People v. Dillon

• Decision Date: 23 December 2011
• Citation: 90 A.D.3d 1468,935 N.Y.S.2d 390,2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 09362
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. David DILLON, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 09362

90 A.D.3d 1468

935 N.Y.S.2d 390

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.David DILLON, Defendant–Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

Dec. 23, 2011.

John A. Herbowy, Rome, for Defendant–Appellant.

John H. Crandall, District Attorney, Herkimer, for Respondent.

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., PERADOTTO, CARNI, GORSKI, AND MARTOCHE, JJ.

MEMORANDUM:

On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of criminal mischief in the third degree (Penal Law § 145.05 [2] ), defendant contends that his plea was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary because he did not understand the plea proceedings or the direct consequences of his plea. Although that contention survives defendant's waiver of the right to appeal, defendant failed to preserve his contention for our review by failing to move to withdraw the plea or to vacate the judgment of conviction ( see People v. Watkins, 77 A.D.3d 1403, 909 N.Y.S.2d 233, lv. denied 15 N.Y.3d 956, 917 N.Y.S.2d 116, 942 N.E.2d 327; People v. Baker, 49 A.D.3d 1293, 852 N.Y.S.2d 867, lv. denied 10 N.Y.3d 932, 862 N.Y.S.2d 338, 892 N.E.2d 404). In any event, defendant's contention is without merit inasmuch as the record establishes that the plea was knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered ( see generally People v. Mullen, 77 A.D.3d 686, 908 N.Y.S.2d 350; People v. Sartori, 8 A.D.3d 748, 749, 777 N.Y.S.2d 792).

We conclude that the People established by a preponderance of the evidence that the two victims sustained out-of-pocket losses in the amounts of $28,543.50 and $9,460, respectively ( see People v. Ford, 77 A.D.3d 1176, 1176–1177, 910 N.Y.S.2d 235, lv. denied 17 N.Y.3d 816, 929 N.Y.S.2d 805, 954 N.E.2d 96; People v. Butler, 70 A.D.3d 1509, 894 N.Y.S.2d 307, lv. denied 14 N.Y.3d 886, 903 N.Y.S.2d 774, 929 N.E.2d 1009; People v. Katovich, 238 A.D.2d 751, 656 N.Y.S.2d 499). By failing to request a hearing on the issue whether he had the ability to pay the amount of restitution ordered by County Court, defendant failed to preserve for our review his further contention that the court failed to consider his ability to pay the restitution ( see Penal Law § 65.10[2][g]; see generally Ford, 77 A.D.3d at 1177, 910 N.Y.S.2d 235; People v. Passalacqua, 43 A.D.3d 964, 840 N.Y.S.2d 915, lv. denied 9 N.Y.3d 1037, 852 N.Y.S.2d 22, 881 N.E.2d 1209). In any event, the record establishes that the presentence report reviewed by the court contained information with respect to defendant's education history and employment income, and thus we conclude that the court considered defendant's ability to pay the restitution pursuant to Penal Law § 65.10(2)(g) ( see People v. Christman, 265 A.D.2d 856, 696 N.Y.S.2d 594, lv. denied 94 N.Y.2d 878, 705 N.Y.S.2d 10, 726 N.E.2d 487). We note that defendant may apply for resentencing pursuant to CPL 420.10(5) and, in the event that the court determines that defendant is unable to pay the restitution “despite sufficient good faith efforts to acquire the resources to do so ... [, it] must consider measures of punishment other than imprisonment” ( People v. Amorosi, 96 N.Y.2d 180, 184, 726 N.Y.S.2d 339, 750 N.E.2d 41; see generally Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 399, 91 S.Ct. 668, 28 L.Ed.2d 130).

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is affirmed.

All concur except CARNI, J., who dissents in part and votes to modify in accordance with the following Memorandum:

I respectfully disagree with the conclusion of my colleagues that defendant failed to preserve for our review his contention that County Court failed to consider his ability to pay the restitution. I also disagree that the record establishes that the court considered defendant's ability to pay the restitution in the total amount of $39,903.68. Therefore, I dissent in part.

Upon his conviction of criminal mischief in the third degree (Penal Law § 145.05[2] ), defendant was sentenced to five years of probation and ordered to pay restitution to two victims in the total amount of $39,903.68, including the 5% surcharge. Defendant's sentence did not include an incarceration component. With respect to the issue of preservation, I note that the majority relies upon People v. Ford, 77 A.D.3d 1176, 910 N.Y.S.2d 235, lv. denied 17 N.Y.3d 816, 929 N.Y.S.2d 805, 954 N.E.2d 96, which did not involve a defendant who was sentenced to probation and ordered to pay restitution as a condition of such probationary sentence but, rather, the defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 2 to 4 years and ordered to pay restitution. Also, the majority relies upon People v. Passalacqua, 43 A.D.3d 964, 840 N.Y.S.2d 915, lv. denied 9 N.Y.3d 1037, 852 N.Y.S.2d 22, 881 N.E.2d 1209, which provides no indication of the nature of the sentence imposed in conjunction with restitution. The nature of the sentence imposed is critical to the preservation analysis because Penal Law § 65.10, entitled “Conditions of probation and of conditional discharge,” permits the court to impose restitution as a condition of the sentence of probation only “in an amount [defendant] can afford to pay” (§ 65.10[2] [g] ). That restitution provision applies exclusively to a sentence of probation with restitution as a condition thereof ( see i...