People v. Denson

• Decision Date: 20 November 2014
• Docket Number: No. 116231.,116231.
• Citation: 21 N.E.3d 398
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Darren DENSON, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

21 N.E.3d 398

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee

v.Darren DENSON, Appellant.

No. 116231.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Nov. 20, 2014.

Michael J. Pelletier, Thomas A. Lilien and Christopher McCoy, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Elgin, for appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Joseph H. McMahon, State's Attorney, of St. Charles (Carolyn E. Shapiro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Leah M. Bendik, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Justice THOMAS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Kane County, defendant, Darren Denson, was convicted of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9–1(a)(2) (West 2002)), armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18–2(a)(1) (West 2002)), and home invasion (720 ILCS 5/12–11(a)(1) (West 2002)). The trial court sentenced him to natural life in prison for the first degree murder, consecutive to two concurrent terms of 30 years in prison for the other two counts. Defendant appealed, and the appellate court affirmed. 2013 IL App (2d) 110652, 376 Ill.Dec. 694, 1 N.E.3d 27. We granted defendant's petition for leave to appeal (Ill.S.Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. July 1, 2013)) and for the reasons that follow, now affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Defendant was charged by indictment with the February 2003 murder of Kyle Juggins. Prior to trial, the State filed a six-page motion in limine to admit certain hearsay statements made by defendant's coconspirators. Defendant filed a five-page written response objecting to the admission of those statements. The trial court then held a hearing on the State's motion, and both sides were given the opportunity to argue before the court. The trial court granted the State's motion, and the matter eventually proceeded to trial. The jury found defendant guilty on all counts, and defendant filed a posttrial motion alleging several errors, including the trial court's pretrial granting of the State's motion in limine. The trial court denied the motion and imposed sentence. Defendant filed a timely appeal.

¶ 4 On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred in (1) admitting the coconspirator statements that were the subject of the State's motion in limine, and (2) allowing the State to elicit a prior consistent statement from one of its witnesses. With respect to defendant's first argument, the appellate court held that defendant forfeited review of this issue both because he (1) failed to file a motion in limine of his own to exclude those statements; and (2) failed to raise a contemporaneous objection when the State introduced those statements at trial. 2013 IL App (2d) 110652, ¶¶ 7–10, 376 Ill.Dec. 694, 1 N.E.3d 27. The appellate court then held that, even if defendant had not forfeited the issue, he still was not entitled to relief because, with one harmless exception, all of the contested statements, including the prior consistent statement, were properly admitted. Id. ¶¶ 11–29. Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. Id. ¶¶ 32–33.

¶ 5 Defendant now appeals to this court, arguing that the appellate court erred both in (1) holding that defendant forfeited review of the admissibility of the coconspirator statements, and (2) holding that two of those statements, as well as the contested prior consistent statement, were properly admitted.

¶ 6 DISCUSSION

¶ 7 Forfeiture

¶ 8 We begin with whether defendant forfeited review of the trial court's decision to admit the statements that were the subject of the State's motion in limine. As noted above, the appellate court's forfeiture determination was based on two, independent considerations: (1) defendant's failure to file a motion in limine of his own to exclude the statements at issue, and (2) defendant's failure to raise a contemporaneous objection when the statements at issue were admitted at trial. Whether these failures resulted in a forfeiture is a question of law, and our review therefore is de novo. People v. Lara, 2012 IL 112370, ¶ 16, 368 Ill.Dec. 155, 983 N.E.2d 959.

¶ 9 Motion in Limine

¶ 10 With respect to the appellate court's first consideration, the State makes no attempt in this court to defend either the appellate court's analysis or its conclusion. Instead, the State simply concedes that “the appellate court's first reason—that defendant filed a response to a motion in limine rather than his own motion—does not justify a finding of forfeiture.” In other words, on this point, the parties agree fully that the appellate court erred. That said, the State's concession on this point does not end the matter, as this court is not bound by a party's concession. See People v. Horrell, 235 Ill.2d 235, 241, 336 Ill.Dec. 27, 919 N.E.2d 952 (2009). Rather, in a case such as this, involving a pure question of law, we are wise to examine for ourselves whether the concession is well-founded, which in this case it decidedly is.

¶ 11 In criminal cases, this court has held consistently that a defendant preserves an issue for review by (1) raising it in either a motion in limine or a contemporaneous trial objection, and (2) including it in the posttrial motion. See People v. Cox, 195 Ill.2d 378, 382, 254 Ill.Dec. 720, 748 N.E.2d 166 (2001) ; People v. Hudson, 157 Ill.2d 401, 434–35, 193 Ill.Dec. 128, 626 N.E.2d 161 (1993) ; People v. Boclair, 129 Ill.2d 458, 476, 136 Ill.Dec. 29, 544 N.E.2d 715 (1989). Here, the State filed a six-page motion in limine to admit certain statements in its case against defendant. In response to the State's motion, defendant filed a five-page written objection arguing why the statements at issue were inadmissible. The trial court then held a hearing on the State's motion, and defense counsel once again had the opportunity to argue against the admissibility of the contested statements. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court allowed the State's motion. Later, following his conviction, defendant filed a motion for a new trial arguing, inter alia, that the trial court erred in granting the State's motion in limine. In short, defendant did everything that cases such as Cox, Hudson , and Boclair require, and we therefore hold that he properly preserved his objection to the admissibility of the contested statements.

¶ 12 The appellate court below reached the opposite conclusion. And one of its reasons for reaching that conclusion is that, rather than objecting to the admissibility of the contested statements in a motion in limine of his own, defendant did so in response to the State's motion in limine to admit those statements. According to the appellate court, this was insufficient because, under this court's settled precedent, it is a motion in limine that preserves an issue for review, not a response to a motion in limine. On this point, the appellate court was quite critical of the decision in People v. Maldonado, 398 Ill.App.3d 401, 337 Ill.Dec. 634, 922 N.E.2d 1211 (2010), which held that the defendant in that case preserved the issue for review “when he raised it in both his reply to the State's motion in limine and in his posttrial motion.”

Id. at 415, 337 Ill.Dec. 634, 922 N.E.2d 1211. According to the appellate court:

“In a single paragraph, Maldonado morphs the law from ‘the supreme court holding that raising an issue in a motion in limine is sufficient to preserve an issue so long as it is also raised in the posttrial motion’ to ‘because defendant did object to the introduction of this evidence both in his reply to the State's motion in limine and in his posttrial motion, we conclude that this issue was sufficiently preserved.’ [Maldonado, 398 Ill.App.3d at 416, 337 Ill.Dec. 634, 922 N.E.2d 1211.] This non sequitur is a patent distortion of a supreme court holding, made with no analysis or purported justification for the expansion of the supreme court's holding. We are unaware of any case prior to Maldonado that holds that raising an issue in a reply to the State's motion in limine, rather than in the defendant's motion, is sufficient for preservation of the issue. To the extent that Maldonado so holds, we disavow that holding.” 2013 IL App (2d) 110652, ¶ 8, 376 Ill.Dec. 694, 1 N.E.3d 27.

In other words, according to the appellate court, the dispositive factor in determining whether an issue is preserved for review is not whether that issue was the subject of in limine litigation, but rather which party filed the pleading that precipitated the in limine litigation.

¶ 13 With due respect to the appellate court, we are convinced that the above analysis elevates form over substance to an unwarranted and unnecessary degree. Far from being a “non sequitur, ” Maldonado's holding is simply a commonsense application of a settled principle to a specific set of facts. This court's forfeiture rules exist to encourage defendants to raise issues in the trial court, thereby ensuring both that the trial court has an opportunity to correct any errors prior to appeal and that the defendant does not obtain a reversal through his or her own inaction. See, e.g., People v. Herron, 215 Ill.2d 167, 175, 294 Ill.Dec. 55, 830 N.E.2d 467 (2005) ; People v. Reid, 136 Ill.2d 27, 38, 143 Ill.Dec. 239, 554 N.E.2d 174 (1990). In light of this, the critical consideration in a case such as this is not which party initiated the in limine litigation, but rather whether the issue being raised was litigated in limine. This is because, irrespective of which party initiates the in limine proceeding, as long as it occurs, the interests served are exactly the same. Here, for example, the trial court was asked before trial to rule upon the admissibility of certain statements. The State fully briefed the arguments for their admissibility, and defendant fully briefed the arguments for their in admissibility. A hearing then was held at which both sides again presented their best arguments to the trial court, and based upon...