People v. Daniels

Decision Date16 March 1971
Docket NumberCr. 4246
Citation16 Cal.App.3d 36,93 Cal.Rptr. 628
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesThe PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Henry Clay DANIELS, Defendant and Appellant.
OPINION

COUGHLIN, Associate Justice.

Defendant appeals his conviction on jury verdict of the offense of attempted murder of Eloise Daniels, his divorced wife, and Barbara Washington, the wife's companion.

On October 12, 1969, at 2:15 a.m., Mrs. Daniels, accompanied by her companion Mrs. Washington, was driving an automobile on a public highway when an explosion, centered in the vicinity of and underneath the driver's compartment, wrecked the automobile; ejected the occupants; and injured both of them, Mrs. Daniels losing both legs and her companion sustaining burns and cuts about the face, hands and legs.

Opinion evidence supports the conclusion the explosion was caused by a bomb made of dynamite, a blasting cap, current provided by batteries and a triggering device activated by a time mechanism to effect detonation.

On March 10, 1969 defendant, while a student at New Mexico State University, was in possession of a book entitled 'Explosives and Homemade Bombs' authored by Major Joseph Stoffel. The book was indexed in the card catalogue of the university library; had not been checked out to anyone; but was missing. A maintenance employee of the university saw the book in defendant's dormitory room; noted the title; observed pieces of scrap paper used as book marks; and upon opening it at these places, noted at one of them a photograph of 'an automobile engine with an explosive attached to the upper side of it electrically' and at the other a photograph which 'showed how to hook up an explosive with a mechanical device.' An expert witness testified the 'book would enable a grade school student to build a bomb with easily available material' and 'not only has articles, but it has photographs, with diagrams that are self-explanatory, which use such things as mouse traps, clocks, all types of easily available materials to set off any type of device that will give an explosion.'

On three different occasions before the explosion, defendant had assaulted his wife under circumstances supporting the conclusion he would kill her if she divorced him. On April 20, 1968 defendant chased his wife with knife in hand; knocked her down; plunged the knife down toward her; and, although he did not actually strike her with it, she was cut on the hand during the scuffle. In the latter part of May, 1968 defendant pointed a loaded gun at his wife's head, saying: 'If I can't have you, nobody else can'; was dissuaded from shooting her when her sister forced her way between them; and relinquished the gun to another person upon request. On August 25, 1968, defendant was in an automobile with his wife sitting beside him; engaged her in a quarrel; was driving at 30 miles per hour; headed the automobile toward the edge of a steep embankment, referred to in the testimony as a cliff; and jumped out. His wife was confined by seat belts but managed to free herself; steered the automobile away from the embankment; and jumped out. She left the scene and reported the incident to the police. Defendant went to New Mexico; was charged with assault with intent to murder; voluntarily returned from New Mexico following institution of extradition proceedings; was arrested; pled guilty to assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily harm; and on October 10, 1969, was placed on probation.

An investigator at the scene of the explosion found fragments of small flashlight batteries adhering to bits of masking tape. Two days before the explosion defendant was in the garage of a friend. Following the accident the police found a clock in the garage from which an electrical cord had been severed and also found some masking tape. The last time the owner of the garage saw the clock it was intact. She previously had not seen the masking tape.

On the morning of the explosion police officers went to a residence owned by defendant's mother with whom he was staying; entered with her permission; asked for defendant; and were told he was asleep in his bedroom. The mother aroused defendant and he came into the living room. Some of the officers interrogated him respecting his whereabouts during the provious night. In the course of this interrogation Officer Schilder asked Mrs. Daniels if he might speak with her in private; when she replied in the affirmative, left the living room with her; and went to another room. The sole purpose of speaking with the mother in private was to verify defendant's statements respecting his whereabouts the previous night. After inquiry pertinent to this purpose, Schilder asked the mother if her son had any batteries, wires or other such equipment in the house. She replied to her knowledge, he did not have any of these items, however, 'the officers were certainly welcome to look in the room where he slept and see if there was anything like that there.' Schilder then asked the mother if her son paid rent, and she replied he did not, that 'he merely stayed there'; and also asked if the house was hers and she said it was 'and that he was merely staying there as her--free, not paying any rent.' Thereupon Schilder and other officers proceeded to the room identified by the mother as the room where defendant slept, and made a search. On top of the dresser were four .30 caliber shells without powder inside, a prescription bottle containing what appeared to be black powder, and a pair of surgical scissors. Inside various dresser drawers the officers found several dry-cell batteries of different sizes and voltages, a small electric motor, an 8 inch piece of red wire, and a pair of wire cutters. Between the mattresses on the bed the officers found a .30 caliber rifle, broken down. In the corner of the room was a suitcase, thereafter identified as defendant's which the officers opened. In it were papers, books and bottles containing quantities of saltpeter, sulphur and charcoal, which are the ingredients of black powder. All of the foregoing items were taken into custody.

After his arrest defendant was told his wife 'had been hurt badly', was in a hospital and might not live; was asked if he cared; and replied: 'Hurray, hurray, hurray; hurray if she lives and hurray if she dies. Doesn't make any difference if she lives or if she dies.'

Prior to trial defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained while searching his mother's house upon the ground it was the product of an illegal search and seizure. The motion was denied. Defendant asserts denial of his motion was error, requiring a reversal.

The issue is whether the search upon consent of the mother, under the circumstances, was reasonable.

We hold the mother was authorized to consent to the search of the premises owned by her, including the bedroom in which the son slept, the dresser, dresser drawers and the bed in that bedroom; in any event, the search thereof was reasonable because conducted under a reasonable belief, in good faith, the mother was authorized to consent; and, for these reasons, the search was legal; but the mother did not have authority to consent to the search of the suitcase; any reliance upon a claimed consent to search the suitcase was unreasonable; and, for this reason, the search of the suitcase was illegal.

Both sides direct major attention to the general rules governing a search upon consent by a co-occupant, and support their respective positions by an application of these rules to their interpretation of the evidence.

A search of the premises occupied by more than one person is reasonable where made upon the consent and in the presence of one of the joint occupants who actually is entitled to enter upon and search the premises. (People v. Ingle, 53 Cal.2d 407, 416, 2 Cal.Rptr. 14, 348 P.2d 577; Vandenberg v. Superior Court, 8 Cal.App.3d 1048, 1053, 87 Cal.Rptr. 876.) Likewise, the search of such premises is reasonable if made upon consent of a joint occupant 'who, By virtue of his relationship or other factors, the officers reasonably and in good faith believe has authority to consent' even though he lacks such authority. (Italics ours.) (People v. Smith, 63 Cal.2d 779, 799, 48 Cal.Rptr. 382, 395, 409 P.2d 222; People v. Hill, 69 Cal.2d 550, 554, 72 Cal.Rptr. 641, 446 P.2d 521; People v. Gorg, 45 Cal.2d 776, 783, 291 P.2d 469.) Excepted from the latter rule is a search conducted without the consent and over the objection of a co-tenant then present whose property is seized as a product of the search. (People v. Frank, 225 Cal.App.2d 339, 342, 37 Cal.Rptr. 202.)

Pertinent and distinguishing circumstances at bench include the fact the person consenting to the search was the mother of the defendant who owned exclusively the entire premises, including the bedroom in which he slept. Consent to search was volunteered by the mother rather than requested by the officers. Defendant was not in the bedroom at the time the search was conducted.

The evidence supports the inference, implicit in the order denying defendant's motion to suppress, defendant did not have exclusive possession or control over the bedroom which he was permitted to use; and his mother, by virtue of her ownership and the circumstances in the case, had the right to enter and search the bedroom at will. The trial judge who ruled upon the motion to suppress, in an oral opinion preceeding his denial thereof, expressed the conclusion defendant's occupancy of the bedroom was not exclusive but was subject to the right of the mother to consent to its search.

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