if the person has been convicted of a felony under the laws of this State or any other jurisdiction. This Section shall not apply if the person has been granted relief by the Director of the Department of Law Enforcement pursuant to Section 10 of 'An Act relating to the acquisition, possession, and transfer of firearms and firearm ammunition, to provide a penalty for the violation thereof and to make an appropriation in connection therewith', approved August 3, 1967, as amended.

(b) Violation of this Section shall be a Class 3 felony."

(Ill.Rev.Stat. 1984, Supp., ch. 38, par. 24-1.1.)

"Section 24-1, Unlawful Use of Weapons, prohibits the possession of certain weapons and includes the following provision:

(a) A person commits the offense of unlawful use of weapons when he knowingly:

* * *

* * *

(2) Carries or possesses with intent to use the same unlawfully against another, a dagger, dirk, billy, dangerous knife, razor, stiletto, broken bottle or other piece of glass, stun gun or taser or any other dangerous or deadly weapon or instrument of like character; * * *."

(Ill.Rev.Stat.1984, Supp., ch. 38, par. 24-1(a)(2).)

A convicted felon may be granted relief from the prohibition against possession of a firearm if it is determined that:

"(1) The applicant has not been convicted of a forcible felony under the laws of this State or any other jurisdiction;

(2) The circumstances regarding a criminal conviction, where applicable, the applicant's criminal history and his reputation are such that the applicant will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety; and

(3) granting relief would not be contrary to the public interest."

(Ill.Rev.Stat. 1984 Supp., ch. 38, par. 83-10(c)).

The due process clauses of both the federal and state constitutions prohibit only the arbitrary and unreasonable use of the State's police power. (People v. Brown (1983), 98 Ill.2d 374, 75 Ill.Dec. 216, 457 N.E.2d 6.) The standard for determining the legislature's proper exercise of the police power is whether the statute is reasonably designed to remedy the evil which the legislature has determined to be a threat to the public health, safety and general welfare. (People v. Bradley (1980), 79 Ill.2d 410, 38 Ill.Dec. 575, 403 N.E.2d 1029.) The legislature is vested with wide discretion in determining what the public interest requires and what means are needed to promote and protect that interest. Rawlings v. Department of Law Enforcement (1979), 73 Ill.App.3d 267, 29 Ill.Dec. 333, 391 N.E.2d 758; see Illinois Gamefowl Breeders Association v. Block (1979), 75 Ill.2d 443, 27 Ill.Dec. 465, 389 N.E.2d 529.

The purpose of the legislature in enacting section 24-1.1 is to protect the health and safety of the public by deterring possession of weapons by convicted felons, a class of persons that the legislature has determined presents a higher risk of danger to the public when in possession of a weapon. (See Rawlings v. Department of Law Enforcement.) We find that the legislature's purpose in enacting the statute was a proper exercise of the police power. We likewise find that the method chosen by the legislature to achieve the protection of the public from danger is reasonably related to that purpose. The unlawful use of weapons by felons statute creates an enhanced penalty for a specific class of persons, convicted felons. If a group of persons creates a greater danger to the public, then it is reasonable to deter use or possession of weapons by means of a greater penalty for that group. This statute, therefore, is reasonably designed to remedy a threat to the public safety and is not an arbitrary use of the police power. See Rawlings v. Department of Law Enforcement.

We reject defendant's contention that the statute sweeps too broadly because it subjects all convicted felons to greater sanctions, thereby "branding" felons dangerous for life. Before the enactment of section 24-1.1, section 24-1 prohibited the use of weapons, including firearms under certain circumstances, and subjected to harsher penalties only those individuals who had a prior felony conviction within 5 years of the unlawful use of weapons offense. (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1983, ch. 28, par. 24-1(b).) A statute is not too broad merely because a prior statute proscribes a narrower range of behavior committed by a narrower class of persons. The fundamental test is reasonableness and we have determined that this method of deterring a threat to the public safety is reasonable. Moreover, section 24-1.1 provides for exceptions to the exclusion of firearm possession by felons through section 83-10 of the code. Section 83-10 allows the Department of Law Enforcement to determine on an individual basis whether a person convicted of a non-forcible felony can possess a firearm. The legislative history clearly demonstrates the intent to protect the public safety through this statutory scheme. (H.R. Discussion of S.B. 1239, 83rd Gen.Assem., 21-22 (November 2, 1983)(remarks of Representative Jaffe, Chairman of Judiciary).) The fact that an individual convicted of a forcible felony would never be able to possess a firearm is not unreasonable and reflects the legitimate legislative determination that such individuals pose a danger to the public.

Furthermore, the prohibition against use and possession of weapons by felons does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Section 24-1.1 treats equally a similarly situated class of persons, convicted felons. (People v. Bradley.) Since the possession of firearms is not a constitutionally protected fundamental right (United States v. Miller (1939), 307 U.S. 174, 59 S.Ct. 816, 83 L.Ed. 1206, Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove (1984), 103 Ill.2d 483, 83 Ill.Dec. 308, 470 N.E.2d 266), equal protection requires that the statutory treatment of this class of persons bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. (People v. Gurell (1983), 98 Ill.2d 194, 74 Ill.Dec. 516, 456 N.E.2d 18.) We find that this classification of felons which limits their possession of weapons is rationally related to the protection of public safety. (See People v. Graves (1974), 23 Ill.App.3d 762, 320 N.E.2d 95.) It is well within the police power for the legislature to classify offenses and prescribe penalties for the defined offenses. (People v. LaPointe (1981), 88 Ill.2d 482, 59 Ill.Dec. 59, 431 N.E.2d 344.) Further, the police power permits the legislature to make broad classifications, People v. McCabe (1971), 49 Ill.2d 338, 275 N.E.2d 407, which are presumptively valid. (People v. Taylor (1984), 102 Ill.2d 201, 80 Ill.Dec. 76, 464 N.E.2d 1059.) The fact that there is no time limitation on the prohibition against possession of weapons by felons does not render this newly-enacted felonious unlawful use of weapons statute unconstitutional. It is well established that the legislature may prescribe enhanced penalties for those persons who have been previously convicted of a felony (People v. Hayes (1981), 87 Ill.2d 95, 57 Ill.Dec. 592, 429 N.E.2d 490; People v. Finley (1980), 82 Ill.App.3d 307, 37 Ill.Dec. 767, 402 N.E.2d 769), and also make conviction of a felony an element of the offense. (People v. Palmer (1984), 104 Ill.2d 340, 84 Ill.Dec. 658, 472 N.E.2d 795.) Such classifications do not arbitrarily stigmatize convicted felons for life, but reflect a legitimate legislative purpose. (See People v. Smith (1984), 124 Ill.App.3d 805, 80 Ill.Dec. 310, 465 N.E.2d 101.) It is, therefore, well within the police power for the legislature to...