People v. Curdgel

• Citation: 634 N.E.2d 199,611 N.Y.S.2d 827,83 N.Y.2d 862
• Parties: , 634 N.E.2d 199 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Clifford CURDGEL, Appellant.
• Decision Date: 28 April 1994
• Court: New York Court of Appeals

Page 827

611 N.Y.S.2d 827

83 N.Y.2d 862, 634 N.E.2d 199

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Clifford CURDGEL, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

April 28, 1994.

Roemer & Featherstonhaugh, P.C., Albany (Matthew J. Kelly, of counsel), for appellant.

Sol Greenberg, Dist. Atty. of Albany County, Albany (Risa L. Viglucci, of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT MEMORANDUM.

The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.

On April 16, 1987, a fire, intentionally set, swept through an Albany residence and killed four people in their sleep. Following his arrest for unrelated crimes, defendant told the prosecutor that he had been involved in setting the fire and was willing to cooperate in its investigation. His counsel arranged for him to provide the authorities with written and oral accounts of the crime. Counsel was also present when defendant signed a waiver of immunity from prosecution and relinquished "any * * * privilege against the use against me of any * * * testimony or evidence" in any "inquiry, proceeding, or trial." In exchange for a sentence promise of 1 1/2 to 3 years' imprisonment, defendant agreed to testify before a Grand Jury about the crime and "cooperate fully" in the prosecution of his accomplices. Although its terms are not in dispute, the parties did not seek approval of the plea agreement.

Soon after describing to the Grand Jury how his accomplices had set fire to the house in retaliation for a drug-related debt, defendant appeared on a televised news broadcast and stated that he had lied to the Grand Jury, apologizing to his accomplices. The People, concluding that defendant's public recantation had "effectively eliminat[ed] his utility and credibility as a prosecution witness," refused to honor the plea agreement. Defendant was ultimately convicted of four counts of murder in the second degree and related counts, following a trial at which his Grand Jury testimony was introduced against him.

On appeal, defendant argues that he is entitled to specific performance of the plea agreement because his testimony before the Grand Jury, presented at risk to himself, placed him in a "no return" position, so that he cannot be restored to his preplea agreement status (see People v. Danny G., 61 N.Y.2d 169, 473 N.Y.S.2d 131, 461 N.E.2d 268). The Appellate Division rejected this contention, 191 A.D.2d 743, 594 N.Y.S.2d 410, as do we.

In order to promote certainty and openness in the plea negotiation process, we generally withhold judicial recognition from plea bargains not submitted for judicial approval (People v. Danny G., 61 N.Y.2d 169, 173, 473 N.Y.S.2d 131, 461 N.E.2d 268, supra). While the fact that a plea agreement was never placed on the record is not always an insurmountable barrier (Matter of Benjamin S., 55 N.Y.2d 116, 121, 447 N.Y.S.2d 905, 432 N.E.2d 777) no exception is warranted here.

Specific performance of a plea agreement is a remedy rooted in concerns of "essential fairness" (People v. McConnell, 49 N.Y.2d 340, 349, 425 N.Y.S.2d 794, 402 N.E.2d 133). Unlike the defendants in McConnell and Danny G., however (who fully complied with the terms of their plea agreements), here defendant failed to uphold his end of the plea agreement and rendered the agreement valueless to the People. Their subsequent refusal to call him as a witness at the trial of the accomplices was not unreasonable in view of the questionable value of his testimony. We cannot say that essential fairness compels enforcement of the original agreement. The question remains whether the People were nevertheless entitled to use defendant's own Grand Jury testimony against him at his own trial.

It has long been our rule that evidence of a defendant's guilty plea cannot be used against him at a criminal trial once the plea has been withdrawn (People v. Spitaleri, 9 N.Y.2d 168, 212 N.Y.S.2d 53, 173 N.E.2d 35). In People v. Moore, 66 N.Y.2d 1028, 499 N.Y.S.2d 393, 489 N.E.2d 1295, we observed that statements made during the course of plea negotiations could be used against a defendant only if the People had specifically bargained for that use.

We declined in People v. Evans, 58 N.Y.2d 14, 457 N.Y.S.2d 757, 444 N.E.2d 7 to extend the Spitaleri doctrine to preclude use of statements induced by a plea promise. As in defendant's...