People v. Dago, 24867
| Decision Date | 19 June 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 24867,24867 |
| Citation | 179 Colo. 1,497 P.2d 1261 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. George DAGO, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., John P. Moore, Deputy Atty. Gen., George E. DeRoos, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for plaintiff-appellee.
Rollie R. Rogers, Colorado State Public Defender, J. D. MacFarlane, Chief Deputy State Public Defender, Randolph M. Karsh, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for defendant-appellant.
George Dago appeals from his conviction for aggravated robbery. He contends that the trial court erred (1) in permitting testimony concerning a second, subsequent robbery allegedly involving Dago but for which he was not on trial; and (2) in failing to define the term 'simple robbery' when alluding to it as a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery. We find no error and therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.
During Dago's trial on the charge of aggravated robbery committed on November 10, 1969, the complaining witness was allowed to testify that he was again robbed on January 24, 1970, by a man whom he recognized as Dago. After the witness testified as to the events of the second robbery, the judge cautioned the jury that evidence of the second robbery
We do not agree with the contention that Dago was unfairly prejudiced by the testimony reported above. It is the rule in Colorado that evidence of similar offenses is admissible when it is offered for the limited purposes of proving motive, intent, scheme, plan or identity. Clews v. People, 151 Colo. 219, 377 P.2d 125; Stull v. People, 140 Colo. 278, 344 P.2d 455.
As pointed out above, the court carefully gave the limiting instruction ordinarily required by Stull v. People, Supra, in cases where similar transactions are admitted into evidence.
The record adequately evinces the probative value of the testimony as it related to the purposes for which it was offered. The complaining witness gave unrefuted testimony that his identification of Dago as his assailant in the first robbery was strengthened because he recognized Dago in the second robbery. Moreover, it should be noted that the Modus operandi of the second robbery was the same as that of the first.
Dago's second contention is that the trial...
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Leonardo v. People
...if the language is clear. E.g., People v. Freeman, 668 P.2d 1371, 1383-84 (Colo.1983) (robbery instruction); People v. Dago, 179 Colo. 1, 4, 497 P.2d 1261, 1262 (1972) (same). The definition of that the trial court included in its instructions to the jury is substantially the same as the de......
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People v. Pearson
...did not commit reversible error in refusing to give the instruction suggested by the defendant on appeal. See, e.g., People v. Dago, 179 Colo. 1, 497 P.2d 1261 (1972); Blincoe v. People, 178 Colo. 34, 494 P.2d 1285 (1972); Simms v. People, 174 Colo. 85, 482 P.2d 974 Defendant also argues th......
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People v. Henderson
...probative of the modus operandi in the theft for which defendant was charged. Pabst v. State, 169 So.2d 329 (Fla.App.). See People v. Dago, 179 Colo. 1, 497 P.2d 1261; § 16--10--301, C.R.S.1973 (1975 Cum.Supp.) (effective April 3, Defendant's contention that only 'completed transactions' ma......
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People v. Frantz, 02CA0463.
...83 P.3d 642 (Colo.2004). Jury instructions framed in the language of statutes are generally adequate and proper. People v. Dago, 179 Colo. 1, 497 P.2d 1261 (1972); People v. Hayward, supra. It is unnecessary to give an instruction that is encompassed in other instructions given by the court......